Problems of Communism

MARCH–APRIL 1977

ASIAN COMMUNISM

China
Harry Harding, Jr.

Japan
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Vietnam
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North Korea
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Book Reviews
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Arnold L. Horelick
Harvey Fireside

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Cover: Asian Communist leaders (clockwise from upper left): Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of the Presidium of the Japan Communist Party; Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party; Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party. First photo from UPI; the others from Camera Press.

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Asian Communism in Flux

EDITORS' NOTE: The 1970's have produced a number of major developments on the Asian Communist scene. Taken together, they suggest that Communist parties in the area have entered a period of complex change. The following articles cover some of these developments. Mr. Harding examines Chinese politics and policies in the post-Mao era, analyzing their implications for the future of the Chinese political system. Mr. Kim discusses the Japanese Communists' electoral setback of December 1976, assessing its impact on the JCP's commitment in recent years to the parliamentary road to power. Mr. Turley examines new directions for postwar Vietnam as signaled by the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party in December 1976, the first such gathering to be held in 16 years. Mr. Lee explores the difficulties encountered by North Korea in its efforts to adjust to the international environment created by the Sino-American détente of the 1970's.

China After Mao

By Harry Harding, Jr.

Speaking at a conference late last December, Chinese Communist leader Hua Kuo-feng called 1976 "a most extraordinary year in the history of our party and of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China."[1] That description may have been an understatement. The death of Chou En-lai in January, the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Acting Premier in February, the Tienanmen riots in April, the subsequent dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing from all his official positions, the death of Chu Te in early July, the enormously destructive earthquakes in North China later in the month, the persistent signs of political disorder and social malaise throughout the country during the summer—all these served only as prelude for the death of Mao Tse-tung on September 9. And then, less than a month later, China experienced its first political convulsion of the post-Mao era. On October 6, Hua Kuo-feng ordered the arrest of the "gang of four"—four leaders closely associated with the Cultural Revolution and with the egalitarian programs it produced. The following day, the Politburo appointed Hua, a man whose principles and qualifications were unknown to most Chinese, to serve as Chairman of both the Central Committee and the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Mr. Harding is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University (Stanford, CA). He is author of several published articles and monographs on Chinese politics and military affairs and is completing a book on bureaucracy in China. He was a member of a delegation from Stanford that visited China in October-November 1976 and witnessed the large demonstrations against the "gang of four" in Peking and Shanghai.

[1] Hua Kuo-feng, "Speech at the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture," Dec. 25, 1976, in *Peking Review* (hereafter *PR*), Jan. 1, 1977, pp. 32-47.

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In a little more than nine months, China had lost its two greatest revolutionary leaders, suffered one of the worst natural disasters of modern times, and seen the death or dismissal of seven members of its party Politburo. It was, indeed, a "most extraordinary year" for the People's Republic of China.

The present essay seeks to answer four sets of questions about these dramatic developments in China. First of all, what sequence of events led to the purge of the "gang of four" in early October? What, in particular, happened in China in the month after Mao's death? Second, why could Hua Kuo-feng move so quickly and decisively against the "gang of four"? What political resources were available to the participants in this final political struggle? Third, what have been the major outlines of Chinese politics, economic policy, and foreign relations since Hua became Party Chairman? How secure and stable does Hua's position appear to be? Finally, what is the general significance of these recent events for the Chinese political system? Do the death of Mao and the purge of the "gang of four" mean, as some observers have speculated, that a process of de-Maoization has already begun, and that the Chinese revolution has effectively been brought to an end?

The Path to the Purge

For the past several months, the Chinese press has been full of detailed and fascinating accounts of the attempts of the "gang of four" to "usurp party and state power" since the 10th CCP Congress in August 1973. While these press materials must be analyzed cautiously, even skeptically, they tend to confirm what most Western observers suspected: that Chinese politics has been characterized by intense conflict, much of it in anticipation of the deaths of both Chou and Mao. They also confirm that the "revolutionary great debates" of the last three years—the campaigns to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to restrict bourgeois rights, to criticize the novel *Water Margin,* to oppose the "rightist attempt to reverse correct verdicts"—were not simply efforts to promote "socialist education" among the Chinese people, as some have suggested, but in fact provided some of the principal arenas in which the political struggle was waged.

Analyzing the participants in this contest is a complicated undertaking. As many thoughtful observers have pointed out, it is an oversimplification to describe Chinese politics since 1973 as a mere debate, or even a power struggle, between two groups with competing ideological principles and policy preferences.[2] It is also true that the terms "moderate" and "radical," because they evoke misleading analogies with similarly named strains in Western political thinking, do not adequately describe the differences between the two groups.[3] Nonetheless, such an approach does provide a convenient way of summarizing the principal developments in China over the past three years.

These two groups—or better, these two political alliances, for each was an amalgam of several political forces—can best be distinguished by the relative priorities they assigned to economic development and socioeconomic equality. The group usually called "moderate" consisted of those leaders who were inclined to emphasize modernization, who believed greater institutional and political stability to be prerequisites for rapid and sustained economic development, and who were willing to accept a certain degree of social and economic inequality for the sake of economic efficiency. The group usually described as "radical," on the other hand, stressed the need to "continue the revolution" and believed strongly that mass mobilization and even political disorder would be necessary to promote socio-economic equality in China. While both groups believed in the desirability of both development and equality, they differed in the priorities they assigned to these sometimes competing goals. In Chinese terms, they resolved the contradiction between "revolution" and "production" in different ways.

Each of these political alliances found support among central leaders, provincial officials, local cadres, military officers, and the masses of ordinary Chinese. It is likely, for example, that the moderates included not only veteran party cadres at both the central and provincial levels, many of whom had been dismissed or demoted during the Cultural Revolution, but also many of China's technicians, managers, skilled workers, and professionally-oriented military officers. In Peking, the most vocal moderate was undoubtedly Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and there is reason to believe that many of his views

[2] See, in particular, John Bryan Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: The Significance of the Color of the Cat," *China Quarterly* (London), September 1976, pp. 457-88.

[3] A good discussion of this problem can be found in Fox Butterfield, "More Moderate Policy for China Indicated in Antileftist Campaign," *The New York Times,* Oct. 22, 1976, pp. A1, A8.

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The "gang of four," leaders of the "radical" grouping within China's political leadership until their purge in October 1976: (from left) Wang Hung-wen, Party Vice-Chairman and member of the Politburo's Standing Committee; Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife and Politburo member; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, member of the Politburo's Standing Committee; and Yao Wen-yüan, Politburo member and prominent radical theoretician.

—Photos by Hugues Vassal/Gamma-Liaison, Henri Bureau/Sygma, Sygmachine, and Charles Paynter/Camera Press.

were shared by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien and Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. The radicals, in contrast, included officials at all levels who had risen to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and who therefore tended to be younger than their moderate counterparts. The radicals could count on support from many students, some writers and intellectuals, and factory and railroad workers. The most important central radicals were, of course, those later identified as the "gang of four": Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, a member of the Politburo; Wang Hung-wen, a Party Vice-Chairman; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, a Vice-Premier, and Director of the General Political Department of the Army; and Yao Wen-yüan, the Politburo member in charge of the party's propaganda apparatus.

This division of the Chinese political spectrum into moderate and radical alliances can be useful provided two important caveats are borne in mind. First of all, many central and provincial leaders, such as Hua Kuo-feng and Wu Te, were not rigidly attached to either of the political alliances. Some probably joined with one alliance on some issues, then switched to the other alliance on other questions. Some people in leadership positions, including many military men, appear to have bided their time, waiting to see which alliance could offer the greatest incentives for their political support. And the country's two top leaders, Mao and Chou En-lai, stayed somewhat above the political battle, seeking to strike a balance between the moderates and radicals—though Chou seemed to lean closer to the moderates than to the radicals in his last years.[4]

Second, superimposed on these political alliances was a network of cliques and rivalries, the participants in which were less concerned with policy issues than with political power and personal status. While it is difficult for any outside observer to identify the personal relationships within the Chinese leadership, it now seems clear that the "gang of four" did constitute a personal faction which sought, through Chiang Ch'ing, to enlist the patronage of Mao Tse-tung, and which tried to create an extensive system of cliental relationships with key provincial leaders, intellectuals, and propagandists. It is likely that there were comparable cliques within the moderate camp as well, perhaps linking Teng Hsiao-p'ing to other veteran military and civilian cadres whom he had helped rehabilitate. And personal rivalries, most of which had emerged from the struggles for power during the Cultural Revolution, continued to plague Chinese politics from the factory and commune level to the Politburo. These two kinds of political cleavage tended to reinforce each other: the network of personal relationships strengthened the competing political alliances while simultaneously intensifying hostility between them.

Although the underlying issues separating radicals and moderates involved, as argued above, the relative priorities to be assigned to economic modernization and socioeconomic equality, the more specific

[4] Cf. analysis presented in Starr, *loc. cit.*

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questions at stake concerned the Cultural Revolution. Should the egalitarian and populist programs of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the areas of education, public health, science and technology, and industrial management, be perpetuated? Or should these "socialist newborn things" be modified or even eliminated for the sake of greater economic efficiency? Should the younger cadres promoted during the Cultural Revolution continue to play an important role in party and state affairs, as part of the "three-in-one" combination of old, middle-aged, and young leaders? Or should veteran officials criticized during the Cultural Revolution be restored to office? Should mass organizations, particularly the trade unions and the militia, be given partial autonomy from party leadership, or should they be brought more firmly under party control? In short, should the patterns of power and policy produced by the Cultural Revolution be retained or abandoned?

The moderates and radicals evaluated the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution in quite different ways. The moderates, given their emphasis on economic modernization, favored the modification of Cultural Revolutionary programs, the rehabilitation of veteran cadres, and the subordination of mass organizations to tight party discipline. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a principal spokesman for the moderate position, is alleged to have criticized the excesses of the Cultural Revolution during 1975 and to have described it as an episode which would best be forgotten.[5] The radicals, on the other hand, advocated the institutionalization of the "newborn things" of the Cultural Revolution, supported the rapid promotion of younger cadres to responsible positions in the party, the government, and the army, and favored granting mass organizations the right to "rebel" against the party if its leadership were deemed "incorrect." Speaking in January 1974, Wang Hung-wen not only defended the necessity of the Cultural Revolution but warned that further Cultural Revolutions "will be carried out many times in the future." [6]

This struggle between moderates and radicals—a struggle for power, a debate over the Cultural Revolution, and a dispute over priorities—occurred in a series of rounds between 1973 and the purge of the "gang of four" in October 1976: the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucious, from late 1973 through mid-1974; the preparations for the Fourth National People's Congress, convened in January

[5] On Teng's views of the Cultural Revolution, see *The Washington Post*, Dec. 7, 1975; and *PR*, July 9, 1976, pp. 9-12.

[6] Wang Hung-wen, "Report to the Central Study Class," Jan. 14, 1974, in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), February 1975, pp. 94-105.

Leading "moderate" elements of the Chinese leadership in 1975-76: (from left) Teng Hsiao-p'ing, former Vice-Chairman of the Chinese CP who was bruited to be Mao's heir apparent until his abrupt dismissal in April 1976; Li Hsien-nien, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China; and Yeh Chien-ying, Party Vice-Chairman and Minister of National Defense.

—Photos by Ledru/Sygma, Wide World, and Keystone.

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1975; the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the spring of 1975; the drafting of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, throughout 1975; the campaign to criticize the novel *Water Margin,* in the summer of 1975; and the campaign against the "rightist reversal of verdicts," from the end of 1975 until Mao's death in September 1976.[7] As a general rule, the radicals sought to wage their struggle against the moderates in the "campaign arena" of Chinese politics, trying to use their influence in the media to mobilize popular indignation against the alleged attempts of the moderates to "negate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." [8] In contrast, the moderates sought to wage their struggle against the radicals in the "bureaucratic arena," attempting to secure the support of party and state officials for greater attention to economic development and threatening to use a party rectification campaign to enforce compliance with their programs. At the same time, the moderates tried to undermine the radicals' campaigns by stressing party leadership over mass activities, calling for unity and discipline, and forbidding the formation of autonomous, Red Guard-style "fighting groups." [9] The radicals in turn, attempted to disrupt the bureaucratic decision-making process by denying publicity to economic planning conferences, blocking the publication of reports and documents with which they disagreed, and obstructing the implementation of national programs.

Without any doubt, the most intense round in this struggle occurred in the late spring and summer of 1976, following the April riots in Tienanmen, the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Premier. Mao's visibly deteriorating health made it clear to all Chinese that the succession was close at hand; and the radicals' failure to secure the appointment of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao as Premier rendered it imperative that they make one last effort to bolster their political position before the Chairman's death.[10] Thus, still claiming that they were resisting a "rightist reversal of verdicts," the radicals launched the most violent mass campaign since the Cultural Revolution, aimed at displacing a large number of rehabilitated provincial-level cadres throughout the country. Veteran cadres were publicly described as being nothing better than "bourgeois democrats" who were "impeding the progress of history."[11] Privately, the radicals went on to say that 75 percent of these older officials were bound to become "capitalist roaders," and that a major organizational readjustment would be necessary to prevent the emergence of revisionism in China.[12]

In this effort to strengthen their political base, the radicals were willing to foment substantial political instability and economic disorder throughout China. Under the slogan "refuse to produce for the wrong political line," radical supporters organized strikes and slowdowns in a large number of cities and along China's railway system.[13] Representatives were dispatched to organize demonstrations against provincial-level officials and to conduct sit-ins in some party and government offices. The radicals commissioned motion pictures dramatizing mass criticism of high-ranking cadres and established underground "liaison offices" to coordinate their activities within a province.[14] The radicals even sought to sustain the momentum of their campaign after the devastating earthquakes in July, asserting that natural disasters were no reason to "brush aside the criticism of Teng Hsiao-p'ing." [15]

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[7] Excellent summaries of the events of this period can be found in Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC) July-August 1976, pp. 1-17; and Starr, *loc cit.*

[8] The concept of "arenas" is drawn from Michel Oksenberg, "The Chinese Policy Process and the Public Health Issue: An Arena Approach," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Winter 1974, pp. 375-408.

[9] For a summary of the political resources available to the radicals and moderates, and the strategies of political struggle they employed, see Kenneth Lieberthal, "Strategies of Conflict in China during 1975-1976," *Contemporary China* (New York, NY), November 1976, pp. 7-14.

[10] On the attempt to have Chang Ch'un-ch'iao named Premier, see *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), Oct. 30, 1976, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (hereafter *FBIS-PRC*—Washington, DC), Nov. 2, 1976, p. E4; and *PR,* Nov. 19, 1976, p. 7. On Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's reaction, see *ibid.*, and Radio Peking, Nov. 21, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC,* Dec. 1, 1976, pp. E11-13.

[11] *Hung-ch'i* (Peking), No. 7, 1976, in *PR,* Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 11-14; also *Hung-ch'i,* No. 6, 1976, in *PR,* June 18, 1976, pp. 7-10, 24; and *PR,* June 25, 1976, pp. 6-9.

[12] Radio Wuhan, Nov. 10, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC,* Nov. 15, 1976, pp. H4-6; also NCNA, Nov. 29, 1976, in *ibid.,* Nov. 30, 1976, pp. E4-7.

[13] In the railway system, the radicals introduced the slogan "Better to have socialist trains run late than revisionist punctuality." *PR,* Nov. 26, 1976, p. 16.

[14] On radical activities in Honan, see Radio Chengchow, Nov. 20, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC,* Nov. 22, 1976, pp. H1-3. On Hangchow, see NCNA, Nov. 11, 1976, in *ibid.,* Nov. 18, 1976, pp. G1-3. On Kiangsi, see Radio Nanchang, Nov. 29, 1976, in *ibid.,* Dec. 1, 1976, pp. G1-7. On Hupeh, see Radio Wuhan, Dec. 8, 1976, in *ibid.,* Dec. 9, 1976, pp. H4-17. On the films commissioned by the radicals, see, *inter alia,* NCNA, Nov. 29, 1976, in *ibid.,* Nov. 30, 1976, pp. E4-7.

[15] *PR,* Nov. 26, 1976, pp. 17-19; for a contemporary editorial warning that some leaders might seek to use relief work to promote a "revisionist line," see *Jen-min Jih-pao* (hereafter *JMJP*—Peking) Aug. 11, 1976, in *PR,* Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 5-6.

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The radicals' campaign served to disrupt the Chinese economy, cause a year's postponement in the implementation of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, paralyze political leadership in some provinces, and contribute to a general breakdown of social order and discipline. Despite these tactical gains, however, the radicals were unable to dislodge very many moderate leaders from their positions. True, two cabinet ministers were apparently dismissed (the Ministers of Education and Railways), along with the director of the New China News Agency, and several provincial leaders may have been suspended from office. But by the end of the summer, the assessment of most observers was that both sides were evenly balanced: the radicals were on the offensive, but the moderates were holding their own.

Then, just after midnight on September 9, Mao Tse-tung passed away. With his death, the struggle between the moderates and radicals entered yet another round. While the basic issues remained much the same, the death of the Chairman raised some more immediate questions to central importance: First, what should be done with Mao's body? Second, who would have control of Mao's papers and supervise the compilation and publication of his post-1949 writings? And third, who would succeed Mao as Chairman of the Central Committee and as Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission?

Little is yet known about the resolution of the first two issues. According to a summary of classified briefings given to Chinese cadres after the purge,[16] Chiang Ch'ing opposed the preservation of Mao's remains, advocating either burial or cremation, while Hua Kuo-feng decided to preserve Mao's body and place it in some kind of memorial hall. Chiang also attempted to secure Mao's last notes and papers from one of his confidential secretaries, but she was forced to return them after Wang Tung-hsing, the Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, informed Hua Kuo-feng what she had done. In each case, Hua's formal position as First Vice-Chairman of the CCP gave him the authority to resolve the issue temporarily, even though he had not yet been officially confirmed as Mao's successor.

But the radicals sought to generate the impression that they, and not Hua, had been selected by a dying Mao to succeed him. To do so, it is now alleged, they fabricated two statements which they said Mao had made shortly before his death. The first statement, transmitted through internal party channels, was said to be Mao's request that the Politburo "help Chiang Ch'ing carry the red banner and . . . not let it fall." [17] The second, which the radicals first published in *Jen-min Jih pao* on September 16, was said to be Mao's final behest: "Act according to the principles laid down." [18] The implication of these two statements was that Mao had decided to entrust China's future to Chiang Ch'ing and had codified some final set of principles to help guide her way. With these statements as justification, the radicals began to mobilize support behind the idea that Chiang Ch'ing should succeed Mao as CCP Chairman.[19] Students at Peking and Tsinghua Universities were asked to write "oaths of fealty" to Chiang Ch'ing, and some of the "gang of four" had their official photographic portraits taken in preparation for the promotions they anticipated.[20]

Convinced that the radicals planned more violence and disorder, Hua Kuo-feng joined with China's moderate civilian and military leaders to resist them.[21] Hua signaled his decision by disputing the authenticity of Mao's supposed request to "act according to the principles laid down." Hua's speech at the memorial meeting for Mao on September 18 contained no mention of this "final behest" but instead included another quotation from the Chairman, "Unite and don't split," [22] as a criticism of the radicals' factional activities. Two weeks later, on October 2, Hua ordered the deletion of a reference to the "principles laid down" from the text of a speech which Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua was scheduled to deliver to the United Nations on October 5,

[16] The summary was carried in *Ming Pao* from Oct. 26 through Nov. 1, 1976, and was translated in *FBIS-PRC*, Oct. 28 through Nov. 3. Enough of the report corresponds with information appearing in the Chinese press to suggest that it is genuine. Whether those findings gave a totally accurate account of events, however, remains to be determined.

[17] *Ming Pao*, Oct. 29, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 1, 1976, pp. E2-4. Rumors of this statement had reached Hong Kong somewhat earlier, where they had been discounted. See *The Washington Post*, Oct. 6, 1976, p. A18.

[18] On the history of this "final behest," see *JMJP*, Dec. 17, 1976, in *PR*, Dec. 24, 1976, pp. 8-12, 32.

[19] It is not known how the radicals planned to allocate other leading party and state offices. Some accounts say Chiang Ch'ing was also to become Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, while others indicate that position was to be given to Wang Hung-wen. *Cf.*, for example, *Ming Pao*, Oct. 29, 1976, *loc. cit.*, and *JMJP*, Dec. 17, 1976, *loc. cit.*

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] For a discussion of Hua's alliance with the moderates, see Lieberthal, *loc. cit.*

[22] "Memorial Speech by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng," Sept. 18, 1976, in *PR*, Sept. 24, 1976, pp. 12-16.

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Members of the CCP Politburo participate in laying the cornerstone for a Mao Tse-tung Memorial Hall on Peking's Tienanmen Square. From left: Wu Kuei-hsien (head only), Wu Te, Chi Teng-k'uei, Li Hsien-nien, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Wang Tung-hsing, and Ch'en Yung-kuei. To the rear, under Mao's portrait is Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, who turned the first shovel of soil at the November 24, 1976, ceremony.

—Camera Press.

denouncing the quotation as an invention.[23] In response, *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* published a vitriolic article by the radical writing group Liang Hsiao which predicted the most dire consequences for anyone who attempted to "tamper with the principles laid down by Chairman Mao." In effect, the radicals had thrown down the gauntlet and challenged Hua's claim to leadership.

At this point, Hua decided that he would have to act preemptively. On October 6, Hua ordered that Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yüan all be placed under arrest. A meeting of the Politburo on October 7 and 8 endorsed Hua's action and adopted a set of resolutions on the other questions at stake: Mao's body would be placed in a crystal sarcophagus in a memorial hall in Peking, the publication of Mao's works would be "under the direct leadership of the Political Bureau . . . headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng," and Hua would become Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and of its Military Affairs Commission.[24]

In attempting to understand the purge of the "gang of four," we are confronted with a paradox. Throughout 1975 and 1976, right up to Mao's death, the radicals appeared to be on the offensive in China. They had secured the dismissal of Teng

[23] *JMJP*, Dec. 17, 1976, *loc. cit.*, says that Hua ordered the phrase deleted "from a document." That the document was the draft of Ch'iao Kuan-hua's United Nations speech is revealed in *Ming Pao*, Oct. 26, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Oct. 28, 1976, p. E3.

[24] The texts of the first two decisions are in *PR*, Oct. 15, 1976, pp. 3-4. The text of the decision naming Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman has never been made public, but it apparently was transmitted through internal party channels.

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Hsiao-p'ing and had launched a major assault against veteran cadres throughout China. The moderates, on the other hand, appeared to be on the defensive, seeking to blunt the scope and effectiveness of the radicals' attack. As late as the National Day celebrations on October 1, the two sides appeared to be evenly balanced.[25] The war of quotations—with the radicals fighting under the slogan of the "principles laid down" and the moderates countering with the phrase "unite and don't split"—seemed to have reached a draw. But five days later, Hua Kuo-feng was able to place the "gang of four" under arrest in a quick, decisive stroke. How could that have been?

Clues to the Radicals' Downfall

The answer lies in the different strategies of political conflict selected by the two sides. The radicals, in essence, were prepared to wage another "revolutionary great debate" after Mao's death, hoping to use their influence in the media and the mass organizations to mobilize a large number of ordinary Chinese workers and students against moderate leadership and programs. But Hua Kuo-feng refused to meet the radicals on their own terms, plotting instead what amounted to a political coup against them. When the final showdown came, Hua had gained enough support to launch his coup, while the resources available to the radicals were neither strong enough nor loyal enough to stop him. What were these resources, and how did they influence the leadership crisis?

1. *The media.* One of the principal political resources available to the radicals was their influence over the central news media, exercised through Yao Wen-yüan's leadership of party propaganda work. But the efficacy of this resource was limited in two ways.

For one thing, the radicals' control over the media was not absolute. While they were able to block the publication of some articles and documents of which they disapproved, and even to prevent much coverage of the death of Chou En-lai, they could not completely deny the moderates access to the media. Thus, in virtually every "revolutionary great debate" from the 10th Party Congress onward, the moderates were able to secure publication of articles and editorials calling for unity, order, and discipline, and thus to vitiate somewhat the impact of the campaigns. Even more important, the usefulness of the media to the radicals depended very much on the area in which the political struggle was to be waged. The media might have helped the radicals to launch mass campaigns against the moderates, but it could do little to protect them against a quick coup. The moderates were able to establish their own control over the media after October 6 and thus limit the radicals' ability to mobilize resistance.

In retrospect, the radicals' influence over the media provided a useful mechanism for guiding the "revolutionary great debates" in China—and helped generate the false impression that the two contending political alliances were evenly balanced. However, when the final showdown came, the media did not provide the radicals with a secure base of power.

2. *The militia.* As indicated above, the radicals had been attempting, ever since the 10th Party Congress, to keep mass organizations relatively independent from party control, so that they could serve as an instrument for criticizing the party leaders and programs considered to be revisionist. The radicals placed particular emphasis on the development of the urban militia, not simply as a reserve force in the case of war but more importantly as an instrument of "class struggle" at home, and hoped to secure its autonomy from control by the party and the military chain-of-command. The aim, as recent accounts have put it, was to turn the militia into a "second armed force" which could resist the army in case of violent political conflict.[26]

In Shanghai, the radicals were relatively successful in creating an independent militia and giving it responsibility for much of the city's public security work. Unfortunately for the radicals, few other provinces adopted the Shanghai model but instead kept the urban militia under joint party and army control. When the "gang of four" was arrested by Hua Kuo-feng in October, the remaining radical leaders were unable to rally the urban militia effectively in their defense. In Shanghai, supporters of the "gang of four" allegedly did give weapons to some 30,000 members of the militia on October 9, but, as we will see below, they decided against any open re-

[25] At the National Day forum, and in the National Day editorial, roughly equal emphasis was given to both moderate and radical positions. On the forum, see *PR*, Oct. 8, 1976, pp. 5-11. The editorial is in *JMJP*, Oct. 1, 1976, in *PR*, Oct. 8, 1976, pp. 12-13.

[26] On the radicals' plans for the militia, see Radio Changsha, Nov. 11, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 12, 1976, pp. H1-6; Radio Changsha, Nov. 19, 1976, in *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1976, pp. H2-4; and *Chieh-fang-chün Pao (hereafter CFCP*—Peking), Nov. 27, 1976, in *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1976, pp. E4-10.

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sistance to Hua once they realized that the nationwide situation was hopeless.[27]

3. *The military.* The radicals' attempt to create an independent urban militia illustrates their understanding that the military—the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—still played a crucial role in Chinese politics, even though its participation in civilian affairs had declined substantially since the purge of Lin Piao in 1971. For one thing, military officers still occupied nearly 45 percent of the provincial party secretaryships.[28] For another, three regional military commanders—Ch'en Hsi-lien, Hsü Shih-yu, and Li Te-sheng—were full members of the party Politburo, along with Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. And most important, it was obvious that the PLA would become even more deeply involved in civilian affairs if the struggle for power in China became too violent or chaotic.

The radicals' interest in the urban militia was only one way of responding to the potential political power of the PLA. There are plausible, but as yet unverified, reports that Chiang Ch'ing hoped to gain the support of the Chinese navy in her struggle against the moderates. She may have sponsored the navy's successful assault against the Paracel Islands occupied by South Vietnam in early 1974 [29] and then may have proposed a political alliance with Su Chen-hua, the navy's political commissar and an alternate member of the Politburo. As one account of Chiang Ch'ing's political strategy put it:

Although it did not have many large vessels, the PLA navy did have many crack troops [probably marines], *formed mainly from the second field army. Without*

[27] *The New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1976, pp. 1, 9.

[28] For an analysis of provincial leadership as of December 1975, see Robert A. Scalapino, "The CCP's Provincial Secretaries," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1976, pp. 18-35.

[29] Radio Canton, Nov. 19, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 22, 1976, pp. H11-14.

Members of China's People's Liberation Army bear portraits of Hua Kuo-feng at an October 24, 1976, rally in Peking's Tienanmen Square, celebrating Hua's selection as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and head of its Military Commission.

—Gamma-Liaison.

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the presence of other factions [i.e., officers from other field armies], *the navy enjoyed unified command. At the same time, it was stationed in one place* [i.e., in relatively few naval bases like Shanghai, rather than dispersed over the country like the army and air force]. *The "gang of four" would have had a powerful force if it had obtained the support of the navy.*[30]

In addition, the radicals hoped that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's position as head of the PLA General Political Department could provide a way of weakening the authority of unfriendly military commanders. On March 1, 1975, Chang convened a forum of military officers to discuss the campaign, then underway, to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The principal problem in the PLA, Chang allegedly declared, was "empiricism"—the tendency to value experience and practical knowledge more highly than ideological sophistication. Apparently, the radicals hoped to develop a campaign against empiricism into a "house-cleaning in the army," in which they could dislodge "a large number of highly-experienced war-tested veteran cadres . . . and replace them with their own people." The PLA's commanders were a bunch of "old fellows," the radicals declared; it was necessary to promote some younger officers, even those in their 30's, to command positions.[31]

Once again, however, the radicals were not able to accomplish all that they had hoped. While they may have gained supporters within some military units, the bulk of the PLA remained loyal to the central command of Defense Minister Yeh.[32] Su Chen-hua not only was unresponsive to Chiang Ch'ing's overtures but promptly reported them to Hua Kuo-feng.[33] Thus, when the showdown came, the PLA sided with Hua. The elite Peking guard unit (Unit 8341) under Wang Tung-hsing most likely arrested the four, and the Peking garrison forces, under Ch'en Hsi-lien, turned out *en masse* to support Hua Kuo-feng in the demonstrations in Peking between October 21 and 23. In short, instead of supporting the radicals, the PLA played the decisive role in bringing Hua Kuo-feng to power.

4. *The provinces.* As already noted, one important goal of the radicals between 1973 and 1976 was to halt the rehabilitation of veteran cadres to serve as party secretaries in the provinces; to secure the promotion of younger, more radical officials; and thus to gain important bases of support outside Peking. During the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius in 1973-74, radicals subjected provincial and municipal leaders in Peking, Heilungkiang, Hunan, Shensi, and Yunnan to intense criticism; during the campaign against "rightist reversal of verdicts" in 1975-76, their principal targets appear to have been Chekiang, Fukien, Honan, Hupeh, Shansi, and Szechwan. In addition, incidents involving violence or disruption of normal political and economic activities have been reported in 10 other provinces.[34]

For all this effort, however, the radicals' accomplishments were not impressive. Shanghai was their principal base, with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan, and Wang Hung-wen holding the three top positions in the city's party committee. In addition, the radicals had significant support in Liaoning, where Mao's nephew Mao Yüan-hsin served as a party secretary.[35] Elsewhere, they appear to have had enough support to be disruptive but not enough to enable them to prevent the moderates from seizing power at the center.

The reaction by Shanghai leaders to Hua Kuo-feng's coup illustrates the weakness of the radicals. According to a fascinating account by Ross Munro, based largely on wall posters displayed in Shanghai after the purge, Shanghai leaders considered calling a general strike, declaring that Shanghai was in revolt against a "revisionist" takeover in Peking, and mobilizing the militia to defend the city, but decided not to act after they realized that resistance was futile.[36]

5. *Popular support.* Above all, the radicals hoped that their principal base of support could be found among the masses of ordinary Chinese workers and

[30] *Ming Pao*, Oct. 29, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 1, 1976, pp. E2-4. On the field armies as a basis for the formation of cliques and factions in Chinese politics, see William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1973, esp. Ch. 12.

[31] Radio Canton, Nov. 19, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 22, 1976, pp. H11-14; *PR*, Dec. 10, 1976, pp. 13-15; and Wang Hung-wen, *loc. cit.*

[32] Some reports state the 15,000 regular PLA troops in Paoting sided with the radicals, at least temporarily. *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Jan. 17, 1977, pp. 33-34.

[33] *Ming Pao*, Oct. 29, 1976, *loc. cit.* That Su Chen-hua remained loyal to Hua is illustrated by his appointment as second secretary in Shanghai shortly after the purge of the "gang of four."

[34] For a map of these disturbances, see *Newsweek*, Jan. 17, 1977, pp. 33-34.

[35] In an informal meeting of provincial party leaders on Oct. 7, Hua Kuo-feng is said to have singled out Liaoning and Shanghai for attention, remarking that "the question of Liaoning province is not serious" but that "Shanghai municipality is in a quagmire and must be handled without delay." *Ming Pao*, Nov. 1, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 3, 1976, p. E3.

[36] *The New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1976, pp. 1, 9.

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peasants, who they believed had benefited from the programs of the Cultural Revolution and could be relied upon to support them. In this vein, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao wrote optimistically in February 1976 that the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Acting Premier would ultimately fail because it did not "represent the interest of the people" and because "the people are the decisive factor." [37] The "revolutionary great debates" of the 1970's represented the radicals' effort to mobilize mass support for their programs and demonstrate that support to their rivals.

It is not clear what role public opinion played in the final outcome. It could be that Hua Kuo-feng was willing to move in the face of popular opposition, calculating that the support of the military would enable him to gain quick control over the media and that without access to the media the radicals could not effectively mobilize popular resistance. It could be that Hua counted on the military to conduct quick raids against radical strongholds, such as Peking and Tsinghua Universities, arresting radical leaders and thus thwarting any movement to oppose him. It is possible, in short, that Hua Kuo-feng was able to act successfully in defiance of popular opinion.

It is not likely that Hua had to do so, however. While it is extremely difficult to gauge the mood of the Chinese people, the available evidence suggests that the "gang of four," at least as individuals, did not enjoy substantial popular support. A sense of relaxation, even exhilaration, was evident to foreign visitors in both Peking and Shanghai in the days following the purge. As compared to the demonstrations against Teng Hsiao-p'ing in April, the demonstrations against "the four" in Peking in October were larger, more enthusiastic, and apparently more spontaneous.[38] While Chiang Ch'ing and others doubtless had their supporters, a large number of Chinese—in all probability the majority—had come to consider them to be unworthy and incapable as leaders, hypocritical as revolutionaries, and petty and scheming in their quest for power.

6. *Mao.* In the final analysis, however, the key to the fate of the radicals was Mao Tse-tung. Alive, Mao had been willing to create a balance between moderates and radicals; dead, Mao could no longer intervene to protect the radicals from their opponents.

Mao's role in the struggle between moderates and radicals in the last years of his life may never be completely clear. But the most plausible account is that Mao was not firmly linked to either of the two political alliances. Despite the version of history now being presented by China's current leaders, Mao did much to support the radicals. He was the sponsor, if not the initiator, of all the political campaigns between 1973 and 1976. His intervention ensured the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. And his widely cited comments in early 1976 that "the capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road," that "the bourgeoisie is right in the Communist Party," and that "a number of party members have moved backward and opposed the revolution" helped justify the radicals' attempt to extend the criticism of Teng into an assault against all veteran cadres.

At the same time, there is little reason to doubt that Mao was also warning Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yüan not to form a faction, not to pursue "wild ambitions," and not to "function as a gang of four." Moreover, even if Mao did agree to the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, he clearly did not agree to the radicals' demands that Wang Hung-wen receive an important government position at the Fourth National People's Congress (held in January 1975), or that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao be named Premier to succeed Chou En-lai. Instead, Mao named, or at least agreed to name, Hua Kuo-feng as his heir presumptive in April 1976, despite the intense opposition of the radicals.[39]

Thus, as in so many things, Mao's role during the political struggles of the 1970's was a complex, even ambivalent one. But it does appear that, while criticizing the "four," Mao was simultaneously protecting, even supporting, them and that his death was the factor that precipitated their downfall.

One must conclude the story of the "gang of four" by noting some possible strategic errors on their part. Why, for example, did they level such harsh criticisms against Chou En-lai, a man whose opposition they need not have incurred, and whose tolerance would have been most advantageous? Why did they launch such a strong attack against veteran cadres in mid-1976, a move which only consolidated the opposition against them? And why, finally,

[37] This is a passage from a short essay entitled "Thoughts on February 3, 1976," The text is in *Ming Pao*, Oct. 30, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 2, 1976, p. E5. The existence of the essay is confirmed in *PR*, Jan. 14, 1977, p. 29.

[38] *The New York Times*, Oct. 22, 1976, p. A8; and Agence France-Presse (hereafter AFP), Oct. 21, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Oct. 22, 1976, pp. E4-5.

[39] For a chronology highlighting Mao's criticisms of the "gang of four," see *PR*, Jan. 14, 1977, pp. 27-31.

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An example of partial mechanization of the wheat harvest at a commune in Chucheng County of Shantung Province in 1975.

—Camera Press.

did they attempt to fabricate Mao's final instructions so soon after the Chairman's death? Did they correctly regard these as necessary efforts to forestall a moderate move against them? Or were they underestimating their own ability to survive? The greatest irony of all is that their chances of political survival might have been better had they not struggled so hard.

Whither China Now?

Since the purge of the "gang of four" in October, there have been signs of new directions in China, particularly with regard to economic policy, but also indications of both uncertainty and controversy among Chinese leaders about the future course they want to pursue. Those indications are strong enough, in fact, to raise questions about the unity and stability of China's first post-Mao regime.

China's course seems clearest in the areas of economic development and foreign trade. In the economic sphere, Chinese leaders have decided to give renewed emphasis to increasing production and promoting modernization in both industry and agriculture. The goal of accomplishing the "comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century"—emphasized by Chou En-Lai in his report to the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975 but criticized by the radicals during the campaign against a "rightist reversal of verdicts"—has been reinstated, and the "gang of four" have been accused of lacking both an interest in economic production and an understanding of economic problems.[40] As part of their renewed emphasis on economic modernization, the Chinese have begun a series of planning conferences to map out short-term and long-term development programs. A national conference on agriculture—the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai—was held in Peking in December 1976 to reiterate the importance of mechanization and capital construction in the countryside. Smaller conferences have also been held to discuss railroads, chemical industry, oil refining, coal mining, and light industry. A conference on "learning from Taching" in industry is scheduled for the spring, and yet another agricultural conference is planned for the summer.[41]

The Chinese have indicated that foreign trade and technological exchanges will play an important part in this development program. The radicals' argument that importing advanced technology meant "servility to things foreign," or even "capitulationism and national betrayal," has been rejected. Instead, Chinese leaders now say that the "planned and selective procurement of foreign advanced technology" can be fully compatible with Mao's policy of "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands." While the Chinese still insist that there can be no foreign investment in China and that the country must not become a "dumping ground for foreign goods," they now seem to accept the notion that importing machinery and complete plants for China's coal, petrochemical, and consumer-goods industries can help "increase China's strength in developing her economic reconstruction self-reliantly." [42]

[40] *JMJP*, Nov. 14, 1976, in *PR*, Nov. 26, 1976, pp. 12-14.

[41] Hua Kuo-feng, *loc. cit.*; Ch'en Yung-kuei, "Thoroughly Criticize the 'Gang of Four' and Bring About a New Upsurge in the Movement to Build Tachai-Type Counties Throughout the Country," Dec. 20, 1976, in *PR*, Jan. 7, 1977, pp. 5-17; and *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1976, pp. 17-28, 24.

[42] Articles and broadcasts indicating a greater receptivity to trade include Radio Canton, Nov. 15, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 16, 1976, pp. E12-13; *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Nov. 10, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 22, 1976, pp. E11-13; NCNA, Nov. 22, 1976, in *ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1976, pp. E9-12; and *JMJP*, Nov. 22, 1976.

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In foreign affairs more generally, the emphasis thus far has been on continuity. Ever since the purge of the "gang of four" in October, the Chinese have repeatedly pledged to "continue to carry out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs." The dismissal of Ch'iao Kuan-hua as Foreign Minister in December has not had any extensive effect on this basic position. Although there was immediate speculation that the purge of the "four" might mean closer ties with the United States, there has been little dramatic change in Sino-American relations.[43] Similarly, despite conjecture that Mao's death might permit a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union, the Chinese have thus far rejected several overtures from Moscow, describing them as "poisoned arrows" disguised as an olive branch.[44] While readjustment of China's international posture cannot be ruled out for the future, the assumptions, goals, and policies of the last seven to eight years still seem very much intact.

Despite these areas of apparent consensus, there have been signs of disagreement and debate on other policy questions. The most basic domestic issue—whether to abandon, modify, or maintain the egalitarian programs of the Cultural Revolution—still appears unresolved. Both Hua Kuo-feng and Wu Te, the Mayor of Peking, have tended to emphasize the need to support the "newborn things" of the Cultural Revolution. In his report to the Tachai Conference, for example, Hua declared:

It is essential to defend and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and continue to do a good job in the revolution in the fields of education, literature and art, public health, and science and technology, do our work well for the educated youth going to the countryside, encourage new socialist things, [and] restrict bourgeois rights. . . .[45]

Yet some provincial leaders have been slow to defend the programs of the Cultural Revolution, and even the important annual New Year's Day editorial

[43] See Allen S. Whiting, "Now, Closer US Relations with China—Perhaps," *The New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1976.

[44] *PR*, Nov. 19, 1976, pp. 9-10; AFP, Nov. 1, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 2, 1976, pp. A2-4. For speculation on the nature of the Soviet overtures, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Dec. 31, 1976, pp. 18-19.

[45] Hua Kuo-feng, *loc. cit.* See also Wu Te's speech at the Peking rally celebrating the purge of the "gang of four," Oct. 24, 1976, in *PR*, Oct. 29, 1976, pp. 12-14; and his report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1976, pp. 10-12.

Premier Hua Kuo-feng exhorts cadres and miners of the Tangshan mine of the Kailuan coal center to work in unity and restore earthquake-disrupted production as soon as possible.

—Camera Press.

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in *Jen-min Jih-pao* in 1977 passed rather lightly over the "victories of the Great Cultural Revolution."[46] Given the vehemence with which Teng Hsiao-p'ing criticized Cultural Revolutionary programs in 1975, particularly in the areas of education, science and technology, and industrial management, and given the support Teng attracted, the possibility exists that there is substantial disagreement among Chinese leaders over the desirability of modifying these "socialist newborn things."

A second area of possible controversy concerns strategic policy. The apparent influence of important military commanders in the purge of the "gang of four" has increased the likelihood that military modernization will receive higher priority, following a general decline in military procurement since 1971. And, indeed, articles appearing in *Chieh-fang-chün Pao,* the PLA newspaper, have accused the "gang of four" of opposing the modernization of the PLA, of attempting to restrict the development of advanced weapons, and of interfering with China's space program.[47] But the military's interest in more modern weapons, while unlikely to be denied altogether, has not yet received Hua Kuo-feng's endorsement. It may be revealing that the 1975 New Year's Day editorial, written at the height of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's influence, specifically mentioned national defense industry as an important target for investment, while Hua Kuo-feng's speech to the Tachai Conference last December did not mention national defense industry at all. This apparent discrepancy between Hua's views and the opinions of the military may indicate disagreement among Chinese leaders on the appropriate level of defense spending.

A third area of controversy concerns the "rectification" of the party and government, already scheduled for 1977. The principal issue at stake is the degree to which rectification should entail a large-scale dismissal of cadres and party members who were promoted or recruited during the Cultural Revolution and who may well retain relatively radical policy preferences. In this debate, Hua Kuo-feng, Wu Te, and Vice-Premier Ch'en Yung-kuei have all come out strongly for leniency. Hua has consistently advocated that the followers of the "gang of four," even "those who participated in the conspiracy," should be "reeducated" and permitted to retain their positions and their party memberships. In so doing, he has frequently referred to Mao's policy of "curing the illness to save the patient" and has argued that a Draconian purge would only be implementing the organizational policies of the "gang of four."[48] Speaking more specifically of rural leadership, Ch'en Yung-kuei has argued that agricultural development requires that "a relative stability of cadres must be maintained at the grass-roots level."[49]

Others, particularly in the army, have issued strongly-worded demands for a more sweeping purge of the party. An editorial in *Chieh-fang-chün Pao,* for example, insisted:

We must not be equivocal or soft towards this gang of ferocious class enemies. We must mercilessly expose and roundly criticize them, thoroughly repudiate them, and resolutely and completely overthrow them. To be kind to them would be a crime against the people.[50]

Even the New Year's Day editorial criticized any possibility of being "kind-hearted towards this counterrevolutionary sinister gang"; instead of mentioning Mao's phrase "cure the illness to save the patient," it called for "life-and-death struggle" against the followers of the "gang of four."[51]

Signs of uncertainty also surround the redistribution of political power in Peking following the October purges. As of February, despite a month of rumors, the Chinese had still not formally announced the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, appointed a new Premier, or filled the nine vacancies on the Politburo. This delay may well involve a dispute over the future roles to be played by, among others, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Wu Te, and Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien. If wall posters appearing in Peking in January are any measure, there seem to be conflicting views on this issue. Some posters supported the appointment of Wu Te as Chairman of the National People's Congress, while others denounced him as a follower of Chiang Ch'ing. Some posters implied that Li Hsien-nien, who has been serving effectively as Acting Premier since October, should be formally named Prime Minister, while others demanded that Teng Hsiao-p'ing be rehabilitated and given the post.[52]

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[46] "Advance from Victory to Victory," *JMJP*, Jan. 1, 1977, in *PR*, Jan. 1, 1977, pp. 45-47.

[47] *CFCP*, Nov. 27, 1976, in *FBIS-PRC*, Nov. 29, 1976, pp. E4-10; see also *The New York Times*, Dec. 9, 1976, p. 10; and *PR*, Dec. 10, 1976, p. 5.

[48] See, for example, Hua Kuo-feng, *loc. cit.*

[49] Ch'en Yung-kuei, *loc. cit.*

[50] *CFCP*, Nov. 22, 1976, in *PR*, Dec. 3, 1976, pp. 8-10.

[51] "Advance from Victory to Victory," *loc. cit.*

[52] *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1977, p. 3; Jan. 10, 1977, p. 2; Jan. 11, 1977, p. 3.

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The significance of these wall posters remains to be seen. But they probably indicate that Hua is facing substantial pressure from the right for a "reversal of verdicts" on the Cultural Revolution. Wu Te, under this interpretation, may be under attack for his apparent opposition to any dramatic departure from the social, economic, and personnel policies of the Cultural Revolution and for his advocacy of leniency for the followers of the "gang of four." Teng Hsiao-p'ing may, in similar fashion, be seen as the principal spokesman for substantial modifications of Cultural Revolution programs. If this interpretation is correct, then the apparent debate over the future of the "socialist newborn things" may have begun to affect the appointment of a new central leadership.

These signs of disagreement and uncertainty—over Cultural Revolution programs, military affairs, central leadership, and party rectification—raise some questions about the stability of the present political situation in China. Despite the relative ease with which the attack against the "gang of four" was conducted, China's immediate political future may not be as untroubled as it first appears.

Much depends on the answers to two crucial questions. First, how much support for radical policy positions and for Cultural Revolution programs exists in China? It would be naive to suppose that the Chinese Communist Party, some 10 million of whose 30 million members joined since the Cultural Revolution, no longer contains any radical supporters or even that the Central Committee, many of whose members were activists in the Cultural Revolution, would wholeheartedly support an abandonment of the "socialist newborn things." In particular, younger cadres throughout the country, many of whom owe their positions to the Cultural Revolution and to the personnel policies of the radicals, may constitute important potential opposition to any attempt by China's leaders to move sharply to the right. Hua Kuo-feng's advocacy of a lenient party rectification program and his public defense of the "newborn things" of the Cultural Revolution both suggest that he clearly perceives a powerful political force to the left.

Second, how much support exists in China for a virtual repudiation of the Cultural Revolution and for the adoption of programs that stress economic development to the virtual exclusion of socio-economic equality? How much support would there be for a sweeping purge of the party? The key here may well be the PLA, whose commanders' views are not yet clearly known. Much depends, too, on whether veteran party moderates can form a strong alliance with moderates in the military, or whether differences over such questions as civil-military relations and the defense budget will keep the right divided.

The greatest uncertainty facing China, then, is the distribution of power and opinion along China's political spectrum. Hua Kuo-feng, Wu Te, and other leaders seem to be striking a centrist position, attempting to build a coalition around a program which stresses economic development and political stability without ignoring revolution.[53] If the left is now weak and if the demands of the right remain muted—if, in other words, the death of Mao and the purge of the "gang of four" have indeed ended a decade of polarization in Chinese politics—then Hua's chances for forming this new centrist coalition are good, and the prospects for China are bright. If, on the other hand, the radicals remain strong and defiant, while the moderates are unyielding—if Chinese politics remains polarized—then the possibility of conflict, even disorder, remains. For while Hua Kuo-feng may hope that, like Mao, he will be able to balance the forces of left and right, he may find it difficult to do so. Despite the attempt to build a personality cult around him,[54] Hua still lacks Mao's special blend of moral authority and personal charisma; and it remains to be seen whether Hua shares Mao's skill in political maneuver and willingness to take political risks. If the situation remains polarized, then Hua may be caught between political forces he is unable to control. If Hua was "walking a precarious political tightrope" last summer, his task may be no easier today.[55]

Some Conjectures About the Future

The dramatic events in China in 1976—particularly the death of Mao and the purge of the "gang of four"—have already led to speculation about the fate of the Maoist revolution. Some outside observers, both journalists and scholars, have begun

[53] For an early discussion of the possibility that Hua, Wu, and others might represent an emerging centrist coalition, see Fox Butterfield, "The Intriguing Matter of Mao's Successor," *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 1, 1976, pp. 12-13, 37ff.

[54] For articles exemplifying the effort to develop Hua's personal prestige, see *CFCP*, Oct. 29, 1976, in *PR*, Nov. 5, 1976; *CFCP*, Nov. 8, 1976, in *PR*, Nov. 19, 1976, pp. 7-8; and *PR*, Nov. 26, 1976, pp. 6-10.

[55] Chang, *loc. cit.*

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to advance the theme that the events of 1976 may have signaled the end of the Maoist revolution in China. American columnist Jack Anderson, for example, has described the purge of the "gang of four" as nothing less than a posthumous "military coup against Mao." [56] David Bonavia, writing in the *Far Eastern Economic Review,* has argued that a "de-Maoization process" has already begun, and has predicted that by the 1990's "the Chinese political atmosphere can be expected to be heavy with stagnation, elitism, bureaucratism, and related ills." [57] Kenneth Lieberthal, while making no predictions, has raised the question as to whether China is "on the threshold of a far more centralized and authoritarian polity." [58]

It is obviously premature, some five months after Mao's death, to forecast the fate of the revolutionary values he espoused or the social experiment he created. Nonetheless, a preliminary assessment may help stimulate or even focus future consideration of this vital question. To begin with, we need to consider what is meant by such terms as "the end of the Maoist revolution." The concluding section of this article will discuss four possible meanings of that term—de-Maoization, deradicalization, demobilization, and stratification—and offer some preliminary speculation about the likelihood that each process might take place.

1. *De-Maoization.* One of the principal characteristics of the Chinese political system since 1949, and especially since 1957, has been the prominent roles assigned to Mao Tse-tung and to his political ideas. Maoism (or, to give it its proper name, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought) has served as one of the most fundamental sources of legitimacy for the regime and as an important guide to policy-making and political action, while Mao himself has played a central role as political arbiter, legitimater, and initiator. The roles of Mao and Maoism have always been controversial: some Chinese leaders have supported the institutionalization of the party as an alternative source of legitimacy, some have advocated policies that departed from Maoist values, and some have attempted to relegate Mao to a less prominent position in Chinese politics. Now that Mao is dead, what likely role will his memory and his ideology play in China in the years to come?

One possibility, following the Soviet example, would be an explicit denunciation of Mao's errors, and a posthumous reevaluation of his role in contemporary Chinese history. It seems to the writer that this is unlikely to occur. For one thing, Mao is more a Lenin than a Stalin: he was the principal founder of the Chinese Communist movement, and it would be extraordinarily difficult to keep the movement intact if its founder were denounced. For another, there is no real need to condemn Mao: scapegoats have already been found for most of his errors, and his writings are complex enough that they can be manipulated to justify virtually any policy. The costs to the party of renouncing Mao would be infinitely greater than any possible gains.

A much more likely possibility is that Maoism, while maintained officially as the ideological basis of the Chinese political system, might gradually become routinized, losing much of its role as a guide to policy-making and to political action and serving more as a means of legitimating policies arrived at pragmatically. Given the problems associated with ideological politics—especially the tendencies toward dogmatism, impracticality, and polarization—some degree of "pragmatization" is virtually inevitable as China returns to an emphasis on economic development and political stability. But it would be unwise to forecast the "end of ideology" in China, just as it proved premature to do so for Western Europe and the United States. Ideology provides a vocabulary for discussing and debating the allocation of scarce economic and political resources, and the assignment of priorities to competing goals and values. In this sense, the "end of ideology," should it ever occur, would essentially signify the attainment of such economic abundance, social justice, and political freedom that questions of allocation were no longer controversial. Since China is not likely to enter such a state soon, no matter how much attention is given to economic modernization, concern over ideological questions is not likely to end.

What may happen, of course, is that China experiences not so much "pragmatization" as revisionism: the redefinition of ideology to stress different values, justify new programs, explain new situations, and meet the needs of new leaders. Revisionism, should it occur, would almost certainly mean less attention to such Maoist values as egalitarianism, voluntarism, mobilization, and selflessness, and greater emphasis on production, discipline, material welfare, and "distribution according to work."

The mechanisms for creating a revisionist version

[56] *San Francisco Chronicle*, Jan. 7, 1977.
[57] David Bonavia, "The Demaoisation Process," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 19, 1976, pp. 8-10.
[58] Lieberthal, *loc. cit.*

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of Maoism are already in place, if Chinese leaders care to use them. The editing and publication of Mao's post-1949 writings, announced by the Politburo on October 8, will provide many occasions for a reinterpretation of Maoism. The posthumous canonization of the "beloved and esteemed Premier Chou En-lai" similarly offers Chinese leaders the opportunity to synthesize Chou's values and programs with those of Mao and perhaps to create a new body of doctrine which future generations may know as "Maoism-Chouism."

It is important to reiterate, however, that these mechanisms need not be used to produce any drastic change in the content of Chinese ideology. The one work of Mao thus far republished since his death, a 1956 disquisition "On the Ten Major Relationships," seems true to the original, with the most important editorial change being the addition of references explicitly critical of the Soviet Union.[59] The discussions of Chou's life have thus far portrayed the Premier as a loyal lieutenant of Mao and have not yet been used to introduce any values or programs that would represent a departure from those of the late Chairman.[60] Indeed, the likelihood that Chinese leaders will actually attempt to "revise" Maoism depends very much on the extent to which Maoist values are widely held throughout China—a subject which deserves separate consideration.

2. *Deradicalization.* Revisionism would be possible in China only if support for Maoist values and programs among officials, lower-level cadres, and ordinary people had declined so much that Maoism had virtually lost its power as a political belief system in China. So important would such a development be, in fact, that it would represent a second possible meaning of the term, "the end of the revolution."

Some observers have argued that deradicalization of the Chinese people has already taken place. David Bonavia, for example, has written that the "glee" with which the Chinese people have welcomed the purge of the "gang of four" reflects the fact that "in their hearts" they "know that it is Mao and Maoism that are really under attack." "Most of [Mao's] policies since 1966 have been unpopular," Bonavia continues; "Mao outlived his genuine popularity among the people." [61]

Gauging the mood and political attitudes of the Chinese people is perhaps the most difficult task in the study of contemporary China. It may well be that Bonavia is right, but the writer would suggest caution in accepting his conclusion. For one thing, it is important to make a distinction between *radicals* and *radicalism.* To say that many Chinese were pleased to see the purge of the "gang of four" need not imply that they would all be equally pleased to see the abandonment of the programs with which the "four" were associated. For another, one should make a distinction between radicalism and Maoism. As suggested above, Mao was not clearly identified with the radicals during the last years of his life, or even during the Cultural Revolution, but instead sought to balance radicals against moderates to create a synthesis that preserved the best features of both. That there was "glee" at the purge of the "four," therefore, need not imply that there would be wide support for the rejection of Maoist values.

On the contrary, it seems equally plausible that Maoism—with its emphasis on participatory, egalitarian, and communitarian values as well as on the search for national wealth and power—will continue to be attractive to many in China, not only to those who are near the bottom of the social, economic, and political hierarchies but also to many intellectuals and officials who believe in the Maoist vision. The purge of the "four," the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and the death of Mao may indeed have reduced the appeal of this vision. But even if Maoism becomes a kind of counterculture in Chinese politics, it may well retain enough strength to hinder the emergency of revisionism.

3. *Demobilization.* Another important feature of the revolutionary system in China has been its reliance on mass mobilization to promote economic development, to conduct political education, and, most recently, to wage political struggle. In the Chinese context, therefore, the "end of the revolution" might mean a decreasing reliance on mass mobilization and an evolution toward a more regularized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic system.

In some ways, this transformation has already occurred. In the social and economic spheres, as Michel Oksenberg has pointed out, most of the tasks for which mass mobilization was appropriate have already been accomplished—land reform, collectivization, communization, the implementation of the marriage law, and the like.[62] One is hard pressed, in

[59] Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Major Relationships," April 25, 1956, in *PR*, Jan. 1, 1977, pp. 10-25.

[60] See, in particular, *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1977, pp. 8-21.

[61] Bonavia, *loc. cit.*

[62] Michel Oksenberg, "Political Changes and Their Causes in China, 1949-1972," *Political Quarterly* (London), January-March 1974, pp. 95-114.

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fact, to think of a major campaign in the economic area since the Great Leap Forward. There have been movements to implement certain policies, to be sure, such as the present movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture, but these have not seemed to involve the same degree of concentrated, highly mobilized activity as the great campaigns of the 1950's.

On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the campaign style will die out so easily in the ideological and organizational spheres. It is likely, instead, that we will continue to see educational campaigns directed at the people and rectification campaigns directed at the party, the state, and even the army. In a poor country, with scarce economic resources, material incentives will be difficult to provide; and the normative incentives afforded by campaigns will continue to be an important instrument of political control. These campaigns may be more closely guided and more tightly organized than those of the past decade—they may thus resemble the Socialist Education Movement of the early 1960's more than the Cultural Revolution—but they will still be campaigns. It may be indicative of the usefulness of campaign techniques to Chinese leaders that no fewer than three political campaigns have been scheduled for 1977: a "mass movement to expose and criticize the 'gang of four,' " an "education movement in Marxist ideology," and a "movement of party consolidation and rectification." [63]

The area of Chinese life in which the fate of mass mobilization is least clear is political conflict. The Cultural Revolution, perhaps Mao's most worrisome legacy, represented his attempt to mobilize the urban masses in his conflict with central and provincial party officials. The "revolutionary great debates" of the 1970's were a similar attempt by the radicals to generate mass support in their struggle with the moderates. These two episodes served to legitimate the use of mass mobilization as an instrument of political struggle, but they also demonstrated the ease with which mass mobilization could degenerate into violence and disorder. It remains to be seen whether Mao's successors will be tempted to continue to use mass mobilization in this way or whether they have come to fear the possible political and economic consequences. It also remains to be seen whether, in Mao's absence, any other leader will develop the ability to authorize the use of such a potentially dangerous political weapon.

4. *Stratification.* In its fullest form the "end of revolution" argument holds that as Maoism becomes routinized, as revisionism begins, as Chinese politics becomes increasingly bureaucratic, and as Chinese leaders become more concerned with problems of economic development, there will be few forces left to halt tendencies toward social and economic inequality in China. Ultimately, the argument runs, China will see the emergence of a "new class" of government administrators and party bureaucrats, desirous to gain and hold social, economic, and political privileges, and essentially outside the control of any countervailing political force.

In evaluating this argument, it is obvious that the fate of egalitarianism in China depends very much on the fate of Maoism, radicalism, and mass mobilization. If Maoism survives as a political belief system, the justification of substantial inequality will be made more difficult. If radicalism survives as a potent political force, and if mass mobilization is still used as an instrument of political struggle, the tendencies toward stratification may be somewhat checked.

Perhaps more important, even if China does see a tendency toward more pragmatic, moderate, and bureaucratic politics, there may still be limits on the degree of inequality the system can tolerate. Increasing wage differentials in the cities may indeed provide greater economic incentives, but they may also exacerbate the urban-rural gap, promote discontent among peasants and less-skilled workers, and even stimulate pressures for migration from the countryside to urban areas.

TO SUM UP, it is difficult to say whether the "revolution" has actually "ended" in China, largely because the revolution itself has so many dimensions and so many meanings. In some respects—such as mass mobilization in the economic sphere—the "revolution" may have ended 15 years ago. In other areas—such as mass political campaigns—the "revolution" seems very much alive. In other areas, it is simply too early to tell. Much depends on factors which are impossible to predict, particularly the strength of Maoism as a political force in China, the vision and skill of China's first generation of post-Mao leaders, and the social and economic constraints to which they are subjected. At a minimum, however, it is far too soon to write the epitaph to the Chinese revolution.

[63] Hua Kuo-feng, *loc. cit.*; and "Advance from Victory to Victory," *loc. cit.*

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The JCP's Parliamentary Road

By Hong N. Kim

For more than one and a half decades now, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) has attempted to attain its political objectives through what is known as the "parliamentary path to revolution," which is a strategy based on the doctrine of "peaceful transition to socialism." On the whole, this strategy has worked remarkably well, and the party's organizational and electoral strength has increased rapidly in recent years. Today, the JCP has the second largest membership of any party in Japan (estimated at 350,000);[1] it has become the richest party in Japan in terms of party finances ($40 million in revenue in 1975);[2] and it has an influential and lucrative party organ, *Akahata,* which claims a total circulation of about 3 million for its daily and Sunday editions.[3]

From 1961 to about 1974, the JCP also did exceedingly well in electoral politics, at both the national and local levels. Its seats in the national and local legislatures increased rapidly from one election to another, and by 1972 it had become the second largest opposition party in the Diet. That year, it captured 38 seats (or 39 if one includes that of a "progressive" independent endorsed by the JCP) in the elections to the *Shugiin* (the House of Representatives) or lower house. However, the party's electoral fortunes began to decline somewhat after 1974. In the most recent lower house elections, on December 5, 1976, it suffered a stunning defeat—its first defeat in parliamentary elections, in fact, since it embarked on the parliamentary path to revolution.

This article will examine the JCP's quest for power through parliamentary means and its strategy in recent years, with emphasis on its performance in electoral politics. In addition, it will analyze: (1) the factors that underlay the JCP's successes from 1961 to 1974; (2) the factors that have contributed to the waning of the JCP's electoral strength since 1974, and especially to the electoral debacle of December 5, 1976; and (3) the implications of recent developments for the JCP's future course and prospects.

Return to the Parliamentary Road

Since 1961, the JCP has stressed repeatedly that it does not seek violent revolution but advocates a peaceful parliamentary path to revolution. Once before, it had successfully experimented with such a line under the leadership of Sanzo Nosaka in 1946-49, but it had abandoned this policy for one of militancy and outright violence under the orders of Moscow and Peking in 1950. The militant strategy, however, had proved disastrous. Terrorist activities by the JCP had alienated it from the masses, and the party had become a symbol of extremism. Not only had the JCP lost all of its 35 seats in the *Shugiin* in the 1952 elections, but its popular vote

Owing to the unavailability of types with certain diacritical marks, these marks have been omitted from most names and foreign words in the present article—Eds.

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[1] Takuro Suzuki, *Shimbun Kisha no Kyosanto Kenkyu* (A Newspaper Reporter's Study of the Communist Party), Tokyo, Keizai Orai sha, November 1975, p. 195. By May 1976, the JCP claimed that its membership exceeded 370,000. See *Asahi Shimbun* (Toyko), May 12, 1976.

[2] *Asahi Shimbun,* Aug. 11, 1976.

[3] According to the JCP, *Akahata*'s circulation had reached 3,050,000 (*i.e.,* 650,000 for the daily editions and 2,400,000 for the Sunday edition) in May 1976. See *Asahi Shimbun,* May 12, 1976.

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had plummeted from about 3 million in 1949 to 897,000 in 1952. The party's membership had also fallen drastically, from 150,000 in 1949 to about 20,000 by 1955.[4] Following the disasters wrought by the militant strategy of 1950-55, the Central Committee of the JCP had agreed, as early as June 1956, to consider a new program of "peaceful parliamentary revolution." [5] It was not until 1961, however, that the JCP officially laid down a policy of seeking power by the parliamentary path, in a new party program adopted by the Eighth Party Congress. Although later supplemented and revised, that program, in its essential features, remains in force today.[6]

In this party document, the JCP held that Japan, a highly developed capitalist country, was virtually dependent on the United States. Accordingly, the document argued, the Japanese Communists should wage struggles against the two principal enemies, "US imperialism" and "Japanese monopoly capitalism," to bring about a people's democratic revolution before undertaking a socialist revolution. Moreover, this first stage of the revolution should be carried out by a multiclass "national democratic united front" led by the JCP.

As for revolutionary strategy and tactics, the party program stipulated that the Communist-led united front should seek to capture as many parliamentary seats as possible, because "if a majority of seats could be won, then the parliament could be transformed from a tool of reaction to an instrument of the people." [7] In committing the party to electoral contests, however, the JCP did not rule out "non-peaceful" revolution. Rather, according to the party program, the question of peaceful or violent revolution hinged largely on the tactics of the party's enemies. Although the JCP did not foreclose the possibility of a "non-peaceful" revolution, it has gradually played down the idea since 1961.

Despite the adoption of the 1961 program, it was not really until after the party's breaks with Moscow (in 1964) and Peking (in 1966) that the Japanese Communists became serious about the "parliamentary path to revolution." [8] During the intervening years (1961-66), Chinese influence was still substantial within the JCP, and the party was more concerned with "struggles" against the United States. Following the rifts with Moscow and Peking, however, the JCP's leadership declared its intention to pursue an independent course of action by "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" to the political problems of Japan. Furthermore, it strengthened its commitment to "people's parliamentarism." [9] According to Tetsuzo Fuwa, who articulated the JCP's viewpoints on the parliamentary path, the Communist revolution in highly industrialized countries such as Japan could be peaceful and nonviolent. The "peaceful transition to people's democracy is possible in Japan," Fuwa maintained, because of the country's liberal democratic political system. Since the Japanese Diet enjoys substantial constitutional powers within the Japanese state apparatus, the capture of a majority of the Diet seats would permit the JCP-led united front to form a coalition government, which could transform the existing Diet into a "people's democratic parliament." [10] In Fuwa's theory of "people's parliamentarism," one can detect the basic ingredients of the doctrine of "peaceful transition to socialism" which European and Soviet Communists have propounded since the late 1950's, if not earlier.[11]

Theoretical considerations aside, the JCP leadership headed by Kenji Miyamoto had other reasons to be willing to strengthen its commitment to parliamentary politics. Capitalizing on its streamlined party organization of more than 250,000 members and a widely-circulated party organ, *Akahata*, the JCP in December 1969 succeeded in electing 14 members to the *Shugiin* and polling over 3.1 million votes. By the end of 1969, the JCP also held more than 1,600 seats in various local assemblies.[12] These "wordly successes" undoubtedly reinforced

[4] Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto* (Kenji Miyamoto's Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, Ikko sha, 1973, pp. 189-90. See also Kotaro Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyosanto* (The Naked Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, Nisshin Hodo Shuppanbu, 1973, p. 25.

[5] Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1966, p. 100. See also Koken Koyama, *Sengo Nihon Kyosanto shi* (History of the Postwar Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, Yoshiga shoten, 1970, p. 207.

[6] For a Japanese text of the party program see Asahi Shimbun sha, *Nihon Kyosanto* (The Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun sha, 1973, pp. 296-310.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 308.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

[9] Iizuka, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-56. See also Tetsuzo Fuwa, *Jinmin teki Gikaishugi* (People's Parliamentarism), Tokyo, Shin Nihon Shuppan sha, 1970.

[10] Iizuka, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-56.

[11] For a detailed analysis of the doctrine of "peaceful transition to socialism," see Cyril E. Black, "The Anticipation of Communist Revolution," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Eds., *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 438-39. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Advanced Countries," in *ibid.*, pp. 407-09.

[12] Jiji Tsushin sha, *Jiji Nenkan 1971* (Jiji Yearbook 1971), Tokyo, Jiji Tsushin sha, 1970, p. 1069.

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the Miyamoto leadership's inclinations to pursue the parliamentary road.

At its 11th Party Congress in November 1970 the JCP not only reaffirmed its intention to follow the parliamentary path but also emphasized the necessity of establishing a "democratic coalition government" in the 1970's as a prelude to setting up a national democratic united front government. In the resolution that the Congress adopted, the JCP claimed to be an "independent, democratic political party," pursuing its ends by parliamentary means in order to fulfill its "historic duty to establish a democratic coalition government during the 1970's on the basis of "an anti-imperialist united front dedicated to peace, neutrality, and democracy." [13] The objective was to win control of the Diet in cooperation with other "democratic forces," such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and to form a broad coalition government under the leadership of the JCP.

These points were stressed again in November 1973 at the party's 12th Congress, especially in the congress resolution on the "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government." [14] In this resolution, the party expressed its willingness to form a democratic coalition government with the other opposition parties on the basis of a commonly agreed program which would include: (1) termination of the US-Japan Security Treaty; (2) protection of people's livelihood; and (3) preservation of the democratic parliamentary system of government. The JCP also indicated its flexibility on matters of economic policy by proposing the nationalization of "energy-related industries" only (such as electricity, gas, coal, and nuclear power) during the interim period of the coalition government. In an obvious effort to alleviate the fears of the non-Communist opposition parties, the party declared its willingness to return governmental powers to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) should the coalition government lose elections to the LDP in the future. To bolster this statement, the JCP renewed the pledge it had originally made in 1970 that a JCP-dominated government would maintain a multi-party system, with opposition parties "free" to compete for power. Finally, the JCP held that by the latter part of the 1970's the establishment of a democratic coalition government would be not merely a slogan but a definite possibility.

Deradicalization of the Party

In the wake of deciding to seek power through parliamentary means, the JCP leadership realized that the party needed to undertake drastic changes to improve its image with the voters, to streamline its operations for "electioneering," and to adjust its political style and behavior to that befitting a parliamentary party. As a result, the leadership has deradicalized virtually every aspect of the party's activities in recent years.[15]

First, the JCP has made systematic efforts to divest itself of the taint of violence and create a new democratic image. Beginning with the 11th Party Congress in 1970, the party has allowed the press to cover the sessions of its congresses. Furthermore, resolutions adopted at the 11th Party Congress pledged that the JCP would not institute a one-party dictatorship even if it came to power, but would permit the functioning of opposition parties "so long as they did not attempt to destroy the democratic system by violence." [16] To help allay the fears and suspicions of the non-Communist parties, the JCP also watered down traditional Communist doctrines. For instance, at its 12th Party Congress in 1973 the party officially decided to replace the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" (*puroretaria dokusai*) with "regency of the proletariat" (*puroretaria shikken*).[17] By July 1976, the JCP had discarded "the regency of the proletariat" as well and had substituted in its stead an even milder term, "the power of the working class" (*rodo-kaikyu no kenryoku*).[18] Moreover, the party deleted "Marxism-Leninism" from its bylaws and its program and replaced it with the blander phrase "scientific socialism" (*kagakuteki shakaishugi*).[19] To enhance its image as a nonviolent and independent Japanese party, the JCP denounced the USSR's in-

[13] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1971*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 598. (The annual *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* will hereafter be cited as *Yearbook*, with the appropriate year.) See also Tawara, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[14] For the text of the JCP's "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government," see Takeshige Kunimasa, *Kakushin Rengo Seiken* (The Progressive Coalition Regime), Tokyo, Gakuyo Shoho, 1974, pp. 218-47.

[15] For a detailed analysis, see Hong N. Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), January 1976, pp. 273-99.

[16] Tawara, *op. cit.*, p. 51. See also Staar, *Yearbook 1971*, p. 598.

[17] Hisamitsu Nagada, *Kyosanto Senryaku* (The Communist Party's Strategy), Tokyo, Kodansha, 1975, pp. 121-22.

[18] *Asahi Shimbun*, July 31, 1976.

[19] *Ibid.*

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The rising cost of living brings Japanese workers to the streets of Tokyo in a demonstration in early 1976.

—Camera Press.

vasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and China's Cultural Revolution of the later 1960's.[20]

Second, the JCP has drastically altered its approach to elections. For example, it has begun to pay more attention to bread-and-butter issues as opposed to foreign policy issues. Specifically, the party has focused increasingly on such mundane but politically potent questions as inflation, taxation, pollution, and public welfare. The JCP and its front organizations have organized grassroots group activities like bowling and table tennis, and they have catered to the common daily needs of the voters by providing tax counseling to small shopkeepers, medical services to the poor, and the like.[21] Along with this stepped-up attention to servicing the interests and needs of voters, the JCP has modified its criteria for the selection of party candidates, placing increased emphasis on "voter appeal." Accordingly, physicians, lawyers, and other professionals with moderate and respectable images tend to receive the party's nomination more frequently than do others.[22]

Third, the JCP leadership has systematically attempted to build up the circulation of its party organ, *Akahata.* Increasing *Akahata's* circulation has been important as a means not only to expand the party's influence and spread its propaganda, but also to generate income for the party. As a result of an editorial policy decision in 1968 to provide broad coverage of newsworthy items and entertainment, the paper has emerged as one of the largest Communist newspapers published outside of the Communist countries and the largest party-operated newspaper in Japan. By 1974, it boasted an overall circulation of nearly 3 million (650,000 for the daily paper and 2,350,000 for the Sunday edition). Furthermore, since 1971 its sales have accounted for more than 70 percent of the total income of the party.[23]

Fourth, Kenji Miyamoto has streamlined the operations of the JCP apparatus. A reorganization of the party's national apparatus in 1970 permitted him to solidify his grip on it and create the "Miyamoto system." Although power theoretically emanates from the Central Committee (composed of 122 members and 48 alternates), the real power of decision-making rests with the 17-man Standing Committee of the Presidium and the 42-man Presidium of the Central Committee, and Miyamoto has chaired both of these since 1970. Sanzo Nosaka, Chairman of the Central Committee, has maintained only nominal power since the 11th Party Congress

[20] For a detailed analysis of the JCP's relations with Moscow and Peking, see Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 72-87. See also his "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-April 1971, pp. 19-23. For more detailed information on the JCP's relations with Moscow and Peking, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook* for 1966 through 1976. Each volume in the series carries a section on Japan.

[21] For a detailed analysis of the JCP's grass-roots activities, see Nagada, *op. cit.,* pp. 10-83. See also Hisamitsu Nagada, *Toin Senryaku* (The Party Membership Strategy), Tokyo, Kodansha, 1975, pp. 10-196; Asahi Shimbun sha, *op. cit.,* pp. 97-137; Karl Dixon, "The Growth of a 'Popular' Japanese Communist Party," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Fall 1972, pp. 387-402; and George O. Totten, "The People's Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party. Part II: Local Level Tactics," *ibid.,* Fall 1973, pp. 398-99.

[22] Asahi Shimbun sha, *op. cit.,* pp. 146-47.

[23] Iizuka, *op. cit.,* pp. 214-15. See also Minoru Morita, "The Monetary Connections of the Japan Communist Party," *Shokun* (Tokyo), November 1976, pp. 54-74; and Hisamitsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (The Akahata Strategy), Tokyo, Kodansha, 1973, pp. 30-32.

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in 1970, at which time he was dropped from the Standing Committee of the Presidium.[24] The Secretariat, the real workhorse of the party's central apparatus, has been packed with Miyamoto's trusted lieutenants and is now headed by his "crown prince," Tetsuzo Fuwa. Fuwa concurrently holds the position of "Acting Chairman" of the party.[25]

Besides the well-organized central party headquarters, which has a full-time staff of over 900, the JCP has more than 5,000 full-time employees (*senju*) at various local levels. It should be noted, however, that while the central party staff has been adequately paid, the local staff's salaries have been kept to a minimum.[26] In addition to these full-time employees, *Akahata* has nearly 13,000 unpaid local correspondents and about 50,000 "delivery workers" (*e.g.*, party members) who render services for little or no compensation,[27] and the JCP has built up a number of auxiliary and mass organizations, including the Democratic Youth League (*Minseido*), the New Democratic Women's League (*Shinfujin*), the Democratic Commerce and Industry Association (*Minsho*), and the Democratic Medical Organizations League (*Miniren*).[28]

As a result of these developments and changes, the JCP emerged as a powerful electoral party in the 1972 *Shugiin* elections. As has been noted above, it won 38 (or 39) seats in the 491-member House of Representatives and polled more than 5,479,000 votes (or 10.5 percent of the total). In 1974, furthermore, the party more than doubled its seats in the upper house of the Diet, the *Sangiin* (the House of Councillors). It won 13 seats, including 9 new ones, to raise its total membership in that chamber to 20 out of 252. In this election, it received more than 6.4 million (or 12 percent) of the votes cast in local constituencies and over 4.9 million (or 9.4 percent) of the votes cast in the national constituency.[29] The party also did well in various local elections. For instance, in 1973 it increased its seats from 18 to 24 in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, thus becoming the third largest party in the Assembly. By December 1975, it held 3,165 out of 76,216 seats in prefectural, municipal, town, and village assemblies,[30] and it had also played an important role in electing so-called "progressive" governors in such populous prefectures as Tokyo, Osaka, and and Kyoto in recent years. In general, the Communists registered their most conspicuous electoral successes in the highly industrialized urban centers of the crowded Pacific coastal belt, where nearly two thirds of the Japanese population live.

It should be underscored that these triumphs did not stem simply from effective mobilization of the party's organizational and propaganda apparatus during elections. Other factors played a role as well. The ruling LDP had failed to cope effectively with urban problems, such as housing and land shortages, photochemical pollution, and traffic congestion, all of which had become serious by the end of the 1960's.[31] The JCP, on the other hand, had displayed important attributes: (1) an ability to identify with and lead the "residents' power movements" which aroused urban residents organized to protest various environmental and urban problems; (2) an ability to provide city dwellers who felt alienated in an affluent but impersonal urban environment with a sense of community through group activities and programs; (3) responsiveness on the part of its deputies to the wishes of their constituents through effective representation of constituent interests; (4) a pragmatic approach to legislative problems, characterized by frequent votes in favor of government bills instead of opposition for the sake of opposition; and (5) a nationalistic and

[24] For analysis of the background and personal ties of the JCP leaders, see Kotaro Tawara, *Nihon Kyosanto Shunobu* (The Governing Body of the Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, Taiyo, 1975, pp. 8-219, esp. pp. 170-75; Shunmei Jidoin, "A Map of the JCP's Personnel Connections," *Keieisha* (Tokyo), April 1976, pp. 44-47. For an analysis of the process whereby the Miyamoto system of leadership was established, see Iizuka, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-236.

[25] *Asahi Shimbun*, Aug. 1, 1976. The size of the Secretariat had increased from 12 to 15 members by October 1974. See Tawara, *Nihon Kyosanto Shunobu*, pp. 176-82.

[26] The 900 figure includes about 300 staff members for *Akahata*. See Morita, *loc. cit.*, p. 73. For the total of local-level, full-time party employees, see Tawara, *Nihon Kyosanto Shunobu*, p. 170.

[27] Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku*, pp. 168 and 184. See also Asahi Shimbun sha, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-72.

[28] The numerical strengths of these organizations are estimated to be as follows: *Minseido*, 200,000; *Shinfujin*, 153,000; *Minsho*, 310,000; and *Miniren*, 13,000. See Ko Kanazawa, "Touching Even Traditional Japanese Culture: Tea Ceremony and Flower Arrangement," *Keieisha*, April 1976, pp. 27-29. See also Nagada, *Kyosanto Senryaku*, pp. 39-57.

[29] *Asahi Shimbun*, July 9, 1974 (evening edition). The House of Councillors has 252 members, each of whom serves a six-year term. Of this total, 152 members represent local (prefectural) constituencies, and 100 represent a national constituency—*i.e.*, are elected by the nation at large. Since there is a staggering of the terms of the members, only 76 of the first group and 50 of the latter come up for election every three years.

[30] *Ibid.*, March 8, 1976.

[31] Isamu Togawa, *Jiminto no Kiki* (The Crisis of the Liberal Democratic Party), Tokyo, Gakugei Shorin, 1973, pp. 142-58. See also his *Nihon Seiji no Tenbo* (The Prospects for Japanese Politics), Tokyo, Nihon Bungei sha, 1974, pp. 76-106; and Hong N. Kim, "The Crisis of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), April 1975, pp. 158-62.

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The compressed urban atmosphere of Tokyo today.

—Eastfoto.

defiant attitude toward Moscow and Peking, which enhanced its image as a nationalistic Japanese political party not dominated by foreign powers.[32]

Problems

By the spring of 1975, if not earlier, however, there was mounting evidence of a slowdown in the growth of the JCP's electoral strength. Although the party's representation in local assemblies increased from about 2,800 to more than 3,110 seats after the April 1975 local elections, its seats in prefectural assemblies declined from 103 to 95,[33] and the number of prefectural assemblies without any Communist representation whatsoever rose from 3 to 7. Furthermore, the party's share of votes dropped noticeably in major urban centers, such as Tokyo, where the Communists had usually done well previously.[34] The decline in the JCP's votes in the populous urban centers seemed to indicate that the party had reached a "saturation point" in precisely those areas where they had been making significant electoral gains since 1961. The only comfort that the party could derive from the 1975 prefectural elections was the reelection with its sole support of the incumbent "progressive" governor of Osaka.

At the Sixth Plenum of the JCP's Central Committee, held on July 6-9, 1975, Kenji Miyamoto warned the Communists: "We are not at the point where our party's prospects have reached an immovable ceiling. However, it is evident that if we become complacent and spiritless, far from reaching a ceiling, we will instead go downwards, even to defeat." [35] Criticizing the rise of "bureaucratism" among party officials and the loss of revolutionary spirit among the rank and file, the JCP leader stressed the importance of nurturing new "revolutionary consciousness" among the party members. In a related move, the Central Committee announced its decision to strip Ryuzo Fujiwara, a Presidium member, of his official position because of his "bureaucratic" behavior.

Several organizational changes were also intro-

[32] For a detailed analysis, see Hong N. Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto," *loc. cit.*, pp. 283-92.

[33] *Asahi Shimbun*, Nov. 4, 1975. See also Yomiuri Shimbun sha Yoron Chosa shitsu, Ed., *Senkyo o Tettei Bunseki suru* (An Intensive Analysis of Elections), Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun sha, November 1975, pp. 42-43.

[34] *Asahi Shimbun*, Nov. 4, 1975.

[35] Quoted in Staar, *Yearbook 1976*, p. 305.

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duced to improve the operation of the party's central apparatus. For example, a series of bureaus was set up to replace subcommittees of the Central Committee; these handle, respectively, education, organization, election policy, local government, mass movement, and propaganda. The bureau chiefs are directly responsible to the Secretariat, headed by Tetsuzo Fuwa; hence, the Secretariat has acquired greater power than ever.[36] (Ultimate authority, of course, still resides in the Presidium, headed by Kenji Miyamoto.)

No less disturbing to the JCP leadership than the shift in electoral fortunes was the drop in subscriptions to *Akahata* in 1975. According to the JCP, the combined circulations of the daily and Sunday editions of *Akahata* had surpassed 3,000,000 by February 1, 1975, but by August 1975, the figure had fallen below 2,800,000, *i.e.*, below the level recorded in November 1973.[37] Since *Akahata* constituted not only an effective channel of communication and propaganda but also a principal source of the party's income, the party leadership could not but be concerned about this development. A series of monthly campaigns to expand the paper's circulation was launched in the summer of 1975; however, this endeavor produced no significant results.[38]

Another source of frustration for the JCP by mid-1975 was its faltering drive to expand party membership. In spite of continuous campaigns to recruit new members, party rolls had increased only marginally since 1970, when the party had claimed a total membership of 300,000. At the 12th Party Congress in November 1973, the JCP had set itself the goal of increasing its membership to 400,000 by 1976,[39] but the actual figure reached just 350,000 in 1975. While a number of new members had been admitted every year, almost as many members had left the party for one reason or another. Thus, the net increase had amounted to not more than 10,000 per year.[40] Among the various reasons that ex-members gave for withdrawing, those most frequently mentioned were (1) dissatisfaction with the requirement to attend too many meetings, (2) dissatisfaction with the obligation to deliver *Akahata* every day, and (3) dissatisfaction with the requirement to pay membership dues and with other financial burdens.[41]

Although the JCP leadership tended to blame the party's organizational stagnation on the "bureaucratism" of party officials and "complacency" among the rank and file, this stagnation must be viewed in relation to other problems that the JCP was experiencing at the time, for these problems clearly inhibited the JCP's efforts to expand its rolls. First, the JCP had encountered severe difficulty in trying to overcome the "anti-Communist allergy"—*i.e.*, the persistent suspicion of non-Communists about the ultimate intentions of the JCP. Despite the party's attempts to demonstrate its peaceful democratic intentions by softening its policy positions, its stubborn refusal to preclude the possibility of violent revolution, plus its continued subscription to Marxism-Leninism, had inevitably kept the suspicion of many non-Communists alive.[42] Furthermore, the JCP's professed commitment ultimately to bring about a Communist society through prescribed stages and its known desire for Constitutional amendments (including the deletion of the clause renouncing war and abolition of the institution of the Emperor) had tended to undermine the impact of the substantial alterations that the Communists had made in their policy programs.

Ambivalence in the JCP's policy positions had been underscored by the non-Communist parties—especially the ruling LDP, the Komeito (Clean Government Party, a centrist opposition group), and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), all of which had grown alarmed at the upsurge in Communist electoral strength. On December 2, 1973, in a paid newspaper advertisement, the ruling LDP pointed out the incompatibility between the policy positions outlined in the JCP's program (adopted in 1961) and the ones announced in its "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government" in November 1973. Since both documents were supposedly binding on the JCP, the conservative party demanded that the JCP explain which one of the two documents represented its real position.[43] Instead of clarifying

[36] See *ibid.*, p. 306.

[37] *Asahi Shimbun*, Nov. 4, 1975.

[38] Minoru Shimizu, "JCP Opposed to Early Election," *Japan Times Weekly* (Tokyo), May 1, 1976.

[39] Shigetaro Iizuka and Shiro Toyama, *Miyamoto Kenji to Daisaku Ikeda* (Kenji Miyamoto and Daisaku Ikeda), Tokyo, Ikko sha, 1975, p. 91.

[40] According to Nagada, 30,000-40,000 new members were admitted annually, while about the same number dropped out. See Nagada, *Toin Senryaku*, pp. 80-81.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[42] See, for example, the polls cited in Asahi Shimbun sha, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-14, and *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 2, 1975. See also *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Nov. 19, 1975.

[43] For the advertisement, see *ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1973; and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Tokyo), Dec. 2, 1973.

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its position, the JCP brushed off the LDP's challenge as an outdated "anti-Communist smear tactic" and took the case to court, demanding that the *Sankei Shimbun,* the paper that had published the advertisement, provide free advertising space for the JCP to rebut the LDP. The Tokyo District Court, however, ruled against the JCP in May 1974.[44]

A more serious challenge had been posed by the Komeito. In response to the JCP's appeal for joint struggle for the establishment of a "democratic coalition government," the Komeito declared that it could cooperate only with parties firmly committed to preservation of the existing parliamentary democracy in Japan and the nation's Constitution, and it questioned whether the JCP would unequivocally endorse the present Constitution.[45] The JCP's refusal to give such an endorsement inevitably deepened the suspicion of the Komeito. After 1974 not only did the Komeito continue to decline to treat the JCP as a possible partner for the proposed coalition government, but it also denounced communism as a "philosophy of hatred" incompatible with the political philosophy of the Komeito.[46]

That all of these developments had an adverse effect on the popular image of the JCP was clear. According to an opinion survey conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* in November 1975, there had been a significant worsening in the general public's image of the JCP. For instance, the percentage of respondents expressing a favorable image of the JCP (*e.g.,* "doing a good job") had decreased from 19 in a similar survey conducted by the same paper in 1973 to 10 in 1975, while the percentage with an unfavorable image (*e.g.,* "too extreme," "dictatorial," etc.) had increased from 32 to 41.[47]

A second problem was that the JCP had not made any progress toward the formation of a united front with the other opposition parties. Despite the JCP's repeated overtures, the non-Communist opposition parties had on the whole proved cool to the idea. Their reactions had been the consequence not merely of an unbridgeable ideological chasm but also of fundamental differences in approach to a coalition government. For instance, the JCP's avowed intention to ultimately transform the proposed democratic coalition government into a "people's democratic dictatorship" had disturbed those non-Communist opposition parties firmly committed to the preservation of the existing framework of parliamentary democracy in Japan.[48] Their fears of being manipulated and then suppressed had been further heightened by the JCP's professed intention to seek constitutional amendments and abolition of the institution of the Emperor.

By 1974, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) had come out in adamant opposition to a united front with the Communists, and the Komeito had also ruled out the possibility of forming such a united front. Developments in 1974-75 merely strengthened the Komeito's resolve in this regard. To try to overcome the Komeito's increasingly anti-Communist posture, the JCP approached the *Soka Gakkai,* the Komeito's Buddhist parent organization. In negotiations in the fall of 1974, the JCP and the *Soka Gakkai* worked out a 10-year agreement on "peaceful coexistence," which they then signed on December 28, 1974,[49] though they did not release it publicly until July 28, 1975. The agreement stipulated that the JCP would unconditionally uphold the freedom of religion, that the *Soka Gakkai* would not regard communism with hostility, and that both organizations would work for social justice, improved welfare, eternal peace in the world, and abolition of fascism and nuclear weapons. Apparently, the agreement was concluded without consultation with the Komeito, the political offspring of the *Soka Gakkai,* and the leaders of the Komeito were clearly shocked and embarrassed when they learned about it.

Because the Komeito leadership strongly opposed what their parent organization had done, the *Soka Gakkai* gradually retreated from its original position, and differences between it and the JCP over interpretation of the agreement had become exceedingly pronounced by the fall of 1975. The most controversial aspect of the document concerned "joint struggles" by the JCP and the Komeito. Miyamoto maintained that the agreement endorsed "mutual cooperation, mutual effort, and, on occasion, joint struggle," but *Soka Gakkai* officials, in-

[44] Suzuki, *op. cit.,* pp. 172-83.

[45] Kunimasa, *op. cit.,* pp. 87-88 and 100-05. See also Iizuka and Toyama, *op. cit.,* pp. 30-31, 119-22, and 266-71.

[46] Kunimasa, *op. cit., pp. 100-01.* See also Iizuka and Toyama, *op. cit.,* pp. 37-41.

[47] For the results of the 1973 survey, see Asahi Shimbun sha, *op. cit.,* pp. 311-14; for the results of the 1975 survey, see *Asahi Shimbun,* Dec. 2, 1975.

[48] For the JCP's three-stage scenario, see Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto,* p. 84. See also Kotaro Tawara, "Affirmation of the Principles under the Soft Orientation," *Jiyu* (Tokyo), January 1974, pp. 91-100.

[49] For the text of the agreement, see Iizuka and Toyama, *op. cit.,* pp. 18-19.

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cluding its president Daisaku Ikeda, vehemently denied the existence of any implication of joint political struggle in the document.[50] Thus, by the end of 1975 it was clear that the much publicized 10-year pact had simply intensified the hostility between the JCP and the Komeito.

For a time, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) had seemed less negative about a united front than the DSP or the Komeito; however, it too had lost interest in the idea with the rapid deterioration of its relations with the JCP in the spring of 1975 as a result of their conflicts stemming from the *Dowa* issue and the revision of the election laws. The *Dowa* issue involved a controversy between the JCP and the JSP over the distribution of government funds, both national and local, to outcast communities known as *eta* (or more commonly, "*burakumin*"). One group affiliated with the JSP insisted on distribution of the funds exclusively through its branches, while a separatist group supported by the JCP fought against such an arrangement. By the spring of 1975, the matter had become such a thorny issue between the Communists and the Socialists that the JCP refused to cooperate with the JSP in the reelection of Governor Ryokichi Minobe of Tokyo until he reversed his policy of funneling the funds for the *burakumin* through the *Buraku* Liberation League (affiliated with the JSP).[51] To make matters worse, the JCP also refused to endorse other candidates on similar grounds in Osaka and elsewhere. Although a last-minute compromise on administration of the controversial funds restored JSP-JCP cooperation and ensured the reelection of Governor Minobe in Tokyo, the bitter aftertaste of the feud lingered on.

The Socialist-Communist battle in connection with the revision of the election laws peaked during the summer of 1975. While the Socialists supported the LDP-proposed revision of the laws, the Communists vehemently opposed it, because the revised election laws would restrict, among other things, the distribution of campaign materials by political parties and their candidates. Despite the JCP's opposition, however, the election laws were revised on July 4, 1975, as a result of agreement among the LDP, the JSP, and the DSP. At the Sixth Plenum of the JCP's Central Committee in July 1975, Kenji Miyamoto castigated the JSP and asserted: "The Socialist Party has openly embarked on a course toward degeneration which is extremely dangerous." [52] He went on to charge the JSP with betraying the principles of "progressivism" and blatantly collaborating with the LDP and the DSP. To add to the JCP's fury, it learned that the JSP had accepted a donation of 30 million yen (or about $100,000) from the Japan Automobile Manufacturers' Association. The JSP eventually acknowledged that it had received the money from the Automobile Association but added that after "self-reflection" it had decided to discontinue the practice of receiving business contributions.[53]

By the end of 1975, then, the growing friction between the JCP on the one hand and the Komeito and the JSP on the other had virtually eliminated any possibility of meaningful cooperation among these three opposition parties in the coming Japanese parliamentary elections.

Political independent Ryokichi Minobe, center, celebrates his successful bid for a third four-year term as Governor of Tokyo Prefecture in the April 1975 elections. To the left in the photo is Sanzo Nosaka, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, and to the right is Tomomi Narita, head of the Japan Socialist Party.

—Wide World.

[50] Kenji Miyamoto, "Standing on the Turning Point of History," *Bungei Shunju* (Tokyo), October 1975, pp. 94-112, esp. p. 99. For the *Soka Gakkai*'s interpretation of the agreement, see Daisaku Ikeda, "Seeking a Path for the Coexistence of Civilizations," *ibid.*, pp. 114-17, esp. p. 117.

[51] See Staar, *Yearbook 1976*, pp. 307-08. For the JCP's position on the issue, see Tetsuzo Fuwa, *Jiyu to Minshushugi no Hata* (The Banner of Freedom and Democracy), Tokyo, Shin Nihon Shuppan sha, September 1976, pp. 57-136.

[52] Quoted in Staar, *Yearbook 1976*, p. 307.

[53] See *ibid.*

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A third problem was that the JCP had failed to expand its influence among the labor unions. The JCP had never been a dominant force in the Japanese labor movement. Indeed, the 4.5-million-strong *Sohyo* (the General Council of Trade Unions) traditionally identified with the JSP, while the 2-million-member *Domei* (the Federation of Labor Unions) supported the DSP. In a drive to increase the JCP's electoral strength, therefore, the Japanese Communists advocated the principle of "freedom of party choice" by union members to loosen the Socialists' grip on the rank and file.[54] Although the Communists made some progress in persuading individual labor unions to adopt such a principle, its proposal was consistently voted down by *Sohyo* and *Domei.* Moreover, the JCP's efforts to penetrate the labor unions alarmed not only the Socialists but also employers, and these two groups took steps to thwart the Communists.[55] Of no less importance, the JCP committed a number of blunders and mistakes in its campaign to strengthen its position within the labor movement. For example, in 1974 the JCP coined the phrase "sacred profession" to describe the duties of teachers whom it had previously labeled "workers and specialists." This slogan was designed to curry public favor, to enhance the benign image of the JCP, and to improve the party's standing with the teachers; however, it proved unpopular with the 619,000 members of *Nikkyoso* (Japan Teachers' Union), who preferred to regard themselves as "workers and specialists," and thus damaged the party's standing with this powerful union.[56] As a result of all these factors, the number of JCP members in trade unions remained at about 117,300 as late as the spring of 1976.[57]

Toward the 1976 Elections

These various problems clearly weighed heavily on the minds of the JCP leaders as they began to gear up for the parliamentary elections which had to take place by the end of 1976. To the party leadership, which believed that the outcome would determine the political landscape of Japan for the remainder of the 1970's, these elections had a special meaning and importance. Consequently, the JCP initially set the goal of increasing its seats in the lower house of the Diet from 39 to 51. Such an increase would not only immensely strengthen the JCP's voice and influence in the opposition camp but also enable the party to introduce legislation concerning budgetary appropriations on its own in the *Shugiin.* With this end in mind, the leadership in late 1975 issued a series of directives to JCP members, urging them to intensify their daily activities to extend the party's influence among voters.[58]

By early 1976, however, developments on the internal scene were clouding the JCP's electoral prospects. Specifically, there was a revival of the controversy over the so-called "spy-lynch" case of 1933. This had involved the death of a party member, suspected of being a police informant, while he was undergoing interrogation by Communist leaders, including Kenji Miyamoto and Satomi Hakamata (currently a vice-chairman of the JCP Presidium). Although Miyamoto had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1944 for his alleged role in the affair, he had been released in 1945 under the Allied Occupation, and in 1947 he had been exonerated, with a full restoration of his civil rights. The old matter became a current political issue when Ikko Kasuga, Chairman of the DSP, demanded that the government of Takeo Miki clarify the circumstances of Miyamoto's release and exoneration in the light of some new evidence that had just appeared in the press.[59] In his interpellation of the government leaders in the *Shugiin* on January 27, 1976, Kasuga pointed out that this evidence raised a number of serious legal questions with regard to the actions taken vis-à-vis Miyamoto, for the government decree upon which these actions had been

[54] For a detailed analysis of the JCP's strategy with respect to the labor unions, see Kotaro Tawara, *Kigyo no naka no Kyosanto* (The Communist Party in the Business Corporations), Tokyo, Shohei sha, 1975, pp. 155-82. See also Ichiro Fujiwara, "The Smiling Tactics without Substantive Transformation," *Keieisha,* April 1976, pp. 30-33; Hiroshi Koyama, "The Three-Stage Conquest: Frontal Attacks, Guerrilla Warfare, and Indirect Attacks," *ibid.*, pp. 34-37; *Japan Times Weekly,* April 24, 1976; and *Asahi Shimbun,* Nov. 4, 1975.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] See Staar, *Yearbook 1976,* p. 302.

[57] For details, see Koyama, *loc. cit.,* p. 37.

[58] For details, see *Asahi Shimbun,* Dec. 24, 1975.

[59] This evidence was contained in an article written by Takeshi Tachibana and published in *Bungei Shunju.* Among other things, Tachibana reproduced a copy of the original court ruling on Miyamoto's case and a copy of the court-appointed coroner's report on the causes of the death of the victim, Tatsuo Obata. It had previously been believed that these two important documents had been destroyed in the fire of the Supreme Court building during World War II. For these and other documentary sources plus a detailed analysis of the case itself, see Takeshi Tachibana, "Study of the Japan Communist Party," *Bungei Shunju,* January 1976, pp. 122-50. This new evidence indicated that the victim, contrary to the JCP's contention that his death had resulted from "shock" instead of "lynching," had died from the shock of lynching.

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based—*i.e.*, Imperial Ordinance 730, issued in December 1945—had exonerated political prisoners convicted under the prewar "peace preservation law" but not those convicted under the penal code (*e.g.*, murderers). Since it would appear from the new evidence that Miyamoto had been sentenced to life imprisonment under the penal code, Kasuga questioned the validity of Miyamoto's exoneration and the restoration of his civil rights.[60]

The JCP immediately denounced the DSP chairman as well as the Minister of Justice, Osamu Inaba, who had disclosed information pertaining to the case from the Tokyo District Court ruling that had imposed the life imprisonment sentence on Miyamoto. According to the JCP, the story detailed at the original trial had been fabricated by the prewar Japanese police authorities, and the revival of the old case which had been legally settled some 30 years before was "absolutely unwarranted." [61] In a statement issued in the name of the chairman of its Diet Policy Committee, the JCP declared its determination to fight against revival of "dark age politicking" and "fascism." [62]

The DSP, for its part, announced that it would carry out a thorough investigation of the case on its own through an *ad hoc* committee to be headed by the party's vice-chairman, Ryosaku Sasaki. Furthermore, Kasuga contended that the two major reasons for raising legal questions about the case were: (1) "to learn whether such a horrendous act was actually committed or whether the story was a mere concoction"; and (2) "to tell the people of the need," should Miyamoto's guilt be confirmed by the proposed investigation, "for serious soul-searching about what would result if they should let such Communists run the government." [63]

Although the JCP brushed off Kasuga's move as an outdated anti-Communist smear campaign launched with the connivance of the ruling LDP, the Communist leadership was plainly shaken by the revival of the case at this particular juncture, for the controversy raised doubts about the integrity of the top JCP leaders and tended to evoke the party's violent past in the minds of Japanese voters.[64] To counter the adverse publicity generated by the controversy, the JCP mobilized all of its resources, including *Akahata,* to castigate everyone who asked questions related to the case.

Fortunately for the Communists, the Lockheed bribery scandal, involving alleged payoffs of over $12 million to Japanese businessmen and LDP leaders, hit the headlines in early February and dominated the attention of the mass media for the next several months. Thus, the JCP became an unintended but major beneficiary of the Lockheed case,[65] although the "spy-lynch" case was not buried for good. As we shall see later, it was taken up again by the DSP and the Komeito on the eve of the 1976 parliamentary elections.

With the unraveling of the Lockheed scandal, the political situation in Japan changed rapidly in 1976. The rampant rumors linking a number of high-ranking LDP officials to the scandal badly tarnished the conservative ruling party's public image. Furthermore, disagreement over how to handle the Lockheed case brought about an intensification of the already strong factional strife within the LDP from the spring of 1976 on, especially after the arrest and indictment of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and two other ranking LDP Dietmen in the summer of 1976. By the eve of the parliamentary elections in the fall, the fierce struggle between the factions supporting Prime Minister Takeo Miki and those opposed to his leadership had virtually split the party in two. These developments made the opposition parties increasingly hopeful that, for the first time since the formation of the LDP in 1955, *hokaku gyakuden* (the reversal of the conservative-progressive power relations in the Diet) could be achieved.

It was in this unfolding context that the JCP formulated strategy for the approaching parliamentary elections. The essential ingredients of its strategy were: (1) to delay the elections as long as possible by advocating a prolonged investigation of the

[60] For Kasuga's statement, see *Asahi Janaru* (Tokyo), Feb. 20, 1976, pp. 29-30. For a detailed analysis of the circumstances surrounding Miyamoto's exoneration and the restoration of his civil rights in 1947, with relevant documentary sources, see Takeshi Tachibana, "Study of the Japan Communist Party (3)," *Bungei Shunju,* March 1976, pp. 183-92.

[61] For the JCP's official position on the case, see "History's Verdicts on the Four Basic Problems," *Asahi Janaru,* Feb. 20, 1976, pp. 26-28. For Kenji Miyamoto's own statement on the case, see his "The Era of the Peace Preservation Law and the Spy Interrogation Incident," *Asahi Shimbun,* Jan. 31, 1976. His original account of the case, published in the December 1945 issue of *Gekkan Yomiuri,* can be found in Tachibana, "Study of the Japan Communist Party (3)," pp. 134-37.

[62] *Japan Times Weekly,* Feb. 7, 1976.

[63] Ikko Kasuga, "Spy Interrogation Incident," *Asahi Shimbun,* Feb. 1, 1976. See also *Japan Times Weekly,* Feb. 14, 1976.

[64] Hayao Shimizu *et al.*, "Symposium: The World Communist Parties and the Japan Communist Party," *Shokun,* November 1976, p. 37.

[65] Takuro Suzuki, "Political Diagnosis of President Miyamoto of the Yoyogi Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc.," *Keieisha,* April 1976, p. 54.

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Lockheed scandal; (2) to implicate not only the LDP but other opposition parties in the scandal; and (3) to deradicalize the JCP platform and policies in order to improve the party's image with the voters.

Unlike the JSP and the Komeito, which demanded the immediate resignation of the Miki government and the setting of an early date for the elections, the JCP called for a thorough investigation of the Lockheed scandal by the Miki government. As the party put it in a statement issued on April 10, 1976, "We will probe the Lockheed payoff scandal to the end and make clear to the people who and what political forces were involved." [66] That the JCP had taken this position as a device to forestall elections as long as possible became quite clear in the summer of 1976. Following the arrest of former Prime Minister Tanaka on July 27, there was a mounting demand on the part of the opposition parties for the immediate resignation of the Miki government and for early elections. But Kenji Miyamoto opposed such a move, ostensibly on the ground that Miki's resignation would only serve to free him from responsibility for continuing the investigation of the Lockheed scandal.[67]

By the summer of 1976, however, the JCP was not merely trying to get mileage out of the Lockheed scandal to discredit the ruling LDP but was also attempting to implicate other opposition parties in illicit dealings with the conservative party. In an interview with the *Yomiuri Shimbun* on July 31, 1976, for example, Kenji Miyamoto alleged: "It is clear that the [LDP's] Diet countermeasure fund [*kokutaihi*] has been passed out to opposition parties other than the JCP." [68] The so-called "Diet countermeasure fund" is a contingency fund used lavishly by the LDP to "persuade" intransigent opposition Dietmen to cooperate in passing important government bills. Because of the very nature of the fund, it is seldom discussed publicly by opposition leaders. Miyamoto apparently took up the matter to bolster the JCP's "clean" image at the expense of the other opposition parties.

This move produced fierce protests and counterattacks by the other opposition parties, especially the Komeito. Immediately after the publication of the interview, the Komeito dispatched a delegation to the JCP headquarters with a demand for an apology and a retraction.[69] Instead, the JCP published a formal statement in *Akahata* on August 4 ridiculing the Komeito protest. On August 30, Miyamoto further infuriated the non-Communist opposition parties by advocating that the Lockheed investigation should cover not only the LDP Dietmen but also opposition members who had connections with big business.[70]

As the fall elections drew near, relations between the JCP and the Komeito, which were competing for essentially the same votes in populous urban districts, continued to deteriorate. Although the Komeito had not initially shown interest in identifying itself with the DSP's efforts to reopen the "spy-lynch" case involving Miyamoto, Junya Yano, Secretary-General of the Komeito, spoke out on the subject on September 28 in a plenary session of the *Shugiin*.[71] Now the Komeito, too, wanted to know the circumstances of the entire case. By October, the intensifying feud between the two parties had led each to file a number of libel suits against the other.[72]

This revival of the controversy over the "spy-lynch" case came at a particularly inopportune moment for the JCP, for the party had just sought to improve its popular image by making a number of important changes in its program and bylaws. At the 13th (Extraordinary) Party Congress, held on July 28-30, 1976, the JCP had announced its decision to discontinue the use in party documents of such orthodox Communist jargon as "Marxism-Leninism" and "dictatorship of the proletariat" (previously softened, as already noted, to "regency of the proletariat").[73] In explaining the rejection of the phrase "regency of the proletariat," Tetsuzo Fuwa stated that such a phrase was too abstruse to be understood by common people. Furthermore, he asserted, the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat," even though it meant simply the "power of the working class" *(rodo-kaikyu no kenryoku),* had, in the eyes of many Japanese, come to be associated with violent revolution, which was no longer applicable

[66] Minoru Shimizu, "JCP Opposed to Early Election," *Japan Times Weekly,* May 1, 1976.

[67] *Asahi Shimbun,* July 28, 1976 (evening edition).

[68] *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 31, 1976. See also Kiyoaki Murata, "Intra-Opposition Feud," *Japan Times Weekly,* Aug. 21, 1976.

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] *Asahi Shimbun,* Aug. 31, 1976.

[71] *Ibid.,* Sept. 29, 1976.

[72] Minoru Shimizu, "Komeito-JCP Confrontation," *Japan Times Weekly,* Oct. 16, 1976. See also *Shukan Asahi* (Tokyo), Oct. 15, 1976, pp. 18-22; and Katsunobu Shihashi, "The Internecine Warfare Within the Progressive Opposition Camp: The JCP vs. Komeito in Osaka," *Chuo Koron* (Tokyo), December 1976, pp. 141-47.

[73] *Asahi Shimbun,* July 31, 1976. See also Kiyoaki Murata, "Communist Semantics, JCP Bans Crucial Words to Improve Its Popular Image," *Japan Times* (Tokyo), July 23, 1976.

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in Japan. As for replacement of "Marxism-Leninism" with the blander "scientific socialism" *(kagakuteki shakaishugi),* Fuwa contended that although Marx and Lenin had played great historical roles, it was not appropriate to equate their ideas with "scientific socialism," for the theory of "scientific socialism" evolves over time.[74] He added that the Japanese Communists must develop their own "scientific socialism" suited to the situation in Japan.

The Party Congress had also issued a "Declaration on Freedom and Democracy" which reaffirmed the JCP's intentions to guarantee fundamental freedoms and democracy when it attained power.[75] In a related move, the JCP announced that its Secretary-General, Tetsuzo Fuwa, would serve concurrently as "Acting Chairman" of the party. Koichiro Ueda, Fuwa's brother, and two others were promoted to vice-chairmanships of the party.[76] The patent purpose of these appointments was not only to confirm Fuwa as Miyamoto's heir apparent but also to convey the impression that a new generation of leaders had taken charge of the party's operations.

Tetsuzo Fuwa, head of the Secretariat and "Acting Chairman" of the Japan Communist Party.

—Wide World.

To compound the problems posed for the JCP by the intense "anti-Communist" campaign now being waged by both the DSP and the Komeito, several party cadres got involved in incidents that tended to undermine the positive image that the party was trying to project to the public. On September 1, a drunken *Akahata* reporter created sensational headlines by getting arrested for assault and battery after he had molested a woman and then beaten up a man who had tried to intercede on her behalf.[77] In light of current JCP exhortations against the "decadence" of Japanese youth, this incident clearly was a great embarrassment to the party. On October 1, however, another incident of even more serious proportions occurred, one which dumbfounded the JCP leaders. Akira Kono, the chief secretary to Acting Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa, was arrested while riding a bicycle under the influence of alcohol—and charged with stealing the bicycle.[78] Although the accused in the two instances were quickly expelled from the party, their cases provided sensational stories for the popular Japanese weekly magazines and powerful ammunition for the JCP's enemies.

On December 1, in a desperate move to improve the party's electoral prospects, Kenji Miyamoto declared that the JCP would form a coalition for a "better government" with any forces, regardless of their political orientation, on the basis of three fundamental planks: (1) opposition to fascism, (2) further investigation of the Lockheed scandal, and (3) promotion and protection of the people's livelihood. He also indicated for the first time that his party was willing to shelve the issue of "the abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty" in order to facilitate the formation of a coalition government with Communist participation.[79]

Not even these steps, however, saved the JCP from suffering a major setback in the parliamentary elections held on December 5. The party lost 22 of the 39 seats it had held in the *Shugiin*—despite the facts that its share of the popular vote declined by only a fraction of a percentage point (from 10.5

[74] *Japan Times,* July 30, 1976.

[75] For excerpts of the declaration, see *Asahi Shimbun,* June 3, 1976. The decision to adopt the declaration had been made at the Ninth Plenum of the JCP's Central Committee on June 2, 1976. See *ibid.*

[76] *Ibid.,* Aug. 1, 1976.

[77] Kiyoaki Murata, "More Sober Communists?" *Japan Times Weekly,* Oct. 16, 1976.

[78] *Ibid.* See also *Asahi Shimbun,* Oct. 2, 1976.

[79] *Asahi Shimbun,* Dec. 2, 1976.

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percent in 1972 to 10.4 percent in 1976) and that the actual number of votes it polled surpassed its 1972 total (5,878,000 as compared with 5,478,000 in 1972).[80] Among the seats that the party failed to retain were those held by five members of the party's Presidium. To make matters even worse, the halving of JCP representation in the lower house deprived the party of its status as the second-ranking opposition party in the Diet and foreclosed any possibility that it could introduce legislation in the *Shugiin* on its own.

Japanese voters unmistakably registered their displeasure with the scandal-ridden LDP, but they showed a clear preference for moderate, middle-of-the-road political parties. Big gains were made by the moderate opposition parties: the Komeito increased its seats from 30 to 55 (in a newly enlarged *Shugiin* of 511 rather than of 491 seats); the anti-Communist DSP won an additional 10 seats, for a total of 29; and the New Liberal Club, which had been established by defectors from the LDP in June 1976, more than tripled its representation, from 5 to 17. Even the JSP, however, boasted a modest gain of 11 seats (from 112 to 123). The LDP, on the other hand, lost 16 seats, capturing only 249, and thus failed to win a majority in the *Shugiin* for the first time since the party's establishment in 1955. Nevertheless, with the help of 11 independents, the LDP was able to put together enough votes in the lower house to maintain control of the central government.

In its postmortems on the elections, the Miyamoto leadership attributed its defeat to: (1) the party's lack of success in offsetting the "anti-Communist" campaigns orchestrated by the Komeito and the DSP, (2) the limitations and restrictions that the revised electoral laws imposed on the distribution of campaign materials, (3) complacency among rank-and-file party members, and (4) the party's failure to win the "floating" independent voters.[81] As the major cause for the failure to win the independent vote, the leadership tended to emphasize the adverse publicity generated by the "spy-lynch" case and other scandals involving the party's cadres.

Japanese political observers were quick to add other factors to explain the JCP's debacle. First, the party's highly self-serving and self-righteous attitudes, as exemplified by Miyamoto's abortive attempt to smear the non-Communist opposition parties by tying them to the Lockheed scandal, had alienated a large number of independent voters.[82] Second, many of the "floating" independent voters even in highly populous urban centers had backed opposition parties which advocated a middle-of-the-road approach. In support of this interpretation, commentators noted that the moderate opposition parties had won most of the 22 seats that the Communists had lost in the election. Nine had gone to the New Liberal Club; seven to the Komeito; and three to the DSP.[83]

Despite this first setback since the JCP embarked on the parliamentary road to revolution in the 1960's, the Miyamoto leadership made it quite clear that the party would not abandon its parliamentary orientation. In an interview with the *Mainichi Shimbun* on December 7, Kenji Miyamoto denied that the JCP's electoral defeat had resulted from a mistaken policy orientation. Instead, he blamed it on the party's ineffectiveness in combating the anti-Communist attacks launched by the Komeito and the DSP. A few weeks later, he vigorously defended the party's decision to revise and deradicalize its programs (*e.g.*, by issuing the "Declaration on Freedom and Democracy" and by making the "better government" coalition proposal).[84]

It is not too difficult to understand why the JCP has taken this position. The electoral defeat it suffered was not as severe as the number of seats it lost in the *Shugiin* might suggest. As already indicated, it registered an increase in total votes over what it had polled in 1972, even if its share of the popular vote declined by a fraction of a percentage point. This showing put it only slightly behind the Komeito, which had garnered 6,177,000 votes, and well ahead of the DSP and the New Liberal Club, which had polled 3,554,000 and 2,363,000, respectively.[85] Equally important, the party is doing quite well financially, notwithstanding the recent electoral setback. According to the official report filed with the Japanese government, the JCP's annual income for 1975 (amounting to about 12 billion yen or $40 million) surpassed that of the ruling LDP.[86] In short, the JCP has become a well-managed and highly lucrative business which pro-

[80] For the results of the parliamentary elections, see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1976, *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1976.

[81] *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Dec. 7, 1976. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 6 (evening edition) and 7, 1976.

[82] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1976. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 24, and 31, 1976.

[83] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1976.

[84] *Mainichi Shimbun*, Dec. 7 and 13, 1976. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 28, 1976 (evening edition).

[85] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1976.

[86] See fn. 2, *supra*.

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vides livelihood to more than 5,000 party cadres. This development has been directly related to the party's parliamentary orientation.

The Future

What, then, can one say about the likely course and prospects of the JCP in the foreseeable future. Several things suggest themselves in light of the previous analysis.

First, it appears highly improbable that the party will forsake the parliamentary road. The JCP has made phenomenal advances both organizationally and financially in recent years as a result of this strategy, and the outcome of the 1976 elections has by no means foreclosed the possibility of its scoring new gains by means of such a path.

Second, the party will probably continue to deradicalize its policy programs. Without doing so, it cannot improve its public image or lay to rest the persistent doubts of non-Communists about its ultimate intentions, nor can it hope to meliorate its relations with the non-Communist opposition parties, especially the DSP and the Komeito. All the available evidence points to an acute awareness on the part of the JCP leadership of the imperatives involved.[87]

Third, continued adherence by the JCP to a parliamentary orientation will further strengthen the power and position of Tetsuzo Fuwa and his brother, Koichiro Ueda, who have been the chief members of Miyamoto's brain trust as well as articulate proponents of the parliamentary path to revolution. Fuwa has already been established as the heir apparent to the aging Kenji Miyamoto by his assumption of the title of "Acting Chairman" of the JCP Presidium in the summer of 1976, and it now seems virtually certain that Fuwa will succeed Miyamoto when the latter steps down from the party's chairmanship.

Fourth, in retaining its commitment to the parliamentary road, the JCP will in all likelihood seek to identify itself even more closely with the Western European—especially the French and Italian—Communist parties, for the JCP leaders appear to believe that the best way to increase the party's electoral strength is to follow the examples of these parties. Since 1968, there have been periodic exchanges and contacts between the JCP and these European parties. In the summer of 1972, for instance, the JCP was host to an international conference of representatives of the Communist parties of France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, West Germany, and Australia.[88] The major topics discussed at the conference included problems of structural reform and the prospects of "peaceful revolution" in the highly industrialized democratic countries. Over subsequent years, mutual contacts between the JCP and the European parties have grown. Not only did leaders of the Italian, French, and Spanish Communist parties visit Japan during 1975–76,[89] but a JCP delegation headed by Tetsuzo Fuwa traveled to Rome in January 1977 to confer with Italian Communist leaders. Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party, is expected to return the JCP visit in 1977.[90]

It is from these European Communist parties that the JCP has been borrowing ideas to liberalize its policy program—including the policy of minimum nationalization of industries, advocacy of a multiparty system under Communist rule, the abandonment of the term "the dictatorship of the proletariat," and the like.[91] This borrowing will also probably continue, for the JCP leaders feel that their party has more in common with these parties than with the Communist parties of Asia. They see Japan, like France and Italy, as a highly industrialized, democratic country, where a "peaceful transition to socialism" is possible.

Fifth, adherence to the parliamentary path will likely compel the JCP to maintain an "autonomous and independent" posture toward Moscow and Peking. Just as the JCP's quarrels with these two Communist giants gave it an image of a nationalistic Japanese party not subject to foreign domination, so the need to preserve that image will dictate that the JCP approach its former mentors cautiously.

Such constraints do not, to be sure, preclude an improvement in the party's relations with Moscow

[87] See *Mainichi Shimbun*, Dec. 13, 1976. See also Hayao Shimizu *et al.*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 134-45; Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto," *loc. cit.* pp. 273-95; *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 28, 1976 (evening edition).

[88] For the JCP's recent relations with the West European Communist parties, see Shigetaro Iizuka, *Nihon Kyosanto* (The Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, Sekka sha, 1969, p. 135; Asahi Shimbun sha, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-52; Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyosanto*, pp. 190-92; and Staar, *Yearbook* for 1966 to 1976.

[89] Koji Nakamura, "Communists Look to the West," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), April 16, 1976, pp. 26-27. See also Fuwa, *Jiyu to Minshushugi no Hata*, pp. 247-71; and Staar, *Yearbook 1976*, p. 313.

[90] *Asahi Shimbun*, Jan. 12, 1977.

[91] Shimizu *et al.*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 136-40.

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Kenji Miyamoto (right), Chairman of the Presidium of the Japan Communist Party, plays host to Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party in Tokyo on April 4, 1976.

—Kaku-Kurita/Gamma-Liaison.

and Peking. In fact, the chances that there will be an easing of tensions between the JCP and Moscow appear fairly good. Direct contacts at a high level were resumed as long ago as February 1968, when Miyamoto and Mikhail Suslov held talks in Yoyogi (a section of Tokyo where the JCP headquarters is situated), and these have continued intermittently over the years. After Miyamoto met with Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in September 1971, it appeared for a while that the disagreements between the JCP and the Soviet party were at least on the wane, but relations between the two parties deteriorated once again when the JCP in November 1973 decided to delete from its documents a clause acknowledging Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement.[92] The JCP's persistent demand for the return to Japan of the Soviet-controlled Kurile Islands and its criticisms of Moscow's "big-power chauvinism" did not help the situation either. However, the most fundamental issue between the two concerned the Soviet party's continued support of the "Voice of Japan," a Communist splinter group composed of pro-Moscow elements which had been purged from the JCP in 1964. To try to iron out their differences, the two sides conducted another round of talks in Tokyo in February 1976, and in late January 1977 a JCP delegation headed by Tomio Nishizawa journeyed to Moscow for further negotiations.[93] After returning home, Nishizawa announced that Kenji Miyamoto and Leonid Brezhnev might meet before July to normalize relations between their parties if a new round of negotiations produced additional progress toward resolving issues causing friction between the parties.[94]

Amelioration of relations between the JCP and Peking, on the other hand, does not seem too

[92] Suzuki, *Shimbun Kisha no Kyosanto Kenkyu*, pp. 162-64.

[93] For the results of the February talks, which ended in stalemate, see *Asahi Shimbun*, Feb. 8 and 28, 1976. On the trip of the Nishizawa delegation, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Jan. 21 and 26, 1977.

[94] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), Jan. 24, 1977.

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likely—despite the deaths of both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, who had been the principals on the Chinese side at the time of the break between the JCP and the Chinese party in 1966.[95] The 1966 rupture resulted primarily from a disagreement over the proper revolutionary strategy for the Japanese Communists to follow, and the JCP's continuing commitment to a parliamentary orientation will probably remain an insurmountable issue between the two parties—at least so long as Miyamoto retains the top leadership post in the JCP. Moreover, the JCP's nationalistic posture toward China—especially its support of the Japanese claim to sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku Islands—and its opposition to the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause that Peking wants to incorporate into the proposed Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty have tended to exacerbate the long-standing tensions.

Sixth, the JCP's pursuit of the parliamentary path will likely lead to a gradual softening of the party's opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty. At the moment, the JCP still regards the United States as one of the two major enemies, along with "Japanese monopoly capitalism," of the Japanese revolution,[96] and it has not relaxed its relentless attacks against the United States. Nevertheless, there has already been a subtle shift in its attitude toward the security treaty. Since 1974, the party has not advocated Japan's immediate, unilateral abrogation of the treaty, but has expressed a willingness to follow the procedures for abrogation provided in the treaty (*i.e.*, to serve notice of intention to abrogate one year in advance) and to replace the treaty with a nonaggression pact with the United States.[97] More recently, the JCP has softened its position further by proposing to shelve the treaty issue as a means of facilitating the formation of a "better government."[98] Thus, while the JCP has not yet gone so far as the Italian Communists have in indicating an acceptance of NATO, it no longer insists that opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty constitutes a prerequisite for the establishment of a coalition government.

Finally, the JCP's efforts on the parliamentary path to revolution are unlikely to produce a "democratic coalition government" or a significant increase in the party's strength in the Diet for the remainder of the 1970's. Despite the LDP's recent electoral decline, it will probably manage to retain power in the years just ahead, even if it loses its majority in the Diet's upper house in the *Sangiin* elections due to take place this summer. While the JCP will in all likelihood retain, if not add to, its 20 seats (out of 252) in the upper house,[99] the gains likely will hardly give it great leverage or bargaining power.

The real initiative for the realignment of political forces in Japan in the foreseeable future will probably come from the moderate opposition parties, which have been advocating the formation of a new political coalition consisting of the DSP, the Komeito, and the right wing of the JSP. Already, the Komeito and the DSP have agreed to cooperate both within and outside the Diet, and their combined total of 85 seats in the lower house of the Diet constitutes a rival force to the JSP's 123 seats. However, competition between these two forces within the opposition could weaken the prospects for the formation of any meaningful coalition against the LDP. In such a competition, the JCP would almost certainly side with the JSP, but it has suffered a deterioration in its bargaining position as a consequence of its setback in the December 1976 elections. Therefore, it is unlikely to play any major role in parliamentary politics unless and until it at least wins back the seats it lost. While the next *Shugiin* elections could take place earlier, they may not come until December 1980.

[95] For a discussion of the background to the break and the subsequent response, see Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *loc. cit.*, pp. 19-23.

[96] See the text of the party program (as revised in 1973) in Suzuki, *Shimbun Kisha no Kyosanto Kenkya*, pp. 214-28, esp. p. 221.

[97] Fujihara, *loc. cit.*, p. 33.

[98] *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 2, 1976.

[99] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1976.

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Vietnam Since Reunification

By William S. Turley

For sixteen years, encompassing the Second Indochinese War, the Vietnamese Communists ruled without convening a party congress—the longest any party in power has gone without one.[1] Then, from December 14 to 20, 1976, they held the long-delayed Fourth Congress to celebrate victory and reunification. This congress was the occasion for promulgation of new party statutes, inauguration of a five-year economic plan, change of the party's name, and election of an enlarged Central Committee.

The special significance of the congress was underlined by the resolution changing the party's name from Vietnam Workers' Party to Vietnam Communist Party (VCP). According to the official party newspaper *Nhan dan,* the name was changed to "reassume" the one chosen by Ho Chi Minh on February 3, 1930, when he forged the party out of three separate organizations at a "unification conference" in Kowloon.[2] That name highlighted the importance of both national unification and social transformation in the party's program. Subsequent changes in the party's name have coincided with strategic shifts in emphasis between these two goals. Now, by renaming itself the Vietnam Communist Party, not only has the party paid tribute to its founder, but it has also moved the goal of social revolution into the foreground. As Le Duan, party First Secretary, observed in an address to the National Assembly last June: "Nation and socialism are one. For us Vietnamese, love of country now means love of socialism."[3] Accordingly, promise of greater diligence in applying ideological prescriptions was a keynote of the December congress.

To suggest that the Fourth Congress marked a shift in how the party views its principal tasks inevitably raises the complex question of Hanoi's priorities. In 1960, the Third Party Congress ratified two major goals, the building of socialism in the North and unification with the South. The former was pursued by the first five-year economic plan (for 1961–65); the latter, by measures to step up the struggle in the South. As the war escalated, the relative share of resources allocated to each of these two goals necessarily shifted, as did their substantive content. It has been widely supposed that the degree to which one or the other of these two goals should be supported constituted the major issue of political debate among party leaders dur-

Owing to the unavailability of types with certain diacritical marks, these marks have been omitted from most names and foreign words in the present article—Eds.

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[1] As is so with most Communist parties, the party statutes provide for a congress every four years but permit postponement in "special circumstances." There were signs that a congress was about to be held in 1973, but it may be presumed that the inconclusiveness of fighting in the South was invoked to justify a further postponement.

[2] Ho Chi Minh City Radio broadcast of Dec. 21, 1976, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (hereafter *FBIS-APA*—Washington, DC), Dec. 29, 1976. Although the 1930 conference is described in the official party history as having had "the importance of a congress," it is not enumerated as one. See *Forty Years of Party Activity,* Hanoi, 1970, in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes,* No. 76, Saigon, US Mission, April 1970, p. 8. The first official congress was held in Macao in March 1935; the second in Tuyen Quang Province (now incorporated in the North's Ha Tuyen Province) in February 1951; and the third in Hanoi in September 1960.

[3] Le Duan, "All Unite to Build the Unified Socialist Fatherland of Vietnam," *Hoc tap* (Hanoi), July 1976, p. 28.

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ing the war years, a debate which ended forever when Communist forces entered Saigon on April 30, 1975.[4] Less frequently observed, though in some ways more important, were the intellectual premises and decisions on means which characterized this debate. Two features of these components of the party's leadership style made the debate much less divisive, more circumscribed, than some analysts believed it to be. First, the leaders did not conceive of the two main goals as competitive but rather as mutually reinforcing; for this reason, there was never any questioning of the desirability of either goal, and disagreements dealt more with implementation than with the priority of the goals themselves. Second, in deciding upon means to pursue the two goals, the leadership tended not to choose among them but to recommend that more use be made of all of them—on the assumption that all means could be made compatible. This tendency was dictated by the logic of total mobilization for people's war, and it sublimated whatever latent conflict there may have been by satisfying all demands for participation and recognition. Both of these features promoted organizational unity and led to the enshrining of the coordination of seemingly competitive programs as a standard operating procedure. Now that the war is over and the single goal of building socialism transcends all others, this leadership style is no longer so strongly reinforced by objective conditions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Fourth Party Congress should have revealed some effort to develop a new style as well as a new generation of leaders, although in both respects continuity with the past is equally striking.

With these considerations in mind, let us now examine in some detail what the Fourth Congress

[4] For an excellent analysis of this debate, see David W. P. Elliott, "North Vietnam Since Ho," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1975, pp. 35-52.



Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party, addresses the Fourth VWP Congress in December 1976. Among representatives of foreign parties attending is Soviet Politburo member Mikhail A. Suslov (behind and slightly to left of Le Duan in the photo).

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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indicates about current developments in Vietnam. The first portion of the discussion will concentrate on questions of party leadership, factionalism, and recruitment, and the remainder will examine the VCP's policies for mobilizing domestic and foreign resources for the reconstruction and unification of Vietnam in the years 1976–80.

Evolving Leadership

Turning first to the question of leadership, one discovers a significant expansion of the party Central Committee (CC). The CC elected in 1960 had 43 full members and 28 alternate members. Over the years, a few deletions and additions were made, so that on the eve of the Fourth Congress the Central Committee consisted of 53 full members and 24 alternates for a total of 77.[5] By contrast, the new CC elected last December has 101 full members and 32 alternates for a total of 133.[6] New members account for half of its full, all of its alternate, and 65 percent of its total membership.

So little is known about so many of the new faces that it is difficult to make any but the most general statements about patterns in the new Central Committee. The first 47 names listed are all carry-overs from the previous CC; their average age is about 60, most of them having joined the party during the 1930's or at least prior to the August Revolution of 1945; and, with the exception of a few who concentrated on clandestine work in the South, their careers have been public for a long time. The remaining 86 members, all new, appear to average a few years younger (if the ages of those few on whom information is available are indicative). This group includes several military officers who achieved prominence in the last years of the war, a number of former leaders in the southern branch of the party, at least five women, and several individuals of ethnic-minority origin. Looking at the CC's ruling Political Bureau, we find that three of its four new full members—Nguyen Van Linh (or Nguyen Van Cuc), Vo Chi Cong (or Vo Toan), and Chu Huy Man[7]—and the three new alternate members—To Huu, Vo Van Kiet (alias Sau Dan), and Do Muoi[8]—are all younger than the 66-year average age of the bureau's 10 carry-over members. The fourth new full member, Le Van Luong, born in 1910, was a Political Bureau member from 1951 to 1956, when he resigned because of involvement in land reform errors; his elevation is therefore a reinstatement. The only member dropped at the Fourth Congress, Hoang Van Hoan, has suffered no public disgrace and at age 71 was very likely ready for retirement. (See the accompanying table for the current Political Bureau lineup.)

In sum, while a serious effort has been made to introduce new blood into both the Central Committee and Political Bureau, there have been no radical breaks with the past, and continuity of leadership has been preserved.[9]

A major purpose in so greatly enlarging the Central Committee, aside from a desire to reflect the growth of the party itself, was to strengthen party leadership specifically in economic work. Many of the new members evidently are economics specialists and were selected for this reason.[10] The new full and

[5] See *Nhan dan* (Hanoi), July 3 and 4, 1976. For a list of those elected to the CC and to other party and government posts in 1960, see *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 114, Part 1, July 1973.

[6] Radio Hanoi broadcast of Dec. 20, 1976, in *FBIS—APA*, Dec. 20, 1976; and Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Dec. 22, 1976, in *ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1976.

[7] Linh and Cong are believed to have achieved Political Bureau status in the late 1960's, in which case their appointment in December may only have been the public announcement of an established fact. See Carlyle A. Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations and the Vietnamese Workers' Party: Continuity and Change, 1945-1974," in Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, Eds., *Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives*, Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath and Company, 1975, p. 48. It should be noted that Linh and Cong are now commonly known by these revolutionary aliases rather than their given names (the latter are provided in parentheses in the text).

[8] Huu and Muoi were elected full members of the Central Committee in 1960 and are believed to have achieved alternate CC status in 1951. *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 114, Part 1, p. 2B.

Of all the new members of the Political Bureau, Vo Van Kiet is the least known outside Vietnam. He began to be mentioned as a Central Committee member in Hanoi publications only after the spring victory in 1975, which suggests he was a leader in the South who had been secretly elected earlier. Since May 1975 he has served as deputy chief of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management Committee, Chairman of the Saigon-Gia Dinh People's Revolutionary Committee (after the Military Management Committee was disbanded in January 1976), and deputy secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) party committee. Recently, he has been cited as "mayor" of Ho Chi Minh City. See radio broadcasts from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam transcribed in *FBIS-APA, passim.*

[9] The promotion of younger party members was detectable in advance of the Congress, as one analyst has noted with respect to the election of provincial party committees in 1974. See Elliott, *loc. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

[10] Le Thanh Nghi made this point in his address to the Congress: "The party Central Committee, which has been reinforced with a fairly large number of new members, will resolutely assign most of its members to assume control of the localities and key economic sectors. Cadres will concentrate on carrying out the principal tasks and reinforcing important economic units and localities." *Nhan dan*, Dec. 28, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 18, 1977.

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Members of the Vietnam Communist Party's Political Bureau and Their Responsibilities
(as of December 1976)

	In the Party			In the Government		
	Secretariat of the VCP	Department(s) of VCP Central Committee headed	Central Military Party Committee	Standing Committee of Nat'l. Assembly	Council of Ministers	National Defense Council
Full PB Members						
Le Duan	First Secretary					Member
Truong Chinh		Legislation; Research on Party History		Chairman		Member
Pham Van Dong					Premier	Vice-Chairman
Pham Hung					Vice-Premier	Member
Le Duc Tho	Member	Organization	Member [a]			
Vo Nguyen Giap			Secretary		Vice-Premier; Minister of National Defense	Member
Nguyen Duy Trinh	Member				Vice-Premier; Minister of Foreign Affairs	Member
Le Thanh Nghi		Emulation			Vice-Premier; Chairman of State Planning Commission	Member
Tran Quoc Hoan					Minister of Interior	Member
Van Tien Dung			Dep. Secretary			Member
Le Van Luong						
Nguyen Van Linh	Member					
Vo Chi Cong					Vice-Premier; Minister of Marine Products	
Chu Huy Man			? [b]			
Alternate Members						
To Huu	Member	Science and Education; Propaganda and Training				
Vo Van Kiet						
Do Muoi					Vice-Premier; Minister of Construction	

[a] Le Duc Tho was identified as a member of the CMPC in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 114, Saigon, US Mission, July 1973, Part 2, p. 136, and he has been confirmed in this position by numerous Hanoi publications since. In November 1976 Tho was elected a delegate to the Fourth VWP Congress by the Congress of the All-Army Party Organization. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (hereafter *FBIS-APA*—Washington, DC), Nov. 24, 1976.

[b] There are grounds to believe that Man may be a member of the CMPC. Called to Saigon from his post as commander and political officer of Military Zone V in the South in December 1974 to take part in Political Bureau discussions concerning the 1975 spring offensive, Man remained in Hanoi in January to plan implementation of the Bureau's decision. See Tien Van Dung's article on these events published in *Nhan dan* (Hanoi), April 1, 1976, as translated in *FBIS-APA*, Supplement, "Sen Gen Van Tien Dung Article 'Great Spring Victory,'" Vol. 1, June 7, 1976, pp. 6-7. While other officers from the South took part in these sessions, they did not emerge as full Political Bureau members at the Fourth Congress.

SOURCES: For information on election of the new Political Bureau, see *Nhan dan*, Dec. 21, 1976; on departmental responsibilities, see *ibid.*, for July 3, 4, 5, 1976; for membership on the Central Military Party Committee, see the chart, "Democratic Republic of Vietnam—Party and Government Structure," Washington, DC, US Library of Congress, DOCEX, May 1974, and footnotes (a) and (b) above; positions in the new state structure were announced at the first session of the Sixth National Assembly—see *FBIS-APA*, July 6, 1976.

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alternate members of the Political Bureau represent a mixed bag of experience in politico-military affairs Linh, Cong, Man, Kiet), organization and propaganda (Huu, Luong), and economics (Muoi). Senior members of the Political Bureau predominate in the new VCP Secretariat, which is charged with implementing the resolution on party-building. As a whole, the leadership reflects in its composition and division of labor a desire to combine hard-won revolutionary virtues with stronger leadership in "practical" areas.

The 14 full and 16 alternate members dropped from the Central Committee in December for the most part were old or had withdrawn from active public life in the last couple of years. Their departure was not cause for surprise. The exceptions were a few men who were at their politically prime age. These included four generals (Le Hien Mai, Tran Van Quang, Nguyen Don, and Tran Quy Hai) who until recently held seats in the Central Military Party Committee along with important posts in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.[11] In this connection, it is worth noting that while—as might have been expected—the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), did increase its numerical representation on the Central Committee, its proportional share of CC membership declined.[12] From this, one may conclude that the party firmly commands the gun in spite of the latter's importance for so long. In the absence of more precise information, further speculation about the fortunes of particular individuals and groups is idle.

At the same time, it is important to correct some of the misconceptions engendered over the years by speculation concerning the position of party leaders either born in or affiliated with party organizations in the South. It has been argued, frequently by observers who let political needs guide their perceptions, either that the party is an essentially "northern" organization which has kept "southern" leaders strictly subordinate, or, conversely, that the complex of revolutionary organizations in the South was essentially autonomous in origin and equal with the party in the exercise of power. The common effect of both oversimplifications was to convey a

To Huu, who in December 1976 was identified as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Vietnam CP, is seen in Milan at the March 1972 Congress of the Italian Communist Party.

—Wide World.

misleading image of the party and the revolutionary movement as having a clear-cut north-south cleavage, though what "north" and "south" meant in this context was never as obvious as it seemed. Questionable interpretation of evidence aside, the chief cause of confusion in this regard was the failure to distinguish between area of birth and locus of political affiliation in applying regional designations.[13]

As party leaders have stated with pride since the war's end, the Central Committee held authority in direction of the revolution from beginning to end. The decisions which led to the revitalization of revolutionary organization in the South were made at Central Committee plenums in January and May 1959 and ratified by the Third Party Congress in September 1960.[14] The various front organizations

[11] Positions of military leaders as of 1973 may be found in *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 114, Part 2, pp. 133-38. The officers mentioned here were still holding their positions in 1975 according to various reports in Hanoi publications.

[12] Whereas 30 percent of the Central Committee members elected in 1960 were military officers, only 23 percent of the CC members elected at the Fourth Congress were officers.

[13] Carlyle A. Thayer has provided guidance through this semantic confusion in "The PRG and the Unification of Viet-Nam," *Dyason House Papers* (East Melbourne), Vol. 1, No. 5, June 1975.

[14] The official party history cites the 15th Plenum as having occurred in January 1959, while Phạm Hung and the Central Committee, in reports to the Fourth Party Congress, placed it in May. The party history is *Forty Years . . .*, cited in fn. 2 above; Pham Hung's speech as broadcast by Radio Hanoi is translated in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 27, 1976; the Central Committee's Political Report (hereafter CC Report) delivered by First Secretary Le Duan was (*continued on p. 41*)

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and party directorates involved in the revolutionary effort were all formed in compliance with Central Committee directives.[15] Although activists in the South—who were actually subject to the repression of the Diem government—were leading advocates of these decisions, they conducted their advocacy within the strictures of democratic centralism, *i.e.*, they contributed to the formulation of decisions at the center but did not constitute an independent focal point of policy-making.[16]

Moreover, it must be emphasized that the party's organs in *both* of the political entities created arbitrarily by partition in 1954 were staffed by individuals born and having Resistance experience in all *three* of Vietnam's traditional regions (northern, central, and southern). In terms of birthplace and experience, it is impossible to say that either the Political Bureau or Central Committee ever has had any particular regional character, regardless of how regions are defined and whether it is birthplace or career experience which is considered important. Merit, necessity, and expedience have been the main criteria determining the makeup of party leadership organs.[17] The party long has been the only real national political movement in Vietnam, not only in objectives but in organizational practice.

Although regional feelings of individuals have been known to cause interpersonal frictions in the ranks, it is nonetheless misleading to categorize party members or the party itself as uniquely "northern" or "southern," to impose a simplistic image of a north-south cleavage on the party, or to characterize front organizations as having had an autonomous existence.

From this perspective, the recent fortunes of individuals who had served primarily in the South are not surprising. The principal leaders of the Central Committee's Directorate for the South (popularly known as the Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN) and of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)—the core of the VWP's "southern branch"—returned to party positions they had held or to which they had earlier been secretly elected.[18] Key military figures affiliated with COSVN or distinguished by recent high-level southern command also retained[19] or achieved Central Committee membership.[20]

However, while persons with long involvement and high responsibility in the party organization in the South have won ample recognition, individuals who headed front organizations but lacked equivalent status in the party do not appear in the new Central Committee. The principal omissions in this respect are Huynh Tan Phat, former President of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), and Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) and of the now defunct Advisory Council of the Republic of South Vietnam. This is not to say that these people have been brushed aside, for in fact some of them have been given positions outside the party which, in comparison to their former front duties, may be considered promotions.[21]

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broadcast in English by Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, on Dec. 16, 1976, and is available in *ibid.*, Supplement, "Materials on Fourth Vietnam Workers Party Congress," Vols. 1 and 2, Dec. 22 and 27, 1976.

Regardless of which meeting eventually receives official designation as the 15th Plenum, two meetings were held in 1959 to discuss a change of policy toward the South. Differences between the two authoritative accounts of this period are traceable to the discrepancy in the party's own record. *Cf.*, Jeffrey Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), May 1970, p. 375, and Carlyle A. Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations . . .," *loc. cit.*, pp. 43-46.

[15] The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) was founded in December 1960; a Central Committee Directorate for the South (better known as the Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN), in October 1961; the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), in January 1962; the Vietnam Alliance of National Democratic Peace Forces (VANDPF), in April 1968; and the Provisional Revolutionary Government for the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), in June 1969.

[16] For testimony of individuals who participated in these events, see Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 97-104.

[17] For elaboration of this point as it applies to the army, see William S. Turley, "Origins and Development of Communist Military Leadership in Vietnam," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago, IL), Winter 1977, pp. 219-47.

[18] Pham Hung—long-time Political Bureau (PB) member, head of COSVN since 1967, and a native of a Mekong Delta province—returned to his seat on the PB. Nguyen Van Linh—born in the North but raised in the South, first deputy to Pham Hung and probably a secret member of the Central Committee since 1960—now appears as an alternate member of the Political Bureau. Vo Chi Cong—born in Quang Tri Province (now part of Binh Tri Thien) in central Vietnam, a COSVN and PRP leader, Vice-Chairman of the NFL, secretary of the Zone V party committee, and also probably previously a secret member of the Central Committee—now is an alternate member of the Political Bureau. Phan Van Dang—a PRP officer—now is a full member of the Central Committee; Nguyen Thi Dinh—previously a deputy commander of the People's Liberation Armed Force and a member of COSVN—is now a full member of the Central Committee. Some of these people also hold positions in the state structure.

[19] Tran Do, Tran Luong, Chu Huy Man, Tran Van Tra.

[20] Le Trong Tan, Le Duc Anh.

[21] Thus Phat is now a vice-premier and Nguyen Huu Tho a vice-president of the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, formerly Foreign Minister of the PRG, is now Minister of Education for all of Vietnam. Others will doubtless remain in public life as officers of the new national front soon to be founded by the merger of the NFL, the Vietnam Fatherland Front, and other front groups. On the new front, see Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Jan. 17, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 17, 1977.

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

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One other circumstance tends to foster the impression of a regional dominance in the party. This is the small and underdeveloped nature of the present party organization in the South, a fact which was noted with concern at the Fourth Congress. Le Duc Tho, reporting on party-building, observed that "grass-roots-level party organizations suffered heavy losses," and "hundreds of thousands of cadres and party members sacrificed their lives or were sent to prison." [22] In consequence, the province-level administrative units (which were consolidated nationwide in spring 1976—see accompanying map) in the South have smaller party memberships than their counterparts in the North. Thus, Dong Thap Province (formerly Kien Tuong in the Plain of Reeds) has only 4,000 party members, and Binh Tri Thien Province (which straddles the old partition line and includes one province previously under Hanoi's jurisdiction as well as important liberated areas in the South) has 50,000 party members. By contrast, the northern provinces of Hai Hung and Nghe Tinh have 80,000 and 160,000 members, respectively. Similarly, Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), with two times Hanoi's population, has a party organization only half as large.[23]

This relative underdevelopment of the party in the South—not some "northern" drive for dominance—is the principal reason for assigning cadres and party members from the North to duties in the South. Moreover, in light of its smaller size, the "southern branch" of the party appears to be well represented proportionally at the central level.

Combating Factionalism

Despite the general picture of generational and regional integration within the party painted by the Fourth Congress, the gathering witnessed pointed references to sectarianism, regionalism, and localism within the VCP. In fact, this was the first time party leaders had ever been so explicit about factional activities or cited them as a significant problem.

Even before the Congress opened, Political Bureau member Nguyen Duy Trinh, writing in the party's theoretical journal, *Hoc tap,* condemned "the practice of using and recommending cadres not on the basis of the qualities a task requires but on the basis of feelings, personal likes and dislikes, personal relations, and localities involved, thus forming factions within the party." In the same issue, *Hoc tap* editorialized that cadres and party members must "adhere to the general viewpoint of the entire nation" and criticize "erroneous thoughts such as parochialism, regionalism, localism, lack of concern for the general good, and lack of the socialist cooperative spirit." [24] At the Congress, both the Central Committee Report and Le Duc Tho's speech on party-building excoriated those who engaged in "splitting activities." The CC's political report, delivered by Le Duan, specifically stated:

. . . selfish calculations, scrambling for positions, enmity and envy, overexaltation of past achievements and self-complacency, claiming merits for oneself while blaming others' shortcomings, etc. It is precisely these evils—and not any serious difference of viewpoints and directives—that are the main causes for disunity here and there in the party.[25]

Although it is difficult to believe that Political Bureau members remained completely aloof from the squabbling, the targets of these criticisms were in the echelons below. It may be surmised that the prospect of the first Central Committee elections in 16 years, the postwar relaxation, and new opportunities for career advancement combined to unleash long-suppressed personal ambitions and intense competition. Jurisdictional disputes between bureaucracies also were a factor. The leaders themselves blamed much of the infighting on failure to involve subordinate echelons fully in policy discussions according to the principles of democratic centralism.[26]

In the end, factionalism appears to have been successfully contained and probably will subside now that the Congress is over. The party's remarkable traditions of collective leadership and solidarity seem intact. However, one may safely predict that the VCP will never again be quite as free from factional activity as the party was in the past.

One legacy of the war which troubled the leadership was the swelling of the party's rolls. By the

[22] Radio Hanoi broadcast, Dec. 17, 1976, in *ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1976.

[23] See Radio Hanoi broadcasts of Nov. 11, 12, 20, and 23, 1976, and Radio Ho Chi Minh City broadcast of Nov. 21, 1976, in *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 23, and 26, 1976.

[24] Broadcast over Radio Hanoi on Sept. 14-19, 23, 25-29, 1976, and translated in *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, and 30 and Oct. 1 and 4, 1976.

[25] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 102.

[26] "General Resolution of Fourth Party Congress," Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Dec. 24, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 28, 1976.

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Fourth Congress, the party had 1,553,500 members, a total which, while amounting to only 3.13 percent of the population of all Vietnam, was almost exactly double the membership of 1966. This rapid expansion was considered necessary in wartime, but it had the unfortunate result, in Le Duc Tho's words, of concentrating "only on quantity and erroneously thinking that zealous people were [automatically] qualified for party membership. . . ." Consequently, the VWP had "recruited people with low political awareness, thus in reality lowering the standards of party members and adversely affecting the class and vanguard nature of the party." [27] Tho judged the campaign launched in 1970 to recruit a "Ho Chi Minh Class" of party members dedicated to higher quality to have been only partially successful. Although many substandard members had been expelled and new, better-educated ones recruited, the campaign had failed to completely reverse the "decline in revolutionary quality" seen in the irresponsible, bureaucratic, arrogant, undisciplined, liberal, vainglorious, and factional behavior of many members. The Fourth Congress demonstrated a resolve that quality should be given decisive priority in the selection of new members and that reeducation or expulsion of substandard members should be accelerated.

But the relationship between quantity and quality is never a settled matter in a Marxist-Leninist party, nor for that matter is the definition of quality, because of difficulties in reconciling practical needs, the class policy, and the available class base. The Vietnamese Communists have been particularly sensitive about how quality should be defined. At the time of the party's birth the Vietnamese working class constituted less than 1 percent of the population, and in 1954 it was still only 4 percent of the population in the North—the smallest ratio of workers to population in any Communist state.[28] Yet even these figures were inflated, in the first case by including plantation workers and in the second by including civil servants and the unemployed. Moreover, the ties of many workers have been stronger to their home villages than to their urban jobs. Thus, the value of this class as an "industrial proletariat" and "revolutionary vanguard" has been subject to question. Somewhat defensively, party commentators have argued that the Vietnamese working class has compensated for its small size with high revolutionary qualities developed in the struggle against French colonialism and American imperialism,[29] and the Central Committee's report to the Fourth Congress argued that it has been the party's fidelity to doctrine, not objective conditions or the size and properties of the working class it represents, which has enabled the party to lay claim to the vanguard role. (In fairness, it must be said that the Vietnamese, in spite of some wavering on this issue, have never followed the Maoist example of viewing the peasantry as a legitimate, sufficient basis for the revolution, even though a majority of the party's members are from rural, often middle-peasant, backgrounds.)

Now that the national democratic revolution is considered completed and the wartime need for the broadest political participation has declined, the party has reaffirmed the primacy of the ideological imperative. This means a concerted effort to alter the social composition of the party, to strengthen its working-class component. The Central Committee's Political Report to the Congress emphasized recruitment of workers in large-scale industry (who are expected to increase rapidly in number under the new economic plan), plus outstanding officers and men of the armed forces, collectivized peasants with proven abilities, and intellectuals "tempered and tested in revolutionary practice." [30] While calling for "drastic measures," Le Duc Tho cautioned against blind rigidity in applying the new policy; he warned that "paying little attention to the transformation effect of the political and ideological education" would lead to "factionalism and narrow-mindedness." [31] It is recognized that the ideological requirement to enlarge the working-class component in the party must be balanced against the practical need for attracting the most capable people wherever they may be found. Nevertheless, the Congress has announced that the days of heavy reliance upon persons of middle-peasant and urban petty bourgeois background, permissible during the national democratic stage of the revolution, will now come to a close.

The party-building program temporarily must take into consideration the complex class structure in

[27] Le Duc Tho's address to the Fourth Party Congress, *loc. cit.* In 1966, the party had 760,000 members. *Hoc tap*, June 1966.

[28] See Tran Huy Lieu, *Lich su tam moi nam chong phap* (Eighty Years of History Resisting France), Vol. 2, Hanoi, Ban nghien cuu Van su dia, 1958, pp. 5-6; and Van Tao, "On the Quality of the Working Class," *Nghien cuu lich su* (Hanoi), No. 144, May-June 1972, p. 36.

[29] See, for example, Van Tao, *loc. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

[30] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 99.

[31] Le Duc Tho, *loc. cit.*

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Former officers in the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) at work in a reeducation camp near Tay Ninh in the South.

—T. Terzani/Sygma.

the South, however. Since the peasantry has not yet been collectivized there, the party must recruit rural members among poor peasants and farm laborers still dominated by the "small-producer mentality." As for the rather large class of educated people in the South, it is, unlike the intelligentsia in the North (now seen as mainly "workers and peasants trained by socialist schools"), overwhelmingly of bourgeois background and regarded with suspicion and as unsuitable for party membership. "Particular caution must be exercised against the reactionaries and spies who try to infiltrate the party," the CC Report warned.[32] Construction of an indigenous party organization in the South is viewed as contingent on creation of new classes through socialist transformation and education. Consequently, recruitment there will proceed slowly, and the assignment of large numbers of cadres and party members from the North to the South will continue.[33]

With the signing of the Paris agreements with the United States in 1973, party leaders had turned their attention to economic recovery in the North, only to be diverted back briefly to military tasks in 1975 by the unexpected opportunity for quick victory in the South. After this triumph in battle, however, recovery became even more urgent and complicated.

Reconstruction and the Five-Year Plan

In spite of the North's remarkable success in sustaining economic activity in the face of American bombardment,[34] the destruction had been enormous. The Central Committee's Report to the Congress frankly acknowledged that the war had wiped out

[32] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 99.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

[34] The Central Committee Report claimed that "by 1975, fixed assets in the sphere of material production increased 5.1 times as compared with 1960; the number of industrial enterprises increased 16.5 times as compared with 1955." *Ibid.*, p. 13. Since the industrial base was very small prior to 1960 and since during the war the number of enterprises was multiplied by the fragmentation

(*continued on p. 46*)

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Work in the rice paddies of northern Vietnam in March 1976.

—J. C. Labbé/Gamma-Liaison.

much of the North's economic base, "slowed down by two or three five-year plans the progress of the North to large-scale production, and upset the practice of economic management itself." [35] Discussion of economic tasks at the Fourth Congress understandably centered upon recovery and "construction of the material and technical bases of socialism" in the shortest possible time. Twenty years have been allotted to achieve this goal.

The present five-year plan, for the years 1976-80, is the first attempt at long-range planning for the nation as a whole. Its guiding principle—taken from the first plan (for 1961-65 in the North alone), which the air war cut short—is that industry and agriculture should be developed simultaneously and in complementary, interdependent fashion. Heavy industry is to concentrate on manufacture of equipment for use in agriculture so that agriculture and other commodity-producing sectors such as forestry and fisheries can achieve the productivity needed to serve as the foundation for further industrialization. Some 35 percent of the plan's budget is to be devoted to industry, and 30 percent is to go to agriculture.[36]

Although the conceptual interdependence of industry and agriculture and the ultimate goal of "socialist industrialization" are not subject to question, matters of means, balance, and timing seem less fixed. Thus, while Le Duan, in his June 1976 speech to the National Assembly, gave unambiguous priority to heavy industry,[37] in the five-year plan's list of "basic tasks" the need "to bring about a leap forward in agricultural development" was listed before the need to develop heavy industry.[38] Le Thanh Nghi, the Political Bureau's chief economics expert and head of the State Planning Commission, em-

and dispersal of facilities, these figures magnify the actual progress made. More representative were figures given by Nguyen Duy Trinh in *Hoc tap*, September 1976, which showed increases of 47 percent in the value of industrial output, 28 percent in national income, and 4 percent in agricultural output between 1965 and 1975. Since the population in the North increased over 3 percent a year during this period, the per capita gain in industrial output was quite small, and national income and agricultural output actually declined on a per capita basis. Moreover, a large part of reported increases only reflected recovery in 1973-75. For detailed statistics on gains in specific areas, see daily issues of *Nhan dan* for July and August 1975.

[35] *Loc. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 16.

[36] The intention to begin five-year planning in 1976 was announced in early 1973, and outlines for the plan went through several stages of refinement in successive Central Committee plenums. In the sense that 1976 was the first year of the plan period, the Congress merely ratified a plan already being implemented. However, the plan appears to have undergone revision virtually up to the opening of the Congress, where the first full report of its details was given publicly. Pham Van Dong at the Congress presented only a synopsis of the 120-page volume distributed among Congress delegates. The text of Pham Van Dong's report, "On the Guidelines, Tasks and Principal Objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan," as published in *Nhan dan* on Dec. 18 and 19, 1976, is translated in *FBIS-APA*, Supplement, "Material on Fourth Vietnam Workers Congress," Vol. 5, Jan 24, 1977.

[37] Le Duan, "All Unite . . .," *loc. cit.*

[38] Pham Van Dong's report on the five-year plan, *loc. cit.*

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phasized the same point in his address at the Congress:

The 1976-1980 five-year plan must . . ., first of all, create a tremendous developmental step in agriculture which will serve as a firm basis for industrial development. . . .[39]

In the six months between Le Duan's speech and the Fourth Congress, agricultural productivity and capital accumulation clearly had not reached levels which justified the priority accorded heavy industry, or at least not the kind of grandiose projects for this sector that had been planned earlier.

That this shift disappointed senior cadres was suggested in Pham Van Dong's report on the plan, which noted that "some comrades might be concerned that because we are concentrating our forces in the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan on developing agriculture and the several sectors mentioned above . . . we are giving light attention to heavy industry." Such, the Premier assured the Congress, "is not the case at all," because concentrating on agriculture only means that development of heavy industry must emphasize those sectors which support agriculture and that agriculture would then provide a "foundation for the rapid development of the heavy industrial sectors." Modification of priorities therefore was mainly a matter of refocusing targets within industry, not of downgrading industry altogether. As resources permit, the Premier continued, "heavy industry will develop at an increasingly high rate and on an increasingly large scale. Heavy industry, as a result of being supplied with much more in terms of investments, labor, and other production forces, will develop more rapidly than the other sectors in order to equip the entire national economy with new technology." [40]

Nonetheless, hard realities have dictated that a maximum effort be given to agriculture at first, especially in the South where recovery is most needed and opportunities for rapid expansion are most available. Forestry and fisheries are considered other areas needing attention and offering quick returns, and it is also viewed as necessary to build light industry to meet basic consumer needs. The precise distribution of priorities among and within the various economic sectors is contingent upon such factors as the weather and the availability of capital; it is therefore certain to be a permanent agenda item.

The plan goals are to raise industrial output an average of 16-18 percent; labor productivity 7.5-8 percent; agricultural output 8-10 percent; and national income 13-14 percent each year of the plan.[41] Goals in specific areas include increasing the annual output of the engineering sector to two and a half times that of 1975, reclaiming 1 million and restoring 3 million hectares for agriculture (for a total cultivated area of 10 million hectares, up from 6 million at present), planting 1.2 million hectares of new forests, and constructing 14 million square meters of housing.[42]

Alongside and in conjunction with these production goals, a major reorganization of society is to take place. In line with a decision in 1967 to strengthen the district as an administrative unit, the country's 500 districts are to be developed as "agro-industrial complexes" in which the functional separation between worker and peasant will be blurred so as to proletarianize the peasants and consolidate the



New facilities at a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Ha Bac Province of northern Vietnam.

—EUPRA.

[39] *Loc. cit.*

[40] Pham Van Dong's report on the five-year plan, *loc. cit.*

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 33; Pham Van Dong's report on the five-year plan, *loc. cit.*

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"worker-peasant alliance."[43] Moreover, in connection with the opening of new areas for cultivation and redeployment of labor, a massive population redistribution is planned. By 1980, some 4 million people are to have been moved out of large southern urban centers and overpopulated northern provinces to underpopulated areas.[44] And as the population rises to a predicted 75 million over the next 25 years, 10 million people are to be sent from the northern delta and central lowlands alone to the highlands and the Mekong Delta to make population densities more even. Furthermore, there are plans to regroup rural settlements into 15,000-20,000 communities averaging 30,000-40,000 people, thereby reclaiming 800,000 hectares in central Vietnam alone and making rural electrification feasible.[45]

Integrating the South

The five-year plan is much more than a plan for economic development; it is a plan to integrate North and South. Formal unification of state institutions was accomplished by nationwide elections in April 1976 for a unified National Assembly, which met in June and adopted the country's present name of Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, the much more difficult task of forming a single, uniform society remained. This task posed enormous problems of both an ideological and practical nature. In ideological terms, the issue was whether to have the South sequentially go through the transformation of the class structure of society and the launching of socialist construction, as the North had done earlier, or to combine the two processes so North and South could advance together toward socialism and complete reunification.

Immediately after liberation, PRG spokesmen seemed to confirm rumors that the South would proceed along a separate course for up to five years,[46] but most likely these early indications of a two-stage approach only reflected uncertainty rather than a firm policy commitment. In any case, the 25th Plenum of the Central Committee in mid-1975 evidently laid the foundations for the Political Consultative Conference on National Reunification held November 14-21, 1975. At this conference, Truong Chinh, Political Bureau member and Chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee, made clear the party's intention of combining "transformation" and "construction" in the South so that complete reunification and full development of the national economy could be achieved quickly.[47] This line was reaffirmed in Le Duan's political report to the National Assembly in June 1976 and in a speech on the same occasion by Pham Hung, though there was some recognition that implementation might be more difficult than had initially been anticipated.[48] Although individual leaders have subsequently hinted at various preferences for modification of this policy,[49] it remained intact in the Central Committee Report and the General Resolution of the Fourth Congress.

Aside from the practical benefits to be realized by incorporating the South immediately in long-range programs of "socialist construction," the principal justifications for making this decision were that the North could provide a firm starting base and that there were differences between present circumstances in the South and those earlier experienced by the North. In the latter case "socialist transformation" had preceded "socialist construction" because development capital and organizational means for domestic accumulation were initially lacking and tendencies toward spontaneous

[43] Of this program, Pham Van Dong's report on the five-year plan observed: "We must be fully aware of the great significance of the aforementioned policy in both the theoretical and practical fields, which is the result of a process of combining the experiences gained by our country and by many others in the world in the development of industry and agriculture." *Loc. cit.*

[44] *Ibid.* This is in addition to the approximately 1 million persons already moved, mainly out of southern cities. For discussion of this program, see William S. Turley, "Urban Transformation in South Vietnam Since April 1975," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Winter 1976.

[45] See the article "Some Suggestions about the Five-Year Plan" by Che Viet Tan, member of the State Planning Commission, in *Nhan dan*, Dec. 7, 1976, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi on Dec. 8, and translated in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 13, 1976. Also see Tan's report to the Fourth Congress, Hanoi Diplomatic Information Service, Jan. 10, 1977, in *ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1977.

[46] See, for example, interviews with Madame Nguyen Thi Minh in *Le Monde* (Paris), June 8-10, 1975; also *FBIS-APA*, June 10 and 16, 1976.

[47] Truong Chinh, "Achieving National Unity with Respect to the State," *Hoc tap*, November 1975, pp. 20-22.

[48] Le Duan, "All Unite . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 20, and Pham Hung, "The South Vows to Commit All Its Spirit and Energy with Compatriots Nationwide to Maintain Peace . . .," *Hoc tap*, July 1976, pp. 51-53.

[49] Nguyen Duy Trinh noted that "construction is the key factor and transformation is an extremely important factor." *Loc. cit.* Le Thanh Nghi, on the other hand, in the context of a report to the Congress on implementing the five-year plan, mentioned only the need to complete socialist transformation in the South "in a fundamental manner" in his list of priorities. For the "Main Points" of Nghi's report, see Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Jan. 12, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 13, 1977.

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regeneration of capitalism were present for some time. Since in the South today capital is available and the North can provide leadership, party leaders find no justification for having the South follow the North's earlier example. In practice, this means the South must undergo class struggle, reduce inequalities of wealth, socialize the means of production, and begin developing modern industry *simultaneously* instead of sequentially.

As for specific economic tasks, the South is to concentrate on agriculture and to some extent light industry, while the North will be the main locus of development of heavy industry and extractive enterprises for the duration of the current five-year plan. This division of labor, far from suggesting northern exploitation of the South, corresponds to the natural, complementary strengths of the two zones.

Capital Requirements

Attainment of these goals will require large amounts of capital, mobilization of domestic manpower resources on an immense scale, and major improvements in management capabilities. A major source of the first of these inputs—capital—is foreign aid, which, now that it is no longer given on a nonrefundable basis by the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist countries, promises to involve Vietnam in much more complex interdependent relationships than in the past. Accurate figures on aid to Vietnam in 1976 are not available, but all signs suggest that the volume of such aid is ample. In 1974, total nonmilitary aid to the North, according to US intelligence sources, amounted to the equivalent of US$1.3 billion.[50] Since the flow of aid has continued at roughly the same rate, the figure for 1976 can be surmised to be around US$1 billion, about half coming from the Soviet Union. In relation to a 1976 SRV national budget amounting to US$2.6 billion[51] and planned investment outlays for 1976-80 of US$7.5 billion,[52] foreign aid is substantial, although now it must be spread more thinly across the whole country. Vietnamese leaders may very well be disappointed by their failure to obtain financing for particular projects, especially in heavy industry,[53] but in light of mismanagement of current projects and the high ratio of aid to expenditures, the total volume of aid is probably satisfactory and may even test Vietnam's absorptive capacity in certain fields.

The problem increasingly has been not just to obtain more aid but to pay for imports. Repeated references were made at the Fourth Congress to the need to increase exports quickly to finance imports, especially imports of modern technology.[54] Actually, exports not only have failed to counterbalance imports, but they declined 10 percent during the year ending June 30, 1976, as compared with the average of the preceding two years. In calendar 1975 Vietnam's balance of payments deficit was over US$130million, and a deficit of US$106 million was expected for 1976. To help cover these shortfalls, Vietnam in January 1977 utilized half of its drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund—the first such use it has made of the Fund since the war—to purchase US$36 million worth of currencies.[55] Exports began to increase sharply after the low point recorded by the IMF, and the goal for 1977 is to raise them 55 percent over the level of 1976.[56] However, these increases continued to be surpassed by increases in imports of machinery and materials for industry.[57]

[50] Cited in *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1975, p. 21.

[51] *The New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1975, p. 4, citing a report of Agence France-Presse.

[52] Pham Van Dong's report on the five-year plan, *loc. cit.*, p. 10.

[53] According to one report, the Soviet Union refused to support construction of an integrated steel mill, and the Vietnamese were unsuccessful in obtaining long-term loans for similar projects at the meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in July 1976. Nayan Chanda, "Vietnam's Economy: New Priorities," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Nov. 19, 1976, p. 40.

[54] According to the CC Report, "the aim of exporting and importing is to secure the world's modern technology, to make production and labor achieve higher economic results in our country, thus contributing to the growth of accumulation and the improvement of our people's life . . . . Imports must satisfy the requirements of the scientific-technological revolution." *Loc. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 45. In search of trade for purposes of obtaining technology, the Vietnamese have made diverse contacts, notably with France and Japan. See Henri Van Regemorter, "A New Type of Scientific Cooperation With France," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), August 1976, p. 7; and the special section, "Report: Science for Vietnam," *La Recherche* (Paris), No. 67, May 1976, pp. 452-63.

[55] International Monetary Fund press release, Washington, DC, Jan. 11, 1977.

[56] See Le Thanh Nghi's report to the Fourth Party Congress on implementing the five-year plan, *loc. cit.* Nghi claimed that exports in 1976 exceeded the level for 1975 by 54 percent. The apparent discrepancy between this figure and that in the IMF report may be accounted for by Nghi's taking the worst of the two preceding years (the IMF averaged the two) for his basis of comparison.

[57] For example, in 1976 Vietnam's purchase of reexports from Hong Kong, its principal center for buying foreign goods, increased 127.9 percent, the largest increase in reexport purchases by any of Hong Kong's trading partners. But Vietnam's exports to Hong Kong, while increasing in the same period, did so at a lower rate and amounted to less than half the value of goods imported. *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), Jan. 18, 1977.

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General Vo Nguyen Giap, Vietnam's Minister of National Defense, pauses for a rest at the northern beach resort of Do Son in 1975 before tackling his postwar responsibilities.

—Jon Swain/Camera Press.

Determined to undertake large-scale projects yet poor in domestic financial capital, Vietnamese leaders have had to weigh the benefits of aid against the costs of dependency. Their decision can only be called an attempt to maximize all options. The five-year plan, the Central Committee Report, and the General Resolution at the end of the Congress all advocated seeking more extensive international economic relations with both Communist and capitalist nations while emphasizing that all means of self-reliance in capital accumulation should be utilized. An important part of the international aspect of the plan is a commitment to broaden Vietnam's participation in the division of labor among socialist countries, which Mikhail A. Suslov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Congress, revealed would result in an expanded role for Vietnam in the Moscow-based Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[58] Because of the important implications this move could have for Vietnam's posture of detachment in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it can only be viewed in Vietnam with some reservations.[59] Undoubtedly, such concerns combine with recognition of the larger value of independence to incline some leaders toward a more austere, self-reliant approach to economic development.[60]

Mobilizing Domestic Resources

Whatever opinions different leaders may hold about reliance upon international sources of capital, there is a strong commitment by all to maximum utilization of domestic sources of growth, which, finances aside, are abundant. Vietnam possesses natural resources which make its development prospects as good as any in the Third World. Party leaders can also point with pride to considerable human resources. The North alone has 430,000 scientific, technical, and management cadres with postgraduate, graduate, and secondary vocational training, a figure 19 times that of 1960.[61] Nationwide, there are 1 million skilled manual workers, and it is estimated that 1 million laborers can be added each year to the work force of 22 million. The party envisions channeling this abundant labor to jobs in tropical agriculture, forestry, fisheries,

[58] Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Dec. 15, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 16, 1976.

[59] A common misconception about Vietnamese foreign policy is that it has exploited Sino-Soviet differences for Vietnamese advantage. Actually, the Vietnamese consistently have held Sino-Soviet unity to be preferable and have taken the lead in working toward that end. During the war, it was their belief that the dispute only encouraged the United States in its war aims and that the US would seek to manipulate the dispute for American advantage in negotiations; in the end they were proved right. In recent years, due to a more supportive Soviet policy under Brezhnev, need for the Soviet Union's superior capital resources, and tensions with China over such matters as ownership of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, Vietnam has been visibly warmer toward Moscow than toward Peking. But it remains in Vietnam's interests to avoid a clear-cut alignment, and the call for restoration of Sino-Soviet harmony remains an important plank in the party's foreign policy platform. See, *e.g.*, Nguyen Duy Trinh's report on foreign policy to the Fourth Congress, Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Dec. 19, 1976, in *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1976.

[60] Nguyen Duy Trinh argued in his September 1976 *Hoc tap* article as follows: "If we rely on the outside to provide goods for consumption, our economy will gradually become dependent. We will not be able to firmly maintain our independence and sovereignty." Truong Chinh, in the middle of his report on state-building to the Fourth Congress, weighed the merits of foreign aid and domestic capital accumulation: "Both of these methods are essential to us, but we hold that achieving socialist accumulation of capital from within the country is the key." Radio Hanoi broadcast, Dec. 17, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 21, 1976. Differences on this issue are not over substance but over degree.

[61] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 13.

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and light industry to meet the plan's ambitious export targets.[62]

To supplement this civilian work force, the army has been mobilized to perform economic functions on an unprecedented scale. The army always has contributed in some degree to repair and construction work, but only after the fall of Saigon did these tasks come close to military duties in importance. The army's principal contribution is in capital construction—mainly the building of roads, communications facilities, railways, airports, harbors, and other "infrastructure" projects. These include the development of a road network through strategic "remote border areas" in which the army can utilize its "experience in traversing the Truong Son range" (that is, in supplying the South over the Ho Chi Minh Trail).[63] In addition, the army is helping to reconstruct towns and cities, open new economic areas, build water conservancy and hydroelectric projects, and expand agricultural production in the South. Despite the end of the war, the compulsory military service system has been broadened both to maintain the army as a labor shock brigade and to help acculturate rural youths to socialist and industrial work ethics.[64]

This assignment was not welcomed by military leaders, and resistance to the large civilian role given to the army persists. In May 1976, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Minister of Defense, published an essay ostensibly designed to counter such resistance, in which he attempted to show that the dual missions given to the People's Army of Vietnam—to assure national defense and contribute to economic construction—were interdependent and that it was in the army's own interests to participate in economic work. Only by helping construct a modern economy, he said, would the army be assured of means to build a self-sufficient, modern armed force in the future.[65] (The apparent decline in Soviet mili-

[62] Pham Van Dong's report on the five-year plan, *loc. cit.*

[63] Vo Nguyen Giap, in a talk to a class in economic management for high- and middle-level army cadres, *Tap chi quan doi nhan dan* (Hanoi), November 1976, broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Nov. 22, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Nov. 30, 1976.

[64] Pham Van Dong's address at a national day rally, Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, Sept. 2, 1976, in *ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1976; and Van Tien Dung's report on national defense to the Fourth Party Congress, Radio Hanoi broadcast, Dec. 16, 1976, in *ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1976.

[65] Vo Nguyen Giap, "Build the Basis for a Solid All-People National Defense, Protect the Socialist Vietnamese Fatherland," *Hoc tap*, May 1976, pp. 13-45.

Members of the People's Army of Vietnam at work rebuilding a section of the Hanoi-Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) railway north of the 17th Parallel.

—Marc Riboud/Magnum.

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tary aid no doubt made this argument persuasive.) In October, he returned to the theme and berated middle- and high-level cadres assigned to economic tasks who complained that economic work would damage the army's combat readiness, erode discipline, and retard modernization.[66] Although he argued against each of these views at length, Giap was defending a decision of which he was not himself unreservedly in favor and which clearly was unpopular in the army. Even in his May essay, Giap described Vietnam's security situation in rather ominous terms and warned against allowing economic work to interfere with defense.[67] At the Fourth Congress, the matter was hardly mentioned except in terse affirmations that the army's economic work would continue. Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, reporting on national defense, stressed that between construction and defense the latter was of "paramount importance," but acknowledged that the two "must go hand in hand." [68]

Whatever the differences of viewpoint, the army is certain to remain an important instrument of development for the duration of the five-year plan, barring a major threat to national security. Since armies are not notably efficient or economical as instruments of development, it may be wondered why the Vietnamese are determined to use their army in this fashion. Part of the reason is the army's near monopoly of the country's resources for certain types of construction (roads, communications, etc.). In addition, immediately after the war's end the army was best equipped to meet reconstruction needs on an emergency basis. Also, with so little domestic financial capital, Vietnam can ill afford to leave any resource idle if the country is to achieve self-reliance. But more important than any of these considerations may be the fact that for the last two decades most of the cadres trained in party, army, and vocational schools have gone into the army. It is by far the country's largest single source of trained cadres, especially in technical fields. Shortcomings among cadres in civilian sectors only accentuate the army's superiority by comparison.

Yet effective supervision of the more complex economy being constructed increasingly will depend on the civilian management apparatus of the state. Echoing criticisms that have been made by party leaders for the last two years, documents of the Fourth Congress state that this is a principal area of weakness.

Managerial Problems

According to these party documents management still follows the procedures of supply operations developed during the war; the organization of production is too decentralized; the apparatus in general is cumbersome, inefficient, and mired in red tape; many cadres have become arrogant, overbearing, bureaucratic, and corrupt, and steps must be taken to prevent cadres and public employees from becoming, in Le Duan's words, a "stratum of privileged people who lord it over the masses." [69] (Some of these problems seem to have been especially severe in the South, where a number of cadres have reportedly succumbed to material temptations or accepted bribes and colluded with the bourgeoisie they are supposed to be reforming.[70] The main causes of these conditions are held to be the habits engendered by small-scale production, the deep-rootedness of procedures adapted to war but obsolete in peace, and the relaxation, indiscipline, and irresponsibility which followed the war's end.

Until these shortcomings are overcome and a more efficient management apparatus built, the five-year plan cannot be effectively implemented, and the army cannot be relieved of its economic duties. Already in July 1976, the party Secretariat had issued a directive to increase education, criticism, and self-criticism among cadres and party members,[71] and this had been followed one month later by announcement of a campaign to combat bureaucratism and red tape.[72] Immediately after the Fourth Congress, the Premier's office called for acceleration of the anti-bureaucracy drive, which was admitted to have stalled.[73]

In its efforts to raise the quality of management, the government must stress reform rather than dismissal because it needs many more cadres than it now has. Economic cadres are in especially short

[66] Giap's talk to a class in economic management, *loc. cit.*

[67] Giap, "Build the Basis . . .," *loc. cit.*

[68] Van Tien Dung, *loc. cit.*

[69] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 66, 68, and 74; and "General Resolution of the Fourth Party Congress," *loc. cit.*, p. 27. The specific quote is from Le Duan's June 1976 address (*loc. cit.*), but the formulation was closely echoed at the Congress as well as in Nguyen Duy Trinh's September 1976 *Hoc tap* article.

[70] Nguyen Van Tran, *Hoc tap*, October 1976, broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Oct. 7, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 14, 1976.

[71] Cited by Hoang Le in *Hoc tap*, October 1976, broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Oct. 9, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 15, 1976.

[72] Radio Hanoi broadcast, Aug. 25, 1976, in *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1976.

[73] Radio Hanoi broadcast, Dec. 22, 1976, in *ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1976.

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supply in the South. It has been proposed that one third of all cadres of provinces, districts, and cooperatives in the North be sent "to help the southern localities and organizations with their experiences in economic management." In the next two years, 30,000 cadres (20,000 from the military) are to receive training as district economic management cadres so that each district can be assigned an average of 60 additional cadres.[74]

These efforts to improve the state apparatus must be viewed in relation to past cadre policy and to the proven potential for contradiction between the kind of professionalism required by the five-year plan and the tightening of ideological criteria called for in party-building. Because the two long wars of resistance (against the French and the US) nurtured revolutionary zeal and forged strong political loyalties as a matter of course, the primary problem generally has been considered that of raising professional and technical competence. In 1973, planning for a two-year recovery period following the Paris agreements, the Political Bureau issued a new cadre policy which was frankly biased in favor of scientific and technical skills and downplayed class criteria in recruitment of nonparty cadres. Party members among state cadres were subject to more stringent political qualifications, but strong incentives were offered for them to study "the latest achievements of science and technology and the organizational methods of management related to their branch." [75] The present five-year plan continues this emphasis on technical skills and promises to reward persons who exhibit a high degree of professionalism.[76] At the same time, the party-building program outlined at the Fourth Congress aims to strengthen political criteria in recruitment and training of party members. This program necessarily intrudes upon the cadre policy because a large proportion of state cadres are party members and it is planned to raise this proportion.

The two sets of values therefore must be integrated in practice more systematically, more by deliberate effort, than they were in the past. In this connection, the Central Committee's report to the Congress reasserted faith in the compatibility of "red" and "expert" values:

In the final analysis, the efficiency of the state rests with cadres. The ever-increasing scope of state activities requires a great number of qualified cadres for each branch and each level, from the center down to the grass roots. Cadres of the state must have good technical knowledge, high professional skill, initiative, and great organizational ability in practice; moreover, they must be zealous, devoted, selfless, highly responsible, disciplined; they must be revolutionary cadres, not functionaries of administrative bureaus. The building up of this contingent of cadres comes under the responsibility of both our party and state.[77]

In a period free of consciousness-raising warfare and dedicated to construction of a modern economy requiring ever more technical and managerial proficiency, however, this line may prove to be difficult to implement. Surely, it will be another permanent agenda item. In view of the party's traditions and the overwhelming desire to have Vietnam become an industrial power, it can be predicted that there will be no sacrifice of "expert" values.

The Future

To sum up, then, the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party opened a period in which politics will be more fluid, policies more subject to challenge and modification, than in the past. With the revolution and the country's survival now guaranteed, issues that once seemed insignificant, hypothetical, or indefinitely postponable will become critical.

One such issue is the welfare of the population. This issue was well marked in the Central Committee's Report:

Our biggest difficulty lies in the fact that while our economy is still predominantly one of small production [and] labor productivity and the national income are still very low . . . we have to settle at the same time two tasks which are both fundamental and urgent: to ensure the needs of the people's life while

[74] Che Viet Tan, "Some Suggestions . . .," *loc. cit.*

[75] See "Political Bureau Resolution on Cadre Work in the New Stage," *Hoc tap*, March 1973, pp. 4-6.

[76] The CC Report listed jobs requiring "high technical skill" first among those which "must be duly remunerated" (*loc. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 47) and promised to make "good use of the scientific and technical cadres left by the former regime in the South" (*loc. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 79). The "scientific and technical revolution," which is held to be the key to socialist construction, was the topic of a separate report to the Congress by General Giap. See Radio Hanoi broadcast, Dec. 13, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 29, 1976.

[77] CC Report, *loc. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 74.

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carrying out accumulation in order to build the material and technical basis of socialism.[78]

While certain minimal things must be done to raise the standard of living above its currently marginal level, this standard will likely remain austere for quite some time so that construction goals can be met.

Other issues resonate with ideological concerns and are likely to be more controversial. As we have already seen, the leadership perceives a need to obtain large amounts of foreign aid without becoming dependent on foreign powers; a need to utilize the army in construction without weakening national defense; a need to build a bigger, better bureaucracy while striving to raise political standards in recruiting and promotion; and a need for "socialist transformation" in the South without delay in "socialist construction." The contradictions inherent in all of these objectives gives each the potential for becoming the center of debate, yet it is noteworthy that the Congress made no hard choices between competing values. The operating principle remains "more of everything."

To the extent that the new tasks merely give a new meaning to the wartime slogan "all for the front," this principle may survive indefinitely, and Vietnam's revolutionary ethos, so deeply marked by struggle with more powerful foes, may too. But what place will this revolutionary ethos ultimately have in the new Vietnam which the party leadership hopes to build?

In discussing Vietnam's future, the Congress articulated an extraordinarily strong desire to build Vietnam into a *modern, socialist* state. The intensity of this desire must be emphasized, but it is not to be understood as an expression solely, or even mainly, of ideological utopianism. Rather, it is based on the belief that for pragmatic reasons, engraved on the mind of every Vietnamese by the recent war, Vietnam must catch up with the "modern world" in every scientific, technical, and material, as well as political, sense. The Soviet and Chinese parties came to power with similar desires, but the Vietnamese are aware that they begin construction of socialism from a position of even more severe backwardness (their term); this perception is made especially painful by the knowledge that during the war the gap between Vietnam and what party leaders call "advanced world standards" actually increased. Noting that reunified Vietnam's population is the third largest among Communist nations and 16th in the world, party leaders suggest that to "catch up" means to become a modern industrial power of some importance. Moreover, they believe Vietnam has paid a unique price—in serving as the front line against imperialism for 30 years—for the right to do so. It is their hope that the nation's unique inheritance of revolutionary values can be transmitted to the generations present at the conclusion of that long revolutionary struggle.

[78] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 31.

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New Paths for North Korea

By Chong-Sik Lee

For more than a decade, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) projected abroad the image of an extremely belligerent, but puritanical and stable polity which was scoring great successes in developing its economy. During 1976, however, a number of developments brought this image into question on all counts.

In the economic realm, the country's financial and balance-of-payments problems by 1976 had escalated to crisis proportions, confirming recurrent rumors which had circulated in 1975 that North Korea was having difficulty paying for her imports. On the diplomatic front, the North Korean President in August uncharacteristically expressed regret over an incident at Panmunjom in which two American officers had been beaten to death by North Korean soldiers; and in September the DPRK delegation to the United Nations General Assembly requested its supporters to withdraw from the agenda a resolution endorsing Pyongyang's uncompromising position on Korean reunification. In addition, the regime failed to send representatives to important international forums like the International Parliamentary Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it seemed, surprisingly, that reduced belligerency was being coupled with a reduced desire even to appear on the diplomatic stage. As to the regime's puritanical image, it was dealt a serious blow in October, when a number of North Korean diplomats were expelled from various Scandinavian countries for alleged involvement in smuggling and black marketeering operations. Finally, even the regime's reputation for stability became debatable as 1976 witnessed the death, retirement, and/or removal of a number of long-entrenched top-level cadres.

All of these indications that things were not going well in North Korea naturally led to speculation abroad concerning the causes of what was happening. Some observers raised the possibility that a power struggle was afoot among the top leaders. Others felt that North Korea was reacting to a rapid loss of its foreign supporters. And a third group cited difficulties in North Korea's economic development as the primary cause of the unexplained anomalies in Pyongyang's behavior. Regardless of the relative degrees of accuracy of these hypotheses, it is clear that the leaders of North Korea have found themselves confronted with serious problems and that they are actively engaged in the process of reevaluating past policies and searching for new and more effective ones. Under these circumstances, a number of key questions present themselves. What are the causes and nature of the DPRK's problems? Under what circumstances are the North Korean leaders attempting to solve the problems, and what are their prospects for success? We shall attempt to answer these questions in the pages that follow.

Owing to the unavailability of types with certain diacritical marks, these marks have been omitted from most names and foreign words in the present article—Eds.

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The Impact of Sino-American Détente

Many of the problems confronted by North Korea today can be traced back to the beginning of Sino-American détente in 1971. The rapprochement between the two world powers had tremendous impact upon all the countries of East Asia, and North Korea was no exception. The changed international situa-

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tion brought new opportunities, but new risks as well.

Indications are that initially the DPRK feared that the Chinese would betray the revolutionary cause—in Korea and elsewhere—for the sake of accommodation with the United States. Only when the Sino-American Shanghai communiqué of February 28, 1972, reiterated the support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) for North Korea's formula for Korean unification, based on the early withdrawal of all foreign troops to their own territory, did the North Koreans appear to grudgingly acquiesce in the nascent rapprochement between Washington and Peking.[1] Then, having been assured of the PRC's continuing support, the leaders of the DPRK began to try to utilize the new international atmosphere created by the Sino-American rapprochement for their own advantage. Specifically, they sought (a) to realize the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, (b) to improve the status and image of their country abroad, and (c) to introduce into the North Korean economy Western technologies and goods as a means of bolstering the nation's development process. To realize the first goal, the DPRK engaged briefly in détente with South Korea, dispatched appeals to foreign governments, invited media personalities from abroad to visit Pyongyang, and conducted massive press campaigns promoting its own views. To realize the second and third goals, the DPRK greatly expanded its diplomatic activity, sending numerous governmental delegations abroad and inviting diverse groups of foreign dignitaries to come to North Korea.

All of these actions were undertaken in a spirit of intense competition with South Korea (Republic of Korea—ROK). The removal of US troops from the South had long been regarded as the first and essential step in realizing North Korea's formula for Korean unification, which would, in the end, fulfill the aim of "revolutionizing" the entire peninsula. Enhancement of North Korea's prestige abroad was a matter of importance in itself; at the same time, it was seen as a means to diminish the significance of South Korea's standing (recognized formally by the United Nations) as the only legitimate government in Korea. And the expansion of foreign trade, the third objective sought by the North Korean leadership, was essential because of the rapid economic advancement of South Korea in the preceding decade. After South Korea normalized its relations with Japan in 1965, it launched massive industrial development programs and attained an impressive growth rate of approximately 10 percent a year.[2] As the South Korean programs initially emphasized light industry, the people's living standards improved more visibly than under the North Korean development program, which emphasized heavy industry. Furthermore, while the DPRK's development plans were autarkic in orientation—depending mostly on forced domestic savings and thus automatically placing additional severe constraints on living standards and restricting the pace of growth—South Korea encouraged the importation of foreign capital, producing precisely the opposite effects. The improvement of the North Korean economy would have created a favorable image of the North in South Korea, thereby improving prospects for the South Korean people to rally to the DPRK. Moreover, massive infusions of foreign capital and the importation of entire plants had accelerated the advancement of science and technology in the South, while North Korea lagged behind in these areas also. Clearly, some adjustments were necessary for the DPRK.

In the end, the goal of removing American troops from the ROK proved elusive. But North Korea was highly successful in expanding its contacts abroad. The number of countries maintaining diplomatic ties with the DPRK increased from 46 in

[1] For details of North Korean reactions to the Shanghai communiqué and Sino-American détente in general see this author's chapter, "The Détente and Korea," in William E. Griffith, Ed., *The World and the Great Power Triangles*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1975 pp. 328-55. For various statements of the North Korean plan for Korean unification, see Kim Il Sung, *For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea*, rev. ed., New York, NY, Guardian Associates, 1976.

[2] South Korea's average annual economic growth rate between 1962 and 1971 was 10.6 percent; between 1971 and 1973, 10.9 percent; and between 1974 and 1976, 10.7 percent. Average annual growth of the mining and manufacturing sector was 18.0 percent between 1962 and 1971; 20.8 percent between 1971 and 1973; and 18.3 percent between 1974 and 1976. See Gilbert T. Brown, *Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in the 1960's*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, p. 3; Korean Development Institute, *Korea's Economy: Past and Present, Seoul*, 1975, p. 342; *Korea Herald* (Seoul), Dec. 31, 1976.

In North Korea, the annual growth rate of national income between 1957 and 1960 was 21.0 percent, far above that in South Korea. But the rate declined to 10.8 percent between 1961 and 1963; 7.9 percent between 1964 and 1966; 3.3 percent between 1967 and 1970; and 4.3 percent in 1971. The rate of growth of industrial output was 33.8 percent between 1957 and 1960; 13.6 percent between 1961 and 1963; 8.6 percent between 1964 and 1966; 15.1 percent between 1967 and 1970; and 0.03 percent in 1971. Since then, North Korea is presumed to have restored a "respectable" rate of growth, but the DPRK has not released adequate data for outsiders to calculate the actual growth rates. The data presented here are based on Pong S. Lee, "Pattern of Economic Development: A Comparative Study of North and South Korea," unpublished manuscript, January 1976, p. 33.

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

Expansion of the ironworks at Kimch'aek, North Korea.

—EUPRA.

December 1972 to 90 in June 1976. Pyongyang was also successful in expanding trade with the West and with Japan, and was able to begin importing large quantities of Western industrial goods.

As is often so, however, in the process of attaining some of these goals and thereby alleviating some of the DPRK's problems, the North Korean leadership found itself confronted with new problems, as complex as those they had initially set out to solve, if not moreso. Nowhere was this more clearly the case than in the realm of commerce and economics.

An End of Autarky

Ever since the area was occupied by the Soviet Army in 1945, the economy of the northern part of the Korean peninsula—where the DPRK was established on December 9, 1948—has been heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union for machinery and technology. Indeed, up to 1956, over 75 percent of the area's total trade was with the Soviet Union. In 1959 however, North Korea commenced trade with non-Communist countries, importing small quantities of industrial machinery and spare parts; [3] and in 1970, the DPRK began to purchase whole plants from Western countries and Japan. Its 1971 purchases included a petrochemical complex, bought from France at an estimated cost of US$54 million. The pace of such acquisitions was accelerated in 1972 when Pyongyang contracted for US$95 million worth of whole plants and additions to existing plants (specifically, US$26 million worth of additions to the petrochemical complex). In 1973, the North Koreans went so far as to buy a cement plant complex for US$160 million, and in 1974 they purchased another US$160 million worth of plant facilities.[4] The total of known North Korean purchases of whole plants from the West and Japan between 1970 and 1974 was US$573 million, but the actual total is likely to have been much larger.

To gain some appreciation of the magnitude of North Korea's purchases from abroad, one need only compare the 1974 imports from Western countries and Japan by the People's Republic of China and by the DPRK. Between January and December 1974, the PRC imported US$592 million worth of machinery, including US$590 thousand worth of industrial plant installations. North Korea, a country with a population of only 16 million, imported US $252.9 million worth of machinery, of which industrial plant installations accounted for US $12 million.[5] In short, North Korea's imports of machinery were nearly half those of the PRC even though the PRC is more than fifty times as large as the DPRK in terms of population and in size of territory.

It is easy to see the rationale behind this frenzy of purchases. The industrial plants and machinery would, first of all, enable North Korea to increase production to meet local needs. By making these purchases on credit, the DPRK could also augment its scarce capital funds. Most important, North Korea could through such means acquire the advanced technology available abroad, and the imported plants and machinery could serve as prototypes for learning and copying. As early as August 1960, President Kim Il Sung had stressed the need for a "technical revolution," [6] and bringing

[3] See Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, *The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1974, tables 30 and 39.

[4] These data have been collected from a variety of publications, including, for example: *Far East Trade and Development* (London), June 1972, p. 199; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (hereafter FBIS-APA*—Washington, DC), Nov. 2, 1972, p. C-4; *Dow Jones Ticker* (New York, NY), March 26, 1974, and Jan. 7, 1976; *Japan Economic Journal* (Tokyo), Dec. 17, 1974; *Japan Chemical Week* (Tokyo), June 25, 1973.

[5] US Department of Commerce, "Free-World Exports to Communist Areas in Eastern Europe and Asia, and to Cuba, by Commodity Groups, 1974," June 1976, pp. 2-3. North Korea's imports from the free-world countries in 1974, according to the same source, amounted to US$691,454,000, while its exports to the same countries totaled US$275,475,000.

[6] "On the Successful Accomplishment of the Technical Revolution," in Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971, Vol. 2, pp. 553-81.

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about such a revolution had been cited as one of the supreme tasks of the 1971-76 six-year economic plan. Since the West and Japan were more advanced in some aspects of technology than the Soviet Union, and since the DPRK had already accumulated extensive long-term loans from the Soviet Union, the willingness of some Western nations and of Japan to extend credit to North Korea was viewed as a godsend.

While the benefits of the large purchases which have been made are obvious, the accompanying problems were also predictable. Kim Il Sung intimated in late 1975 to editors of the Japanese magazine *Sekai* that the new plant facilities ordered from the West would not become operative very quickly:

We were not able to scale the heights of steel and cement [this year] in the industrial sector, but this was because we are importing new plants from abroad in order to introduce advanced technology. The plants imported from abroad become operative only when the contractual dates arrive. . . .[7]

Furthermore, the North Korean President added, the world economic recession was also affecting the DPRK's plans adversely:

Now we are importing some large-scale facilities from abroad, but because of the recent economic difficulties, [the suppliers have] not been able to provide the facilities we require at the proper time. Most of the large machine works will probably be completed next year. At the latest, they will be completed in the first half of 1977. . . .[8]

Even when these plants are completed, of course, serious problems are likely to remain. Experience elsewhere indicates that it takes at least a few years for native engineers and managers to adjust themselves to and operate new plants effectively. The North Koreans are likely to find this problem more serious than originally anticipated, although Kim Il Sung's statements to *Sekai* did reveal an awareness of the existence of the problem:

Most of the engineers working in factories and enterprises are the graduates of our colleges. But it has been a long while since they graduated from college, and as they are busy in their daily tasks, they have not been able to study regularly. As a result, they are not sensitive to the development of new technology, and they are behind in it.[9]

The President added that the government had, as a part of the "Three Revolution Campaign," sent college professors, scientists, engineers, and even college seniors "who are well versed in modern science and technology" to teach new technology to engineers already in the field.[10] Still, one cannot be very sanguine about the prospects of quick improvement.

Another problem associated with new plants was hinted at when Kim Il Sung revealed that there had been serious difficulties in the transport of materials within the DPRK. At times, he allowed, the lack of freight cars hampered the transport of coal that had been excavated in large quantities; and he recognized that in a planned socialist economy, imbalance or inadequacy in one sector would affect all other sectors.[11] Providing raw materials, supplies, and skilled labor in suitable quantities to the new plants is likely to magnify the DPRK's transport and planning problems.

President Kim Il Sung's reference to the problem of imbalance and its overall effect is noteworthy particularly because it would appear that the North Korean leaders may have been forced to alter major aspects of the Six-Year Plan after the plan was officially launched. There are reasons to believe, for example, that the North Korean leadership had intended to build a large-scale petrochemical base complex on the northeastern coast of the DPRK—adjacent to the Soviet border—when the Six-Year Plan was unveiled at the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (*Choson Nodon-dang*—KWP) in 1970. The projected construction of a steam power plant at Unggi, mentioned at the Congress, was undoubtedly related to this proposed complex. But the plan for the Unggi power plant was later scrapped, and in 1974 President Kim announced that the DPRK would build the Taedong River Hydropower Station and the Ch'ongch'ong River Steam

[7] Kim Il Sung, "The Road to Revolution and Construction," *Sekai* (Tokyo), February 1976, pp. 191-92.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[10] The "Three Revolution Campaign," to be discussed later in this article, was a large-scale operation conducted in 1974-75 in an attempt to bring about accelerated ideological, technical, and cultural development among workers and farmers. Quotation is from *ibid.*, p. 191.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

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Power Station on the country's west coast.[12] The evident decision to shift the site of the petrochemical complex (purchased from France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium between 1971 and 1972 at a total cost of US$80 million) from the east to the west coast was probably related to the breakthroughs at the Tach'ing Oil Field in Manchuria in 1972 and the completion of the pipeline from Tach'ing to Chinwangtao on the Chinese coast east of Peking in late 1973 or early 1974.[13] Most likely, the original plan for the northeast coast had envisaged oil supplies from eastern Siberia.

Other changes in the Six-Year Plan seem to have been made as opportunities presented themselves. For example, in 1973 the DPRK purchased a large cement plant from Japan and Denmark at a cost of US$160 million. In announcing the goals of the Six-Year Plan in November 1970, Kim Il Sung had referred only to a "heightening of production capacity of the [existing] cement plants and the building of small- and medium-scale local cement plants."[14] The construction of the Sunch'on Cement Plant in the northwestern region was first mentioned in the President's New Year's message of 1974.[15] While the leaders of the DPRK must have appreciated the magnitude of the problems which could be caused by such massive plan changes in a centrally directed command economy, they must have reasoned that the long-range advantages would far outweigh the immediate dislocations which would result.

In contrast, they were unlikely to have anticipated the grave problems with which they would be confronted as a result of worldwide recession and the quadrupling of petroleum prices by the member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Indeed, the DPRK leadership initially applauded the decisions of OPEC on ideological grounds. But the rapid rise in the prices of fuels, machinery, spare parts, and other goods required by North Korea, coupled with plummeting demand for North Korea's export commodities (in particular, nonferrous metals, zinc, and lead), began to affect North Korea adversely. According to a Japanese estimate, the DPRK's outstanding debt to the West and Japan as of June 1975 was US$550 million, and it owed the equivalent of an additional US$750 million to the Communist nations.[16] Some of these debts came due in 1975, but Pyongyang was unable to pay. The North Korean President at first blamed the nonpayment on a lack of ships to carry North Korean goods abroad and on a lack of adequate markets for those goods.[17] However, the nature of the country's fiscal problem may be much more serious than these excuses indicate.

The problem can perhaps be traced to the types of industrial development and scientific and technological training which the North Koreans have pursued. In accordance with the DPRK's early autarkic policies, North Korean industries were developed primarily to meet internal needs. While some industries were export-oriented, the largest commodity group of exports to the West and Japan has remained base metals and semimanufactures, which together constitute over 30 percent of total exports to non-Communist countries (US$89.5 million of US$275.5 million in 1974, for example). Exports of other manufactured goods have remained insignificant. Furthermore, while North Korea has emphasized technical training, and while the number of engineers and specialists increased from 497,000 at the end of 1970 to one million in 1976, the training, one suspects, has been designed to staff existing industrial and agricultural plants and institutions rather than to develop new commodities for export.

This situation may have suited North Korea before 1973, when the country's need for foreign currency was minimal, but expanded imports and the abrupt recession-generated changes in international market conditions which developed that year introduced a situation—new requirements—to which the

[12] See Yun Myong-son, "The Miscarriage of Economic Planning in North Korea and the Improvement in Technology," *Koria Hyoron* (Tokyo), March 1976, pp. 30-41, especially pp. 34 and 41; and Motoi Tamaki, "How Far Has North Korean Economic Construction Come," *ibid.*, June 1974, pp. 2-15.

[13] Concerning the pipeline, see *The New York Times*, Feb. 10, 1975. According the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 20, 1973, the Chinese began to extract oil from Tach'ing in 1959, but they did not solve the technical problems involved in transporting large quantities of oil until 1972. Japan began to import Tach'ing oil in 1973. The news agencies of China and North Korea announced the inauguration of the "Sino-Korean Friendship Oil Pipeline" on Jan. 7, 1976. While details were not released, it is presumed that the pipeline lies across the Yalu River on the Korean west coast. Additional oil could be transported by tankers from Chinwangtao, the major oil pipeline terminal in China, to Namp'o on North Korea's west coast.

[14] *Kim Il-song chojak sonjip* (Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung), Pyongyang, Choson Nodon-dang Ch'ulp'ansa, 1972, Vol. 5, p. 450.

[15] Tamaki, *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

[16] See S. Awanohara, "North Korea: Deeper in Debt," *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), June 6, 1975, p. 52.

[17] Kim Il Sung, "The Road to Revolution and Construction," *loc. cit.*, p. 190; and Kim Il Sung's interview with Oda Minoru, *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Nov. 27, 1976.

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North Korean economy could not easily accommodate. In order to expand exports, the DPRK needed to make swift adjustments to produce new commodities more palatable to foreign markets, but the industrial infrastructure and scientific and technical manpower of the country were not sufficiently malleable to do so. This was in stark contrast to the situation in the ROK, where industry had been largely export-oriented and where manpower training had been highly diversified. South Korea could draw on a large number of highly trained scientists, engineers, and managers, who had pursued specialties on their own initiative rather than in accordance with rigid state plans. Also, South Korean industrialists had long been highly sensitized to economic vicissitudes abroad. North Korean planners and managers, trained to pursue autarkic goals, could not make the adjustment required by rapidly changing international conditions.

By early 1977, the North Koreans had managed to renegotiate payment schedules on loans which had come due, and the immediate crisis had been met. But since the problems underlying the recent default are deep-seated, they are not likely to be solved so easily or quickly. Nor, for that matter, do the problems created by the defaults end with the DPRK's renegotiation of terms of payment. News about the defaults and charges of black marketeering leveled against North Korean diplomats have seriously damaged the country's image abroad. Kim Il Sung himself had told his followers on March 3, 1975, in a speech addressed to an industrial activists' meeting:

Next, we must further develop foreign trade. Only by conducting foreign trade well can we heighten our country's dignity and prestige, and improve our relations with other countries. Also, only if we develop foreign trade well can we make our people's life more affluent. . . . In order to conduct foreign trade well, it is important to maintain the trust of others. In trade work, we must put forth the trust-first principle.[18]

It is clear now that the DPRK did lose credibility and credit abroad. Following the line of argument presented by the North Korean President himself, this was likely to damage the republic's dignity and prestige in the international arena and impair its relations with other countries. To what extent has this been so?

Foreign Relations

The deterioration of trade relations with the outside world, of course, could not help but affect North Korea's general image abroad. The DPRK had been riding the wave of détente since 1971 to gain international recognition and had greatly expanded the number of countries with which it maintained diplomatic relations. Now, however, events raised doubt as to whether the DPRK would indeed



Kim Hong-ch'ol, former North Korean Ambassador to Denmark, seen just prior to departure from Copenhagen after his expulsion for alleged involvement in narcotics traffic.

—UPI.

[18] "Let Us Vigorously Carry Out the Three Revolutions and Further Accelerate Socialist Construction," *Kulloja* (Pyongyang), March 1975, p. 22. My translation here varies slightly from that of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) staff; for theirs, see *FBIS-APA*, Supplement, March 27, 1975, pp. 27-28. I have tried to be as faithful to the original as possible.

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meet its international obligations and observe international conventions.

The primary goals of DPRK foreign policy before the defaults—as today—had been to "arouse more extensively world public opinion subscribing to the reunification of Korea [under the North Korean formula] and to expose before people throughout the world the unwarranted acts committed by the US imperialists in South Korea," in order to force the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea.[19] It was with these purposes in mind that the DPRK had intensively cultivated the friendship of nonaligned states and sought to "strengthen solidarity with the Third World countries." This strategy had been successful in many respects. At the Lima (Peru) Conference of Foreign Ministers of Nonaligned Nations held in August 1975, North Korea's application for membership was accepted, while a similar application from South Korea was rejected. One year later, the Colombo (Sri Lanka) Conference of Nonaligned Nations adopted a resolution on the Korean question which had been submitted by the DPRK delegation.[20]

This friendship extended to other international forums as well. Owing largely to the support of the nonaligned nations, which voted together with the Communist bloc countries, the United Nations General Assembly first passed a resolution on Korea supporting the North Korean position at its November 1975 session, a significant milestone for the North even though the same session also passed a resolution in favor of the South Korean position.[21] In September 1976, the DPRK's observers at the United Nations solicited the support of the country's friends to introduce another resolution along similar lines before the new General Assembly. They marshaled 31 cosponsors for the resolution. But then, to the amazement of all, the North Korean delegation on September 20 requested its allies to withdraw the resolution, touching off rampant speculation. Had North Korea decided to change its overall strategy against South Korea? Did it agree with South Korea, which had announced the previous year that it was no longer interested in bringing the Korean question to the UN for a settlement, that the propaganda war at the UN was futile? Or was

North Korean Premier Pak Song-ch'ol seen with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976.

—Gamma-Liaison.

North Korea discouraged by an alleged lack of enthusiasm among its previous supporters. Did it fear that it would not be able to win as many votes as in the previous year, thereby losing face? [22]

There exists a distinct possibility that by 1976 North Korea's shrill and incessant attacks on the United States and South Korea and its insistence that its allies not deviate from the North Korean line had begun to raise doubts about the DPRK's worthiness of support among some of its allies. Many of these allies had been pursuing policies of accommodation with the United States, and it would have been difficult for them to accept Kim Il Sung's view that "strategically, the US imperialists are now preparing for a world war," that "they are trying to find a way out from the economic crisis by means of war." [23]

Nor could many of North Korea's allies ignore South Korea's existence and support North Korea's view that it should bypass South Korea entirely in

[19] Kim Il Sung, "Talk with the Editor-in-Chief of the Japanese Politico-theoretical Magazine Sekai," *Korea Today* (Pyongyang), No. 7, 1976, pp. 2-13, at p. 8.

[20] Yi Nam-ju, "The Colombo Conference and the Korean Question," *Chosen Shiryo* (Tokyo), October 1976, pp. 16-24.

[21] *The New York Times*, Nov. 19, 1975.

[22] According to a South Korean report, 27 nations at the Colombo Conference of Nonaligned Nations, including the PRC and India, did not react enthusiastically to North Korean assertions that the United States was committing aggression against Korea by stationing its troops in South Korea and that the Americans were threatening to attack North Korea. See *Tong-a Ilbo* (Seoul), Sept. 23, 1976. According to a North Korean source, some of the nonaligned nations at the Colombo conference presented an alternative Korean resolution in support of the South Korean position and "resisted to the end." See *Chosen Shiryo*, October 1976, p. 28. According to the *Tong-a Ilbo* report cited above, some Western observers estimated that the DPRK-supported resolution would have received ten fewer General Assembly votes in 1976 than in the previous year (when they got 54).

[23] *Korea Today*, July 1976, p. 3.

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The late Chinese Premier Chou En-lai (left) welcomes Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to Peking in April 1975.

—Hsinhua via Wide World.

dealing with the problems of the peninsula and conclude a Korean war peace treaty directly with the United States. As early as 1973, the Soviet Union had issued entry visas to South Korean citizens attending international meetings and athletic events, despite North Korea's protests. Even the People's Republic of China, which shared strong ideological affinity with North Korea, had seen fit to engage in détente with the United States. The PRC had temporarily set aside the thorny question of Taiwan to do so, and had further revealed the pragmatic nature of its foreign policy in 1974 by welcoming a parliamentary delegation from West Germany and commending them for "their resolute opposition to a permanent split of the German nation." [24]

Would the leaders in Peking who had made these decisions be convinced by Pyongyang's argument that the admission of two Koreas to the United Nations as separate states, as South Korea requested in 1973, was contrary to the interests of peace? And if the leaders of North Korea could not get wholehearted support from the Chinese, how many other nations would be willing to stand unflinchingly behind the DPRK? There are as yet no definite answers to either of these questions, but the sudden reversal of North Korean policy at the United Nations certainly suggests that the DPRK was unsuccessful in rallying new supporters for its views between 1975 and 1976.

Moreover, in 1976 events within the PRC, North Korea's strongest supporter in the international arena, can only have added to the worries of the Pyongyang leadership concerning the DPRK's international situation. In the wake of Chairman Mao's death, the DPRK regime probably favored the succession of the radical wing of the Chinese leadership, since this group's ideological orientation was closer to that of the North Koreans. But the ascent of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to power was followed by the quick demise of the radicals, headed by Chiang Ch'ing. When Hua invited to China the former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger—a man whom Pyongyang had denounced previously for a policy of "nuclear blackmail" and for "war hysteria" [25]—North Korea must have felt that the new leader of China could not have invited a worse American guest. Although Kim Il Sung's congratulatory message to Hua on his elevation had exhorted the new Chinese Communist Party Chairman to "liberate Taiwan," [26] Hua, in his talks with Schlesinger, did not press the issue.[27] All of these factors must have raised serious concern among the DPRK's leaders about what the leadership turnover in China implied for them.

It is significant to note in this connection that North Korean Premier Pak Song-ch'ol visited the Soviet Union in January 1977. The last foreign travel undertaken by members of the top North Korean leadership had been in April-May 1975, when President Kim Il Sung had led a delegation to China, Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Omission of the USSR from President Kim's itinerary had strengthened the impression abroad that all was not well in Soviet-North Korean relations. The pace of contacts between the two states stepped up markedly during 1976, however, with the Soviet Union ultimately promising more aid

[24] Joseph C. Harsch, "Peking and One Germany," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 24, 1974. A *Pravda* (Moscow) commentator's reaction to the Chinese welcome was that "Peking leaders have joined hands with warmongers from among the most rabid circles of international reaction." *Ibid.*

[25] *The New York Times*, June 23, 1975.

[26] *Peking Review*, Nov. 5, 1976. None of the other congratulatory messages printed in the same issue of *Peking Review* mentioned Taiwan.

[27] See the editorial, "Schlesinger on China," in *The New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1976.

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to the hard-pressed North Koreans in June. Undoubtedly, Premier Pak's visit was related to the economic and diplomatic problems the DPRK faces, and he must have had much to discuss with the Soviet leadership. But the timing of Pak's trip also suggests the possibility that the North Koreans wished to signal the Chinese leadership of their displeasure at recent developments in China.

In contrast to their reaction to Chinese events, the Korean Communists must have been pleased by the hard-line resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on January 31, 1977, soon after Premier Pak's visit to Moscow. The resolution stressed proletarian internationalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, reversing the moderating tendencies shown by the Soviet Union the previous year.[28]

The evidence at hand does not lead to the conclusion that the DPRK is about to reverse its strategies and tactics vis-à-vis the United States or South Korea. But there is little room to doubt that the North Korean leaders are being forced—by international developments and by events within the Communist world—to review their foreign policies and that they are indeed engaged in such a review. It would not be surprising if the DPRK attempted to restore the moderate image it projected abroad in 1972. Such an image definitely served the purposes of the DPRK well between 1972 and 1974. Of course, how much the North Koreans will be willing to change their policies cannot be foretold.

Leadership Turnover in the DPRK

Whatever policy changes are made will certainly be decided by President Kim Il Sung and his top lieutenants in the Political Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and the Central People's Committee of the DPRK. With few exceptions, the memberships of these two bodies, consisting of between 20 and 25 leading cadres each, overlap. As in any Communist party, the Political Committee of the KWP is the central decision-making organ of the party. The Central People's Committee of the DPRK, created in 1972 when a new constitution was adopted, is the "highest leadership organ of sovereignty of the DPRK." [29] The makeup of the two committees is of preeminent importance in determining what policy will be.

[28] See Paul Wohl, "Kremlin fires salvo against all dissidents," *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 2, 1977.

[29] For details, see this author's chapter "The 1972 Constitution and Top Communist Leaders," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, Eds., *Political Leadership in Korea*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1976, pp. 192-219.

Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (left) and Soviet Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin (right) welcome North Korean Premier Pak Song-ch'ol to the Kremlin in January 1977.

—TASS via UPI.

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Over the last seven years there has been a high rate of turnover among top leaders in the North Korean political system. Of the 15 members of the Political Committee elected in 1970, only eight remained active in 1976. Two had died. Three, including Premier Kim Il and Defense Minister Ch'oe Hyon, had been removed from key party and government posts for reasons of ill health and old age. Two others had been removed from their posts for unexplained reasons.[30] To fill these vacancies, the party had appointed nine new members to the Political Committee over the same period, some as candidate and some as full members. What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from these turnovers? What do they portend in terms of the party's policy directions?

The first characteristic to be noted is the generational change taking place among the top-echelon leaders. All the new appointees except two[31] are believed to be relatively young, in their 50's, in contrast to the members replaced, who were in their 60's and 70's. A related characteristic is that while most of the old cadres were veterans of the partisan warfare of the 1930's who had had little opportunity for formal education or training, the new cadres are KWP careerists who have risen through the party ranks since 1945. Since the KWP has emphasized formal education for its members and has sent many young men to the Soviet Union for higher education, one is inclined to believe that most of the new leaders are better educated than their predecessors.

Of course, one cannot conclude automatically that younger cadres with more education and technical training will be more pragmatic than their elders. All of them undoubtedly pride themselves in their undivided loyalty and dedication to the supreme leader and the party, and if asked, they would probably deny that their orientations are any different from those of the men who have been retired. But, if the experience of other countries can be used a guide, there is a likelihood that they will be more "rational"—or pragmatic—than the old veterans they have replaced.

Quite apart from the changes in the overall composition of the Political Committee which we have been discussing, it is important to consider the difference in background and training between the retired Premier Kim Il, who has been "promoted" to a vice-presidency, and the new Premier Pak Song-ch'ol. While the former had little formal education and was credited with expertise in agriculture, the latter is reported to have attended a Japanese college prior to joining Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930's and has devoted himself exclusively to foreign affairs since 1954, becoming director of the International Affairs Department of the KWP in 1966 and filling the post of Foreign Minister between 1959 and 1970. He has been in charge of negotiations with South Korea since 1972, although Kim Il Sung's younger brother, Kim Yong-ju, has served as nominal chairman of the North-South Coordination Committee. It is reasonable to assume that a man of Pak's background will have a broader perspective and a much wider range of knowledge than his predecessor.

Ultimate decision-making power in the DPRK rests, as always, with President Kim Il Sung, the undisputed leader of North Korea. But the leader cannot act without counsel and advice from those he trusts. Therefore, one can build a plausible case for the hypothesis that North Korea's departures from past policies, at the United Nations and at Panmunjom, were the results of leadership changes. One might argue that the new Premier, having assumed office on April 30, 1976, prevailed upon the President to review certain old policies which had not been very effective in promoting the interest of the DPRK, and that the younger generation of technocrats in the leadership, who were more pragmatic

[30] Ch'oe Yong-gon, Vice-President of the DPRK, died in 1976 at age 76. Chong Chun-t'aek, an industrial expert, died in 1973. Kim Il, the former Premier, was elevated to the post of First Vice-President in 1976. Ch'oe Hyon, Defense Minister, was relieved of the post in 1976, at age 69, although he retained his position as Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. Kim Yong-ju, younger brother of the President and director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the KWP, is believed to have been relieved of that assignment in 1974 or 1975. He was made a vice-premier in 1974. Kim Chung-rin, director of the KWP's bureau in charge of South Korean affairs, is thought to have been removed from that post in 1975 or 1976. Kim Man-gum, an agricultural expert, was reported to have been relieved of his vice-premiership in 1973 at age 68. While Kim Chung-rin held rank-order number 10 and Kim Man-gum held rank-order number 15 in 1970, they were listed as numbers 30 and 31 respectively in the roster of the funeral committee for Vice President Ch'oe Yong-gon in September 1976. Neither of them was included in the roster of high-ranking officials who appeared in October 1975 at the 30th anniversary of the KWP's founding, an important indication that they were no longer counted as members of the inner circle. President Kim's brother, Kim Yong-ju, also failed to appear at the anniversary celebration, and was missing from the funeral committee roster cited above, although he had been a member of the funeral committees for Nam Il (March 1976) and Hong Won-gil (May 1976). See *Kita Chosen Kenkyu* (Tokyo), October 1976, p. 15.

[31] The exceptions are Yim Ch'un-ch'u and Chon Mun-sop, guerrilla veterans who fought under Kim Il Sung in Manchuria.

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

Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang, a prime focus of North Korea's efforts to upgrade the skills of future generations.

—EUPRA

in their orientation, supported the new Premier's position.

The generational change occurring at the highest levels of KWP leadership has been matched by changes at the grass-roots level of the party as well.

Change in the Party Rank and File

Ever since 1970, leaders of the KWP have openly expressed concern about the problem of party cadres lagging behind the times. The problem was particularly acute among older cadres. Kim Il Sung summed up the situation in March 1975:

With the lapse of three decades following liberation . . . they [the old cadres] have now reached an old age. . . . [In spite of various study programs] they cannot successfully press forward socialist construction, nor can they wage energetically the battle with the speed required by the Party, with only the knowledge and experience they have now. [This is because] the economy has grown greatly in scale and modern science and technology are required in all domains of economic construction.[32]

The President's solution for the problem was to "teach and help" the old cadres. For this purpose, the KWP launched a massive campaign between 1974 and 1975 by dispatching a large number of "Three Revolution Teams" from the center to revitalize the cadres ideologically, technologically, and culturally. But since more than half of the 2 million members enrolled in the KWP in 1975 belonged to the older generation—admitted to the party before 1961 and poorly educated—the task undertaken was a tremendous one. Nevertheless, the President proclaimed the campaign a success.[33]

It matters little for our purposes here whether

[32] "Let Us Vigorously Carry Out the Three Revolutions . . .," *loc. cit.* p. 6.

[33] I have discussed this problem in detail in Chapter 7 of my book, *The Korean Workers' Party: A Short History*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, forthcoming.

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such a campaign could in fact have substantially advanced the technological level of aging cadres. What is clear is that the party leadership is concerned about the technological preparation of cadres at lower levels who have been playing pivotal roles in pushing party programs through to fruition. The whole episode of the "Three Revolution Teams," which involved "tens of thousands of young intellectuals," leads one to believe that the party will strive to replace older cadres in leadership positions at various levels with young technocrats armed with ideological commitment, daredevil spirit, and technological knowledge. No concrete data about party cadres and membership are available, but it would not be surprising if generational change is occurring at a rapid rate at the grass-roots level.

Conclusions

From all that has been said above, it should be clear that North Korea is in a state of flux. Of course, North Korea has been undergoing a dynamic process of change ever since 1945, and it would seem abnormal to North Korean citizens to experience tranquility. But the changes that have taken place during the past few years have been more unsettling than ever before.

North Korea has confronted severe problems before, including a serious estrangement from the Soviet Union during Khrushchev's last years in power, and one might argue that problems are normal for a developing society such as North Korea. An important difference between past experiences and the present situation, however, is that the current problems being faced have been created by the DPRK's first bold attempt to break into the unfamiliar world of Western diplomacy and capitalist trade without compromising its basic ideological outlook. The North Koreans entered the world arena in the 1970's with an attitude very similar to that held by some advocates of Western learning in 19th-century China—to use the barbarians to curb the barbarians. The sanctity and ultimate inviolability of the North Korean way was to be preserved while benefits were reaped from advantages proffered by capitalist societies.

To be sure, North Korea has not been alone in undertaking such policies. Both the Soviet Union and the PRC sought jealously to guard their sovereignty and ways of life while promoting intercourse with the capitalist world. But in large measure, both have come to accommodate to Western conventions and norms. When strict adherence to political principle jeopardized practical interest, they learned to compromise or at least circumvent the former. At times, principles have been strictly interpreted; but on other occasions, looser or broader interpretations have prevailed.

Until 1976 at least, the leaders of North Korea adhered to their principles in the strictest way and attempted to conduct foreign policy and trade accordingly. Unforeseen events prevented this policy from succeeding, however, and forced the DPRK's leaders to reevaluate their course. They now face a choice of whether to minimize pursuit of their practical interests or to follow the example of other Communist countries by yielding on matters of principle. Changing membership of high-echelon leadership groups and revised cadres policies suggest that the DPRK may opt for the latter alternative. But only time will tell which path the North Korean leaders decide to take.

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Books

The Dynamics of Revolution in Asia

By William J. Duiker

JOHN WILSON LEWIS, Ed. *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1974.
ANTHONY SHORT. *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960.* New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Co., 1975.
G. F. HUDSON, Ed. *Reform and Revolution in Asia.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1972.

IN RECENT YEARS the study of revolution has become a matter of increasing interest in the social sciences. It is fitting, of course, that this should be so, for we live in a revolutionary century. The atmosphere of protest, of revolt against the status quo, has now permeated virtually every corner of the globe, and movements dedicated to the overthrow of established governments and the inauguration of socialist utopia proliferate from the jungles of Thailand to the deserts of southern Africa.

It is useful to remember, however, that even in today's frenetic era, revolutions are not a sure thing. For every revolt which has suceeded, there have been countless insurgency movements which have failed or have languished for decades without realizing their ultimate goal of seizing power. This stark divergence between revolutionary success and failure raises some obvious questions: What causes revolution in human societies? What are the key factors which contribute to the success of a revolutionary movement? Can the experiences of successful movements, such as those in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, be distilled for application elsewhere?

Each in its own fashion, the three books reviewed here are devoted to such issues in the Asian context. Of the trio, the most sophisticated in analysis is *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia,* a selection of provocative articles edited by John W. Lewis. Anthony Short's *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960* is a useful study of the failure of revolution in one specific country in Southeast Asia. *Reform and Revolution in Asia,* edited by G. F. Hudson, appears to be directed more to the general reader than to the specialist and therefore adds little to the study of revolution. Several of its contributions, however, deal in general terms with current conditions in a number of Asian societies and provide a useful counterpoint to the more analytical articles in the volume by Lewis.

IN HIS introductory chapter, Lewis directs the reader's attention to the two key factors affecting the success of revolution in Asia: (1) the objective conditions within society, and (2) the nature of the revolutionary leadership itself. As he points out, without conditions conducive to revolt, the most brilliant insurgency movement is unlikely to succeed. By the same token, however, favorable objective conditions do not guarantee success: without astute leadership, the triumph of a revolution is not inevitable, regardless of the general social conditions in a given society.

The recognition of the importance of human will and objective social conditions, then, is a useful starting point for the study of the revolutionary process in human societies. However, the simple enumeration of these two key factors does not carry us much farther than Lenin, who had reached similar conclusions three quarters of a century ago. What, precisely, are the "objective conditions" which must exist in order for a revolutionary movement to have some chance for success? Given such conditions, what are the magic qualities which revolutionaries must possess in order to turn their dreams into reality?

Both of these questions are explored by various contributors to the three volumes under consid-

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eration here. To Donald Zagoria, in his chapter in Lewis' volume, one of the central questions concerns the role of the peasantry. Classifying Asian agrarian societies according to types of rural class structures (manorial, family-size tenancy, family small-holding, and plantation and ranch agriculture), Zagoria finds that rural areas characterized by the existence of family-size tenant relations are the most conducive to social instability. There are difficulties in this hypothesis, as Zagoria admits, for some high-tenancy areas in China and Vietnam were noticeably resistant to revolutionary penetration. Here, however, he points to an additional factor: the degree of cohesion exhibited by local traditional forces.

Another factor important for success—the degree of alliance between urban and rural revolutionary elements—is discussed in the chapter by Charles Tilly. Drawing his working hypothesis from examples of political and social movements in southern Europe, Tilly concludes that an urban-rural coalition is likely to work only when urban elements provide the original impetus. Without urban leadership, he contends, rural revolt is likely to degenerate into a peasant jacquerie. He further suggests that cities characterized by a high level of industrial activity are the most likely to produce such a spark for a rural revolt. Cities dominated by conservative, landowning elites (southern Italy provides Tilly's example; Saigon might be proposed as an example in Asia) are less likely to generate a stimulus for discontent in the surrounding rural districts. Tilly's hypotheses need corroboration by Asian specialists. At the least, however, they suggest that the urban-rural linkage, now commonly recognized in analyses of the revolutionary process in Asia, may be more complex than previous treatments have assumed.

Other chapters in these volumes focus on specific revolutionary movements in modern Asia which have enjoyed some success. The contributions on China and Vietnam, not surprisingly, tend to support the conclusion that a combination of favorable conditions and astute leadership brought victory to the revolutionary forces. Each stresses the importance of an alliance between urban intellectuals and discontented peasants as a vital factor in the success of the insurgency movement. This urban-rural alliance, as the articles by Ying-mao Kau and Christine Pelzer White confirm, was not easily forged. Radical urban intellectuals found it difficult to see the benefits of building their revolutionary base in the hinterlands, among the ignorant and simple peasantry, and tended (with some encouragement from Comintern strategists) to regard the city as the primary key to a successful revolt. But both movements, by trial and error, gradually came to appreciate the value of a rural strategy. The link, once made, was a natural. Urban intellectuals provided strategic leadership and ideological direction; the peasantry provided the mass constituency as well as the rural base, from which the attack on the governing order could most effectively be launched.

WHEN SUCCESSFUL, revolution looks predetermined. What about those insurgency movements which failed or, to put things another way, have not yet succeeded? Can their failure be attributed to human weakness—to a lack of revolutionary will or an incapacity to link city and village in a revolutionary symbiosis? Or have conditions for revolution simply been less favorable in

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ARNOLD L. HORELICK—Senior Staff Member, The Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, CA); coauthor of *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 1966, and author of numerous articles and papers on Soviet foreign and strategic policies.

HARVEY FIRESIDE—Professor of Politics and Chairman of the Department of Politics, Ithaca College (Ithaca, NY); author of *Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church Under Nazi and Soviet Control*, 1971, and numerous articles on Soviet affairs.

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their countries than conditions were in China and Vietnam?

The most obvious example of a *révolution manquée* in Southeast Asia is the Communist insurrection in Malaya. This case receives detailed consideration in Anthony Short's volume. Short's study effectively undercuts the argument of some observers that the cause of the Communist defeat lay in the effective counter-insurgency policies of the British government. Government policy vacillated between feebleness and spasmodic acts of brutality (including an alleged British equivalent to My Lai). The much-lauded settlement of Chinese squatters in "New Villages" is described by Short as "conceived in uncertainty, carried in indifference, and born in haste." However, Short is equally critical of the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). He finds it indecisive, unable to build a revolutionary constituency among the mostly rural Malay population, and periodically weakened by disloyal elements.

Short's analysis, then, seems to lend support to the hypothesis that human factors contributed to the revolutionary failure in Malaya. This conclusion is tempting, but it is also too simple, for ethnic considerations — a factor over which the party had little control —probably played a major role in preventing the party from achieving nationwide support. The MCP, like its wartime counterpart, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, was primarily Chinese in composition—a fact which automatically limited its popularity among the indigenous Malays. In effect, ideological and economic issues were largely secondary to the emotional communal issue between the majority Malays and the Overseas Chinese and Indian settlers. Could the MCP have improved its chances for success by breaking with its urban Chinese base and attempting to strike roots in the predominantly Malay countryside? This seems doubtful, for although statistical evidence is lacking, the Malay peasantry, whatever its economic and social discontents, was probably not in a revolutionary frame of mind. On balance, then, there is probably little that the MCP could have done to improve its chances for victory (short of preserving its strength by not launching the insurrection in the first place), since the social conditions were simply not as favorable to the revolutionary forces as they appeared to be at the time. The MCP's misreading of the situation simply compounded its problems.

Another notorious example of Communist failure in Asia lies in Indonesia, where the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI), the third largest Communist party in the world, squandered its strength in an abortive *coup d'état* in 1965, an effort which resulted in the rise to power of anti-Communist elements in the army and the decapitation and virtual dissolution of the PKI itself. In Indonesia, the conditions for revolt—both in the cities and in the countryside—appeared relatively favorable for success. Moreover, the party did not face the ethnic divisions faced by its counterpart in Malaya. Yet despite impressive rice-roots support and considerable sympathy from urban nationalist intellectuals, it was unable to consolidate its influence in Indonesian society and, after the disastrous failure of the 1965 revolt, was compelled to retreat underground, a position from which it has not yet reemerged.

Why did the Communists fail in Indonesia? At a superficial glance, the lack of an urban-rural linkage must be dismissed as a factor, since the PKI had apparently won support from a wide spectrum of Indonesian society — from urban workers and intellectuals as well as from poor peasants in the heavily populated island of Java. Yet, as Rex Mortimer contends in his chapter in the Lewis volume, the party's attempt to straddle urban and rural concerns led it into a *cul-de-sac*. The PKI discovered that the Javanese peasantry was not an undifferentiated radical mass which could be mobilized by revolutionary slogans and programs into the dynamic vanguard of an anti-government coalition. Suffering from divisions stemming from the religious and social cleavages within Islam, having a social structure characterized by a certain "formlessness" and "vagueness," and containing numerous residents still attracted in many respects to a traditional mysticism, the Javanese countryside was not an ideal base from which to launch a nationwide uprising. If some areas were susceptible to radical programs (and, as the late Harry J. Benda demonstrated in his study of the 1926 rebellion in Western Java,[1] the reasons for Communist popularity could be highly complex and not replicable elsewhere), there were others where the party found that it had to adjust its policies to traditional themes, thus weakening the thrust of its modernist slogans elsewhere.

[1] Harry J. Benda, "The Communist Rebellions of 1926-1927 in Indonesia," *Pacific Historical Review*, 1955, reprinted in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda*, Monograph Series No. 18, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1972.

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In the cities, too, the PKI had problems. Most important, it confronted a serious rival for popularity among nationalist intellectuals and urban workers, in President Sukarno's Nationalist Party. Sensing its own weakness, the PKI tied its future to an uneasy alliance with the charismatic and ideologically slippery Sukarno. Although this policy proved successful in terms of sheer numbers of new recruits, in 1965 the party found that its constituency was shallow and easily dispersed when faced with primordial emotions mobilized against it by its opponents.

In Indonesia, as in Malaya, societal divisions and the tenacity of traditional forces tended to work against the success of the revolution. Technically, economic conditions and anticolonialist sentiment had seemed to create an explosive situation in both countries, but in the crucible of struggle, neither party was able to overcome the inherent odds against success. Faced with disagreeable reality, the PKI (like the MCP) lashed out in frustration, and lost. In fairness to the PKI, it had perhaps done as well as it could under the circumstances. One must remember that the 1965 coup came quite close to success. Without the resolute response of a few top military leaders, scholars today might be searching for reasons to explain a successful Communist seizure of power in Indonesia.

Space does not permit an extensive discussion of several other interesting case studies in these volumes. In a few instances, Communist mismanagement seems to have resulted in the bungling of a potentially favorable revolutionary situation. Burma is a good example. In John Badgeley's interpretation, responsibility for the failure of communism in Burma seems to lie primarily with the Burma Communist Party itself. Plagued with inveterate ideological factionalism, the party leadership failed to build a firm base either among urban groups or among the ethnic Burman population in the delta areas of lower Burma. Identified primarily with minority interests, the BCP lost the image of a nationalist force, so important to the success of the insurrections in China and Vietnam.

THE GENERAL picture that emerges from these volumes is that in most societies in Asia, postwar revolutionary movements have faced an uphill struggle against a variety of forces—ethnic or religious divisions, lingering traditionalism, the popularity of rival parties, and other factors too numerous to mention here. In such conditions of extreme diversity, there appears to be no "magic formula" which could provide revolutionaries with a strategy for victory. Put simply, the success of revolution in Asia has required the convergence of several fortuitous factors. It will not be easy to repeat the Vietnam example elsewhere.

To say this does not necessarily mean that the prospects for revolution in contemporary Asia are remote. As G. F. Hudson remarks in his concluding essay in *Reform and Revolution in Asia,* the Asian revolution has only just begun. Governments are facing rising pressures from their expanding populations. Traditional bonds and attitudes are loosening, and even disintegrating in some areas, and the level of social frustration with existing problems, and existing governments, is on the rise. All of this ultimately may work to the advantage of the Communists. Recent signs indicate an upsurge of revolutionary sentiment in Thailand and among the rural Malay population in peninsular Malaysia. If this is a sign of the future, the prospects for further revolution in Southeast Asia will undoubtedly increase.

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China's Post-Mao Foreign Policy

By Richard L. Walker

HAROLD C. HINTON. *Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1975.
FRANCIS O. WILCOX, Ed. *China and the Great Powers: Relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.
GENE T. HSIAO, Ed. *Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.
JAY TAYLOR. *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements.* Rev. ed., New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.
ROBERT C. NORTH. *The Foreign Relations of China.* 2nd ed., Encino, CA, Dickenson, 1974.
JOHN GITTINGS. *The World and China, 1922-1972: The Men and Ideas that Shaped Chinese Foreign Policy.* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1974.

THE GENERATIONAL change in China has come about much more quickly than most of us expected. It was really compressed into less than two years, and although there were clear signs that the struggle for the new mandate of heaven had begun earlier, most outside observers were not really quite prepared for the fact that K'ang Sheng, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, and Mao Tse-tung would die within 10 months of each other and not long after the passing of Tung Pi-wu. By early 1977, in the wake of the purges that accompanied the consequent power struggles, only two members of the Standing Committee of the 1973 Politburo, Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Chien-ying, and less than half the members of the Politburo itself were in place. The changes in the top leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have quickly dated some of the painstaking work of that redoubtable band of specialists known as "China-watchers" in the Western world, some of whom apparently expected Mao and Chou to prove immortal.

The flux at the top in Peking leads us to wonder whether it will be possible to discern consistent or predictable features in Chinese foreign policy—especially since the PRC has increasingly been playing a more active role in world affairs and is now enmeshed in a much wider range of transactions around the globe. Dramatic events of the 1970's, such as the Nixon visit to China, have tended to obscure the fact that the PRC has had more than a quarter of a century of experience in dealing with foreign governments. It has conducted regularized diplomacy through embassies and a foreign service corps abroad; it has carried on extensive programs of trade and cultural relations; it has been an active participant in international conferences; and it has joined various international organizations. With the exception of one brief period during the Cultural Revolution, the personnel engaged in the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs since the early 1950's have been relatively untouched by the dramatic contests of internal Chinese politics. Thus, to some degree at least, bureaucratic inertia has provided a minimal thread of continuity in Peking's foreign policies.

GIVEN THE GREAT uncertainty as to how China will handle the passing of a generation which has had exclusive hold on the reins of power for so long, and bearing in mind the obvious importance of the PRC in the world balance, it is useful to survey some of the recent literature on Chinese foreign policy for some clues to what are likely to be major features in the post-Mao period.

There is probably no better place to start than with Harold Hinton's survey of the new balance in Asia. This is a readable and judicious presentation of the context within which Peking's most important foreign policy decisions will be made and felt. The first third of the volume deals with the post-World War II period of American paramountcy in East Asia, up to 1969; the second part, comprising the latter two thirds of the

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book, analyzes the changing power relations in East and Southeast Asia in the period of a relative Soviet-American strategic balance. Although Hinton covers aspects of Japan's reemergence as a new-style economic giant, the American involvement and defeat in Indochina, and diversity and change in Southeast Asia, China remains at the center of his attention, because he feels that "China will be a significant power in Asia, whether in the rest of the world or not, and that Peking will be in a reasonably good position to play an active role in the international politics of the region" (p. 293). Hinton charts the trends in the post-1969 period toward moderation in Peking's policies and notes the "disincentives" to a bellicose or expansionist stance.

The selection of 1969 as, so to speak, a watershed in Peking's world role is legitimate. It is good to be reminded of the great number of events which came together that year: the Nixon administration entered office and initiated a series of overtures to Peking; the United States also took steps to extricate its military forces from Indochina; Japan's economic power began to be apparent as figures revealed that it had surpassed a number of European countries, including the USSR, in per capita income; the impact of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia the preceding August was felt in China, especially following armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet military units along the Ussuri River in March 1969 and along the Turkestan border that summer; within China, the Cultural Revolution came to a close.

Policy adjustments attendant upon the events of 1969 culminated in the visit by an American President to China and the resultant Shanghai communiqué of February 28, 1972, pointing toward smoother relations between Peking and Washington. This dramatic turn in the international relations of the Western Pacific led to a number of studies and conferences devoted to analysis of the portents. The small volume edited by Francis O. Wilcox is the result of four China-centered lectures given in 1973 when the euphoria about the new China-US relationship was at its height. Short lecture-essays analyze Peking's relations with the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. John G. Stoessinger notes that the forces making for discord and tension between the PRC and the USSR are not easily reversed, and that the relationship between the two Communist powers thus remains central in the evolving pattern of international relations. This observation is reinforced by Edwin O. Reischauer, former US Ambassador to Japan, who concludes that "it is difficult to envisage the development of a dangerous rivalry between China and Japan unless Sino-Soviet relations improve greatly on the one hand, or American-Japanese relations deteriorate seriously on the other" (p. 44). He also feels that Chinese-Japanese relations are unlikely to develop into a meaningful partnership.

If the Sino-Soviet rivalry is one theme which runs through all the volumes under review—and it is—the issue of Taiwan and the problem of the United States security treaty with the Nationalist government there is another. Mike Mansfield, a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a long-time admirer of Chinese culture, observes that "until the Taiwan situation is clarified we shall probably find ourselves looking primarily to trade and other exchanges for the cement of our relations with the new China" (p. 58). He believes that the preponderant focus of attention for the PRC has been and will continue to be the military defense of its own country.

TWO OF THE authors in the Wilcox volume, Stoessinger and Professor Jerome A. Cohen, are contributors to the more important collection of essays edited by Gene T. Hsiao, which is the result of a conference held in June 1973 in Bermuda (thus do China-watchers suffer!). It contains 15 chapters which examine various aspects of the changed structure of relations in Asia and of Chinese foreign policy concerns. Though some of the essays are dated by subsequent events, including the passing of the old guard in Peking, the volume remains a valuable guide to the long-term concerns of the PRC.

Hsiao divides the collection into two parts. The first examines some of the broader issues such as trade, scholarly exchange, media treatment in the PRC, and China's relations with and participation in the United Nations. Veteran reporter Stanley Karnow notes the many impediments to accurate or in-depth coverage of the PRC. He was concerned at the time of writing that American journalists, finally admitted to the Middle Kingdom after so long, would wind up distorting reality by substituting too favorable treatment for the relatively unfavorable treatment which he felt had pervaded the US press in former years, and he cited the journalist Joseph Alsop as an example. Indeed, it is worth recording that China has been neither the fire-breathing dragon portrayed by

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many of us in the 1950's and 1960's nor the cuddly panda some observers saw during the euphoric days following the opening to the US. Fortunately, as more contacts between Chinese and Americans have developed, a balance has entered into the reporting. Stephen Uhalley, while warning of "fundamental and enormous political differences between the respective political systems, ways of life, and societal objectives" (p. 84), still held out more optimism for the development of Sino-American scholarly exchange than has proved justified over the intervening years. William R. Feeney maintains that the UN has been an important forum for the articulation of Peking's foreign policy since the PRC was admitted in October 1971 (and the government on Taiwan expelled). While the PRC has frequently had to take stands on issues where it would have preferred an ambiguity, for the most part its representatives have been able to pursue policies which have been of lasting and important interest. These include elimination of the challenge of the Nationalist government on Taiwan by expunging it from past records and voting it out of UN-affiliated bodies, denunciation of the two superpowers, and a bid for Third World leadership.

The second part of the collection deals with more specific relations in the wake of the Sino-American détente. George Ginsburgs observes that the Soviet response was one of balanced and measured, though hardly friendly, caution. Chong-Sik Lee argues that while, as a result of the opening of dialogue between Washington and Peking, the two sides in Korea were brought (and he could have said "temporarily") to the negotiating table, "it is likely to require a long period of arduous negotiations before the Korean people experience genuine peace and can afford to shed the seige mentality under which they have labored for too long" (p. 205). Though a couple of the essays, such as Kenneth P. Landon's treatment of the Indochina conflict, have been overtaken by events, the general thrust of the volume—that major constraints will be placed on Peking's policies by the realities of the world around China—remains valid.

As Michael Witunski notes in his concluding chapter in the Hsiao volume, by the turn of the century more than 60 per cent of the world's population will be concentrated in Asia. Obviously, then, this is the major area of operation for China, which sits at the continent's heart, and the region could offer fertile ground if the PRC wishes to pursue the policies embodied in the 1965 declaration of support for people's wars by the now-discredited Lin Piao.[1]

In this context, the detailed study of PRC policies toward Southeast Asia by Jay Taylor is helpful. His study is likely to remain a standard reference work for appraising the many levels of Chinese relations with the peoples and states of the region—through Overseas Chinese connections, official diplomacy and state-to-state contacts, ties with Communist parties, cadre training programs, visiting delegations, and clandestine electronic communications. Peking has insisted that its official state-level relations are fully in accord with the five principles of peaceful coexistence—that mainstay of official foreign policy pronouncements since the Bandung Conference of 1955—but that this does not exclude support for and assistance to the revolutionary movements and insurgencies in Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Political leaders in the area thus have had difficulty in separating and sorting out, let alone coping with, the various dimensions of relations.

The seeming contradictions in policy are well brought out in Taylor's discussion of PRC relations with Burma and Indonesia. His research highlights the selective nature of Chinese support for revolutionary movements abroad. It would be hard indeed to interpret the choices by Peking in strictly ideological terms, though the Chinese attempt to do so. As Taylor notes, "the primary standard by which the Chinese divide sham from genuine liberation struggles is Peking's own security, prestige, and influence" (p. 389). Increasingly, Peking's view of its own national interest, rather than its vision of some utopian Asian Communist community, dictates its other foreign policy choices too. But, as Taylor warns, to preclude the possibility that some such national-ideological objective might again motivate Chinese behavior would be to commit the mistake of an earlier period when people refused to believe that the leadership around Mao were serious Communists.

EVEN IF Peking were to attempt to bring about a Cultural Revolution-style proletarianization in surrounding areas, there would be great obstacles, for, as Taylor brings out, the political climate is not the same as in former decades. Further, there are the practical restraints on the capabilities

[1] Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," released by New China News Agency, Sept. 2, 1965.

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of China itself. The limitations on Peking's capacity to deploy its power and exert influence beyond its borders are the subject of the first part of Robert C. North's treatment of Chinese foreign policy. North's volume, intended as an undergraduate text and an introduction for the intelligent layman, condenses a great amount of material about China into brief scope. He concludes that despite its size and population, "Communist China, in terms of its economy, is still a second-rate power at best" (p. 33). And despite a nuclear capability, he feels, the same can be said about the PRC as a military power. In fact, North would probably retitle Hinton's book "Two and Two-Half Powers."

The second part of North's book is devoted to "describing and projecting Chinese Communist foreign policy." His summary of the issues which have concerned Peking for more than two decades is in large part a description of continuing problems for the PRC and of major centers of persistent concern: adjustments with the United States and Japan; contention with the Soviet Union; and active participation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although only minor changes have been made to update this book since it was first published in 1969 and most of the materials are drawn from the Chinese experiences in foreign affairs before that watershed year, North is able to point toward the major determinants of foreign policy for the future. In his concluding chapter, he gives weight to the Chineseness of that policy, observing:

For the People's Republic of China it appears that political culture, tradition, changes in capabilities, and conscious choice arising from deep reservoirs of dissatisfaction have all been powerful factors in Chinese behavior. Of these four, capability, tradition, and conscious choice arising from dissatisfaction are still so strong that certain aspects of Chinese policy and behavior would be very likely to continue even if the leadership should substantially change and if specific aspects of the political culture — the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and style—were to be replaced by something else. (p. 150)

But he also feels that China's foreign policy will be determined by such factors as the need to close the population-technology gap, the concern for access to raw materials, and the adjustment to the new balance of forces in Asia.

One thing is quite clear: Chinese foreign policy does have its own style. Historians have commented on the parallels between foreign policy styles of dynastic times and those of the PRC—secrecy, inaccessibility, guided tourism, internal controls, and exaggerated rhetoric, to name only a few examples. But the style of Peking today is something more. Its perspective has been influenced by Maoist interpretations and behavior patterns, and despite the clear indications that some of the exaggerated claims advanced for the late leader are being revised as his judgment about people, including his last wife, and even about policies is called into question, Peking continues to justify policies and maintain a mystique of infallibility by reference to Mao's interpretations of world forces and trends. This sometimes necessitates distortion and unmaking of facts. Nevertheless, it is important that this ingredient, a key factor in PRC perceptions of the world and PRC expectations regarding actions by others, be taken into account.

In this respect, John Gittings' historical summary of the Maoist views on foreign policy is useful. Gittings is an avid admirer of Mao Tse-tung, and this work is sprinkled with characterizations that resemble those that adorned the pages of *Jen-min Jih-pao* during the height of the personality cult: the Chinese leader is "correct," "clear-headed," and "farsighted"; his writings have a "brilliant twist of dialectical skill"; and the nine polemics in reply to the July 14, 1963, "Open Letter" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,[2] which Gittings believes bore the stamp of "The Chairman," are a "masterly mixture of crisp invective and cold logic" (they are actually somewhat repetitious and at times downright boring). According to Gittings—and this much is accurate—a key feature in Mao's world view is the Leninist interpretation of imperialism and the resulting perception of China's position as a semicolony. Much of Mao's dynamism stemmed from his commitment to a constant struggle against the forces of imperialism as he perceived them. It is interesting that no attention is given to Lenin's 1920 "Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Question," yet therein lay the strategy for the semicolonial countries for which Mao was later to receive credit.

Gittings so identifies with Mao's interpretations and with PRC positions it is frequently difficult to determine which are his and which are those of the Chinese.

[2] *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965.

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He accepts PRC rewriting of such items as the 1936 kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek, the voluntary repatriation issue in the Korean negotiations in 1952-53, the 1958 offshore islands crisis (which he describes as an American blockade), and the 1965 Gestapu incident in Indonesia (which he characterizes as a "rightwing coup"). And for Gittings, who finds in "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line" the "key to our understanding of the inner rationality of Chinese foreign policy in the past and probably in the future as well" (p. 260), naturally the villains of the piece are "American imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism." His is a "devil theory of history" which perceives a "fundamental principal of universalist capitalism which lay behind US foreign policy" (p. 164).

Much of Gittings' presentation could be dismissed as distorted and in fact downright silly; however, these Maoist interpretations have sunk some roots into the Chinese intellectual soil, and it is important that we understand the sources for arguments which we are likely to confront in years ahead. His book also helps us to appreciate why a number of revisionist historians in the West, where there is a deserved guilt complex over past treatment of China, tend to be admirers of Mao Tse-tung and to accept somewhat uncritically the PRC's world view.

Gittings' emphasis on the Chinese sensitivity to imperialist pressures leads him to the conclusion —surely one of the most provocative theses of his work—that the internal shifts in Peking's policies are in response to external pressures rather than the other way around. On this score, the authors of the other works under review here would certainly disagree. They too would doubt whether the Chairman's "revolutionary line" is as solidly entrenched in Chinese foreign policy as Gittings believes it is. But it remains a factor deserving our attention, and he has proved himself an able, albeit partisan, analyst.

As Harold Hinton accurately observes, "more than most countries, China in the past has surprised those who have tried to predict its future" (p. 278). Thanks to efforts such as those under review, however, we are in a better position to anticipate major thrusts and to chart important problems and trends in the foreign relations of the world's most populous state than we were for the Soviet Union when the Stalin era ended.

Peking, Southeast Asia, and the Overseas Chinese

By Thak Chaloemtiarana

GARTH ALEXANDER. *The Invisible China.* New York, NY, Macmillan, 1973.
C. P. FITZGERALD. *China and Southeast Asia since 1945.* Camberwell, Longman Australia Pty. Ltd., 1973.

IT IS ONLY in this decade that China has regained much of the prestige and power position she enjoyed prior to the 18th century. The People's Republic today looms as a superpower, whose proximity is viewed as an overwhelming threat by Southeast Asian countries. Once limited to pursuing influence basically through the promotion of her domestic experience as a panacea for underdevelopment, the PRC is now in a better position to reclaim China's lost hegemony over the area. The countries of Southeast Asia must exercise realism in formulating viable policies to deal with and accommodate to this recent change in the international order. And no policy toward a strong China can ignore the role and presence of the sizable Overseas, or "Nanyang," Chinese communities in all of these countries. For, unless local leaders pragmatically reassess discriminatory policies and actions rooted in traditional Sinophobia and move to assimilate local Chinese minorities (or the majority in the case of

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Singapore) as cocontributors to national development, they may find themselves providing Peking a source of considerable political leverage.

In a very readable journalistic style, Garth Alexander examines the various local prejudices—racial, social, cultural, ideological, and economic—which have led to the persecution of the Overseas Chinese over the centuries. During the early years, when Chinese were in many instances being exploited as a source of cheap labor, to be bought and sold like sheep and cattle, there were still warnings against the "Yellow Peril," and campaigns were launched in Southeast Asia and elsewhere to eliminate the Chinese. The Chinese had no rights or protection under local legal systems and, as the idiom that entered the English language somewhat later suggests, stood only a "Chinaman's chance" of alleviating the constant abuse and discrimination.

Despite raids, slaughters, provocations, and abuse, the patient and hardy Overseas Chinese—some 10 million of them—survived and carved a niche for themselves in the history of Southeast Asia's development. From mere coolies and vendors, they became important financiers, educators, and even prominent politicians. Whether directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, the Chinese helped modernize these societies as tax farmers, retail traders, or bankers. Commercialization of agriculture went hand in hand with Chinese introduction of rice mills and export-import businesses. Capital-investment and finance houses followed shortly thereafter. However, while grudgingly acknowledging these vital contributions, indigenous political leaders have been all too ready to heap the blame for national ills on the Overseas Chinese, to make them the scapegoat par excellence.

(In his zeal to demonstrate the unjust treatment of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, it should be noted, Alexander tends to exaggerate the role that anti-Chinese sentiment played in spurring various nationalist movements. For example, he too readily links the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in Thailand in 1932 to a fear of Chinese "colonizers" who allegedly were using their privileged status to establish a stranglehold over the entire Thai economy. According to Alexander, the People's Party that was successful in overthrowing the absolute monarchy in favor of a democratic system was a Thai secret society founded to counter this perceived threat [p. 31]. Such an approach in discussing Thailand and other countries tends to paint the Chinese as the main, if negative, determinants of political change, whereas in most cases they have been merely the victims of or *ex post facto* excuses for important political events that have occurred.)

An oft-cited rationale for anti-Chinese sentiment has been the allegedly exploitative nature of the Overseas Chinese communities. Particular emphasis has been given to the practice—common among Chinese merchants and businessmen—of systematically remitting part of their profits to kinsfolk in China. This has made the Chinese seem to be ingrates, not worthy of trust as full-fledged citizens of the local societies. The Chinese have also been accused of depriving indigenous populations of many desirable jobs. To this argument, it can be responded that these jobs came about through the initiatives of the Chinese, who were primarily responsible for the development of the market economy and the growth of urban business centers.[1] Regardless of the merits of that argument in historical terms, however, the complaint is that *now* the predominance of Chinese in a number of occupations effectively prevents locals from entering such jobs.

Local governments have tried to respond to such complaints by adopting laws barring Chinese and other aliens from employment in various occupations. Interestingly enough, these discriminatory laws have been applied only to occupations in which only the less well-to-do Chinese might pose a threat—*e.g.*, in taxi-driving, hair-cutting, and retail trade. Seldom do they put limitations upon participation by Chinese in banking and finance, importing and exporting, or other sophisticated occupations where the proverbial expertise, tenacity, and acumen of the Chinese are needed.[2]

While such socioeconomic issues, and more recently the almost pathological fear of Communist infiltration, have been important sources of discrimination against the Chinese, racial antagonism has probably been

[1] On this point, see Likhit Dhiravegin, "Is It True That the Chinese Have Snatched Away Thai Occupations?" *Warasan Chin Suksa* (Bangkok), January-March 1976, pp. 127-31.

[2] At a seminar in 1969, American anthropologist Lauristan Sharp argued that, thanks to the Chinese, the Thai have been allowed to become more Thai. The Cornell professor explained that, by fulfilling important social functions related to business and market transactions, the Chinese have permitted the Thai to follow bureaucratic careers they prefer. A similar argument was posed by Victor Purcell in his *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 164.

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the most potent motive for persecution. As Indonesia's foremost lawyer, Dr. Yap Thian Hien, himself an Overseas Chinese, has said:

It is easier to intimidate stateless aliens and to whip the people into indignation over apparent racial exploitation rather than over class exploitation.[3]

Thus, while the anti-Chinese excesses in Indonesia following the 1965 Gestapu Affair and the Chinese-Malay race riots of 1969 reflected political factors (in the one case, strong suspicion of Chinese collusion in the attempted coup against Sukarno; in the other, the swing of Chinese support away from the ruling Alliance Party in the West Malaysian elections of May 1969), racial animosities were the underlying cause of both developments.

Perpetuation of anti-Chinese attitudes and discriminatory practices tends to foster a severe "identity crisis" among locally-born Chinese.[4] Most have never even seen China, and they would like to become fully accepted as Filipino, Indonesian, or Burmese citizens if they only had the opportunity. Unfortunately, legal adoption of local citizenship hardly guarantees such an acceptance by the local population. This is true even in Thailand, the only country pursuing an active program of assimilation of its Chinese minority.

The psychological dilemma this state of affairs has produced and continues to produce among the Nanyang Chinese is sympathetically painted by Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, a respected Thai educator, economist, and humanist. He gives the following moving account of his early experiences as a *luk cheen* or locally-born Chinese:

Because our name was Chinese, our family name also Chinese, our friends at school ridiculed us for being chek *[a derogatory term for Chinese, allegedly derived from the expression* a chek, *meaning "uncle"]. They called us by many shameful names. For example, they called me* ai tii *[a derogatory term for a Chinese boy, derived from the Chinese expression for "younger brother"]. When my father had to sign our report cards, he had to do it in Chinese since he could not write Thai. Kam was more sensitive to this than I, to the point of later faking father's signature in Thai and taking the opportunity to change Sāā, being the third son of my grandfather, to Sǎā, which sounded Thai.*

At school we tried so hard to be accepted as Thais by our friends; when we went home, especially if we visited father and uncle at the fish-float, our relatives ridiculed us for becoming Thais, for not being able to speak Chinese correctly. We became "huan kia," *or children of barbarians. . . .*

One tends to view the question of the local Chinese as though the local Chinese were the main problem. One does not consider that the local Chinese themselves face problems — being sandwiched between both the Thai and Chinese communities. I think that if we can solve the problems that the local Chinese face, we can get rid of the local-Chinese issue. For myself, mother helped me resolve this [dualism] by saying: "Born in Thailand, live in Thailand, must be Thai, must be loyal to Thailand." . . . Mother showed me the way. Mother's name was Chinese; she had Chinese blood; she could speak Chinese fluently and was well acquainted with Chinese traditions such as ancestor worship. But those involved family and social considerations and not matters of nationality and loyalty, which should belong to Thailand. During the Japanese War [World War II] many of my friends and I who were locally-born Chinese never hestitated to put up our lives for the Thai nation. Not only were we born in Thailand and grew up on Thai rice, but we also received scholarships from the Thai government—money from the Thai farmers and people.[5]

THE STATUS of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has been further complicated by events in China, *i.e.*, the schism between the Nationalists and Communists. This point is elaborated in Professor C. P. FitzGerald's insightful study of relations between China and Southeast Asia since World War II. Governments of the region generally felt closer ideologically to the Nationalists, or Kuomintang (KMT), and, even though wary of a strong Communist China, made accommodations with the KMT. The latter maintained the principle of *jus sanguinis* and claimed jurisdiction over all Nanyang Chinese. As before the war, the KMT operated a strong network among those communities designed to maintain control and influence, including assurance of a continued flow of remittances to Taipei. (The long arm of the KMT was demonstrated

[3] Quoted in Alexander, p. 199.

[4] See Richard J. Coughlin, *Double Identity*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1963.

[5] Puey Ungphakorn, *Santi prachatham* (Peaceful Social Justice), Bangkok, Khled Thai Press, 1973, pp. 7-8.

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in the case of the Yuyitung brothers in the Philippines.[6])

Initially, the Communist regime established in Peking in 1949 vociferously defended the rights of the Overseas Chinese in its pronouncements. At the same time, the PRC called for local revolutions (not so much through Chinese forces as through indigenous movements), a posture which precluded effective relations with local political authorities and thereby left Peking with little concrete means for defending the interests of the Nanyang Chinese. It was not until 1954 that the People's Republic even established an Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, under the directorship of Liao Ch'eng-chih.

However, as FitzGerald points out, there was a shift in Chinese policies in 1955. At this juncture, the PRC accepted the reality of the independence of former dominions and colonies in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and at the Bandung Conference she confirmed the existence of the new political order. As for the Overseas Chinese, Peking declared itself in favor of the principle of *jus soli*—determination of a person's nationality by his place of birth. Chou En-lai offered to sign a treaty embodying this principle with any government which engaged in diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. Indonesia, which had recognized the PRC in 1950, was the only country to indicate its willingness to begin negotiations for the conclusion of such a treaty.

Peking's conciliatory move was a calculated one. In the first place, the PRC apparently hoped that by establishing governmental relations it would gain access to the Overseas Chinese communities *and* the remittances which still flowed to the KMT. Even though the local Chinese, especially the well-to-do, were operating in a capitalist environment inimical to Communist ideology, they might provide the PRC some foreign exchange. Second, Peking saw no point in actively promoting disaffection or disloyalty to local regimes among the Nanyang Chinese, for it perceived little chance for these communities to instigate revolutions in the host countries. Instead, overly assertive Chinese communities might only incur increased local enmity toward them and Peking. The latter was still in no position to have its ability to protect Chinese abroad tested. The doctrine of *jus soli* in effect relieved Peking of a potential embarrassment.

For more than a decade—from Bandung until the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69)—Peking's policy toward the Overseas Chinese was one of moderation and laissez-faire. FitzGerald would even adjudge it "hesitant, indecisive, timid and inconclusive" (p. 90). In any case, the PRC, realizing that it would be too costly to attempt to win over ethnic Chinese already imbued with the vices of liberal capitalism, completely reversed Nationalist practice and encouraged the Nanyang Chinese to assimilate. In conformity with this approach, Peking did not send teachers and textbooks for local Chinese-run schools. Insistence on doing so, of course, would only have hastened the closure of the schools because of local governments' sensitivity on the ideological front.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution seemed for a moment to signal a shift in Peking's policy toward the overseas communities. Indeed, Liao Ch'eng-chih was driven from office in July 1967 for harboring "revisionist" thoughts and carrying out nonrevolutionary policies. But, rhetoric notwithstanding, no new policy was enunciated. One must assume that Peking continues to advise the Overseas Chinese to conform to local laws.

Social realities in Southeast Asia would certainly seem to dictate that such a policy be allowed to prevail. There has been no great influx of Chinese immigrants to the region since the 1930's, and time has dulled and made tenuous the ties to family and clan in the motherland. Second- and third-generation local Chinese are less promising sources of foreign-exchange remittances. Furthermore, the Overseas Chinese are now part of the educated, entrepreneurial, and financial strata of local societies and—while not always totally accepted—find little attraction in calls to expatriate themselves.

FITZGERALD's account leaves off in 1973. Since then, most countries in Southeast Asia have opened diplomatic relations with Peking and have forsaken their previous close ties with Taipei. However, most Overseas Chinese communities have been cautious

[6] The brothers Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung were publisher and editor, respectively, of the influential *Chinese Commercial News*, then the largest newspaper in the Philippines. Kuomintang agents and the Philippine military establishment were concerned that the newspaper did not adequately support the anti-Communist policy of Taiwan and of the Philippines. Local authorities arrested and interrogated the brothers several times and finally in 1970 deported them to Taiwan to stand trial for treason although they had renounced their Nationalist Chinese citizenship long before (their Chinese passports had been withdrawn eight years earlier). There was a question whether, as "stateless persons," the two should have been sent to Taiwan as their "land of origin." Alexander treats the case in detail (pp. 149-66).

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about casting their lot with the People's Republic. While all Chinese respect the Peking regime for being able to restore China's prestige, so badly damaged by the incursions of Western imperialism, most of those abroad do not subscribe to the Communists' ideology. This and Peking's continued emphasis on the principle of *jus soli* make it unlikely that the Overseas Chinese will become revolutionary nuclei for Peking-directed adventures.

Although Peking possesses improved military and economic capabilities to intervene on behalf of overseas ethnic kin, it is doubtful whether China would do so purely from motives of racial chauvinism. The "irrational" aggressiveness of China's foreign policy in previous years would seem to have been largely a reaction to the United States "containment" policy and the underlying "domino theory" argument. Now that this policy appears to have been discarded—and indeed the domino theory proven fallacious—one might expect China to behave more "rationally," *i.e.,* less aggressively.

Under such circumstances, it seems likely that Peking would opt for some modern version of the Confucian overlord role with regard to Southeast Asia, embodying elements of imperial China's tributary approach but adapted to the contemporary setting. Such a role would accord with the traditional belief of the Chinese in their own cultural superiority and with their concept of the Middle Kingdom. Moreover, China's own bitter experience with Western spheres of influence makes it inconceivable that Peking would want to annex the highly nationalistic Southeast Asian states. In any case, it would be easier and more economical to exert control and influence over the area indirectly as the Russians and Americans have done. Ultimately, then, the world might be confronted with something approximating a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in Southeast Asia.

If the above prognosis proves accurate, the policies of Southeast Asian governments toward the Overseas Chinese could enter significantly into relations between these governments and Peking. A disenchanted minority might easily succumb to efforts by the PRC to stir up trouble for local governments to make them more malleable. By the same token, a persecuted minority might provide China with an excuse to reprimand or demand satisfaction from the local governments. To be sure, the question of the Overseas Chinese would not be central to Peking's foreign policy once the PRC had established de facto political hegemony over the region, but it could still be a useful issue for China to manipulate in its dealings with recalcitrant governments, as a means of exerting pressure on them.

Thus, as long as the countries of Southeast Asia continue to maintain laws and policies which discriminate against the local Chinese—many of whom, as we have seen, seek to resolve their identity crises by committing themselves to the lands where they reside—these countries may find themselves working against their own self-interests. Not only do such laws and policies fail to take account of the Overseas Chinese as potential national assets, but they also ignore the possible ramifications of the likely reemergence of a strong China.

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The Strategic Mind-Set of the Soviet Military

By Arnold L. Horelick

A. A. GRECHKO. *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977. A translation of *Vooruzhënnyye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva,* 2nd expanded edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975.

V. D. SOKOLOVSKIY. *Soviet Military Strategy.* New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Company, 1975. A translation, edited with analysis and commentary, by Harriet Fast Scott, of *Voyennaya strategiya,* 3rd edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968.

FIVE YEARS after the first SALT agreements registered the USSR's coequal status with the United States as a nuclear superpower, the perennial question of Soviet strategic goals has reemerged in a new light as an urgent and highly controversial issue in the West. It is at the heart of the ongoing American defense debate, which is shaped largely by contradictory assumptions about Soviet strategic purposes made by advocates of alternative American policies. Those who believe that the Soviet leadership, at bottom, shares with the United States the objective of stabilizing the Soviet-American strategic relationship at a level of rough equality and regards as futile the quest for any meaningful margin of superiority are prepared to enter into arms limitations agreements with the USSR and unilaterally exercise restraint in defense programs, steps that others, making rather different assumptions about Soviet purposes, reject as endangering American national security and encouraging unhealthy Soviet impulses.

"Hard" evidence bearing on Soviet strategic deployments and new weapons development programs does not, in itself, seem capable of resolving the controversy. For those deeply persuaded that achievement of a nuclear-war-winning capability is precluded by the laws of physics and that "strategic superiority" is therefore a militarily meaningless and politically bankrupt concept, there simply may not be any hard evidence of the kind likely to be acquired that can disprove the USSR's commitment to mutual deterrence. In sharp contrast, now that the USSR is generally credited with having achieved "rough equivalence" in strategic capabilities, those equally persuaded of the ambitious designs of the Soviet leadership can find no satisfactory explanation for the rapid pace and extensive scope of new Soviet strategic programs other than a relentless Soviet drive for strategic superiority—to be employed for purposes of political coercion if not military action against the United States or its allies.

Soviet leaders, who presumably know best why they are doing what they are doing, have for the most part been mere bystanders in this American debate over their strategic purposes — bemused, perhaps, but certainly not indifferent, given that US defense budgets hang in the balance. Occasionally, they inject themselves into the debate to assert that their purpose is not aggression, or to reassure the United States that Soviet military preparations serve exclusively peaceful purposes. But they have displayed no inclination to provide in operationally meaningful terms a benign rationale for the military deployments they make and the new strategic arms they are acquiring. In this connection, it might be recalled that one of the early American hopes with respect to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was that these negotiations would provide a forum in which the strategic rationales underlying the behavior of the two sides would first be illuminated and then, by mutual adjustment, reconciled to serve the common objective of stabilizing the strategic competition along Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) lines. But the Soviet side manifested no interest in such a strategic dialogue, and at an early stage the negotiations moved into bargaining over specific measures of limitation and constraint, with

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the US side obliged to guess at the larger strategic purposes of its negotiating partner.

Given the absence of direct evidence regarding Soviet strategic goals, it is remarkable how negligible a role Soviet military literature has played in the US debate, especially since this literature is the one available source in which Soviet strategic purposes are set forth with some measure of systematic articulation. There are two reasons for this relative neglect, one superficial and the other quite profound. The superficial reason is that until recently very little of this voluminous literature has been available in English translation; it has therefore been accessible only to those who read Russian—in short to only a small part of the American defense-intellectual and arms-control communities. More important, to the limited extent that this material has been brought to bear in the debate, the same kinds of mutually contradictory strategic world views that have made "hard" evidence seem inconclusive have also produced utterly irreconcilable interpretations of the military literature. The optimistic school, which inclines to a more benign view of Soviet strategic purposes, tends either to ignore this material as irrelevant or to discount it as morale-building Soviet military propaganda and special pleading by the Soviet military establishment for bigger budgets. That is, the goal of "superiority" and the commitment to "victory" repeatedly proclaimed in this literature are dismissed as Soviet military pie-in-the-sky, comparable in operational significance to the party ideologues' harping on the ultimate objective of building communism and creating the new Soviet man. The pessimists, on the other hand, tend to accept this material at face value and to employ it selectively, attaching cardinal importance to its most belligerent and strategically ambitious passages and imparting to them latent operational meaning that goes substantially beyond their manifest content. Seldom is the middle ground between these two positions explored.

For reasons all too well known to students of Soviet affairs, there are great difficulties in attempting to interpret Soviet military literature, and inferences derived from it are bound to be controversial. But to discount it as irrelevant is even less justified than to read it uncritically. Allowing even for the high propaganda load and low hard-data content of Soviet military pronouncements, surely what Soviet marshals have to say about the USSR's strategic goals should be at least as relevant to the debate as what American officers and defense officials say about those of the United States. While marshaling the evidence would take us far beyond the scope of the present article, the case that Soviet military professionals exercise far greater influence than their American counterparts in shaping their nation's strategic programs and arms control policies seems overwhelmingly powerful to the reviewer. Certainly, in the USSR the military professionals enjoy a virtual monopoly in public exposition of military strategy; in the United States that function is not only shared with but also clearly dominated by civilians.

TO THE EXTENT that inaccessibility has in the past limited utilization of Soviet professional military writings by Western analysts, that constraint is fast being relaxed thanks to the appearance of competent translations of major Soviet military works, such as the volumes under review. The book by the late Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, who was at the time of his death last year both a full member of the Soviet Communist Party's Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense, is the 12th in the *Soviet Military Thought* translations series published since 1974 under the auspices of the US Air Force. The translation is from the second (1975) Russian edition, with certain slight revisions (introduced under unusual circumstances to be described below). The second volume under review is a new translation, with analysis and commentaries, by Harriet Fast Scott of the third edition of what still stands as the most comprehensive Soviet treatise on military strategy. Written by a group of leading Soviet military academicians under the supervision of the late Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1953 to 1960, *Military Strategy* was first published in the USSR in 1962. As the first Soviet work of its kind to appear in almost four decades, the Sokolovskiy volume attracted wide attention in the West and was published in two independent translations in the United States, each accompanied by analytical introductions and annotations written by distinguished American students of Soviet military affairs.[1] A second revised Russian edition appeared a year later, and still a

[1] V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, with analytical introduction and annotations by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Gouré, and Thomas W. Wolfe, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1963; and V. D. Sokolovsky, *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts*, with an introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff, New York, NY, Praeger, 1963.

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third, again revised, in 1968. By carefully identifying additions to and deletions from the Sokolovskiy volume as it passed through successive editions, Mrs. Scott in effect has given readers access to all three editions under a single cover.

The books are dissimilar in scope and purpose. Strategy is the central concern of the Sokolovskiy opus but is only one of many issues treated in Marshal Grechko's more modest but wide-ranging book on Soviet "military construction" (*voyennoye stroitel'stvo*). Aimed at a larger, less specialized audience than Sokolovskiy's treatise, the late Soviet Defense Minister's book contains a great deal of popular historical and party-political material and is written in the turgid prose style that is a hallmark of the genre. For the uninitiated Western reader, the ratio of pot-boiler to strategic substance in the Grechko translation will therefore seem distressingly high.

These books will be of interest on two rather different levels of analysis for two classes of foreign readers. For the specialist in Soviet military affairs, the volumes offer an opportunity to explore in minute detail changes in authoritative Soviet military views on a broad range of subjects (*e.g.*, the role of conventional forces, the probability of conventional war escalating to nuclear war, service roles and missions, the external functions of the Soviet armed forces, and perceptions of the opponent) as they have been affected by the shifting US-Soviet strategic balance, the explosive growth of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities, and new advances in military technology during the 13-year time span bracketed by the first edition of Sokolovskiy and the last edition of Grechko. The organization of this latest translation of Sokolovskiy makes it particularly convenient for precisely this kind of microanalysis, though more assistance from the American editor would have been helpful. While Mrs. Scott provides brief introductory comments to each chapter, identifying a few major changes, the analytical content is disappointingly thin. The editor's overall introduction, useful as a guide to Soviet military literature and to the military and academic institutions in which they are produced, is also weak in analytical substance and does not contribute much to updating the more extensive introductions to the two translations of the first edition written by Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas Wolfe and by Raymond Garthoff.

SINCE FEW readers of the Grechko translation are likely to take the trouble to compare it with the two earlier Russian-language editions, the reviewer has dutifully done so. This involved two stages: the first, a comparison of the translation (or, in effect, the second Russian edition) with the first Russian edition; the second, a comparison of the "revised" translation with the original second Russian edition. Having noted this, let me record my findings.

The second Russian edition (signed to press in March 1975) is somewhat more belligerent in tone than the first (April 1974), expressing deeper reservations about the durability of the improved international situation, and stronger warnings about the changeless aggressive character of the imperialist opponent. Marshal Grechko's considerably expanded discussion of the multinational character of the Soviet armed forces in the later edition is of particular interest, less for its manifest content than for broader concerns that may underlie the disproportionate attention devoted to the subject. Given the kinds of ethno-demographic changes now underway in the USSR, the Soviet armed forces will in the years ahead be obliged to draw on progressively larger numbers of non-European conscripts—primarily from Central Asia and the Caucasus—if they are to remain at their present size. The language, technical-skills, training, and morale problems associated with what is privately referred to in Soviet military circles as the "yellowing" (*ozhëlteniye*) of the Soviet armed forces may require major organizational adjustments. It is clear from Marshal Grechko's historical survey that one adjustment he would strongly have opposed is formation of territorial units comprised of local-nationality conscripts, such as existed in the Soviet Union during most of its history prior to the end of World War II. In proposing a one-third reduction in the size of the Soviet armed forces, Khrushchev had hinted in January 1960 that reorganization of the forces on a territorial basis—inevitably along ethnic lines in many national republics—was under consideration.[2] The hint, like many other "harebrained schemes" of the late First Secretary, was never publicly developed into a proposal; however, Grechko's pointed critique of the military disadvantages of national units (p. 117 of the translation) suggests that the idea may still find favor in some quarters, particularly in light of the economy's competing claims for the dwindling numbers

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 15, 1960.

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of new European workers entering the Soviet labor force.

The USAF translation, as the American editor notes in his Introduction, is a "slightly revised version of the Soviet 2nd edition," the revisions having been suggested by the Soviet All-Union Copyright Agency (VAAP), from which the required copyright release was obtained. According to VAAP, Marshal Grechko continued to work on his book during the last period of his life, and the changes incorporated into the American edition correspond to the author's final wording. While relatively few in number—totaling some two pages of text—they suggest some Soviet sensitivity regarding what American readers might infer from certain passages in the Russian edition. Several of the changes requested by VAAP were evidently intended to soften somewhat the belligerent tone of the original.

Particularly noteworthy is the excision of some passages calling for a vigorous Soviet program of military research and development, including the orientation of basic research toward discovery of "still unknown attributes of matter, phenomena, and the laws of nature" that might have military application. On page 193 of the second Russian edition, we read:

First of all, a uniform military-technological policy is called upon to ensure the preferential development of those trends in scientific-technological progress in the military field which are capable of most fully and comprehensively solving the USSR's growing defense needs for effective means of conduct of modern combat operations. ***Along with the resolution of current problems, it orients scientific-technological cadres on the development of various long-term problems, the result of which may find broad application in future military affairs. Of particular importance is basic research aimed at discovering still unknown attributes of matter, phenomena, and the laws of nature, and developing new methods for their study and use to reinforce the state's defense capabilities.*** *[Emphasis added.]*

On page 152 of the American edition the passage in bold type has been replaced by sentences that convey a strikingly different thrust:

At the same time our party and the Soviet state consider that one of the major tasks (and it was once again stressed in the materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU) is the struggle to ban new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This is an important aim of military détente.

A particularly strident passage from page 7 of Marshal Grechko's Introduction has also been rewritten, perhaps because the original version rather sternly suggests that only unilateral arms efforts by the USSR—rather than negotiated mutual arms limitations—can secure deterrence of general war. The original read:

. . . the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed and as long as it exists, the threat of a new world war also persists. ***And there is no other guarantee in the world against its outbreak than strengthening the economic and defense might of the USSR and of all the states of the socialist community and raising the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces and of other fraternal armies.*** *[Emphasis added.]*

In the American edition (p. 4), the passage in bold type is replaced by a softer statement that does not explicitly preclude "other guarantees." Also excised from the American edition is a passage on page 115 in the civil defense section of the second Russian edition calling for "the systematic conduct of specialized exercises and practices which must be just as organized and planned in character as training in the army and navy."

In a rather different vein, VAAP apparently requested deletion (on page 195 of the second Russian edition) of an unusually specific passage from the section on prospects for future arms development calling for research to increase the sea endurance and diving depth of Soviet missile-launching nuclear submarines and to reduce their noise and radiation levels. The excision suggests Soviet reluctance to provide gratuitous confirmation for foreign readers of what are widely known to be deficiencies in the performance of Soviet nuclear submarines.

Since lead-times in book publication are long, updating has its perils as well. Two new anti-Chinese passages introduced in the version approved for the American edition (pp. 85, 347)—presumably in 1976, but before the death of Mao Tse-tung—are probably now regretted by Marshal Grechko's heirs and the military publishing house on whose behalf VAAP claimed to be acting.

WHILE THE MINUTIAE of Soviet text revision provide grist for the mill of Kremlinologists, yielding microscopic evidence of potentially significant changes in Soviet

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military affairs, for general readers the volumes under review are recommended primarily for the macroanalytical insights they offer into Soviet strategic policy. What is striking in this respect about both books—and about Soviet military literature generally—is the evidence they provide not of change but of continuity over the last decade and a half in basic attitudes toward nuclear war and policies to prepare for it. These attitudes appear to be fundamental elements in the belief system of the Soviet military and have been little affected by the appearance of new military technologies and alterations in the global military balance of power.

Entering the realm of Soviet military discourse, the uninitiated Western reader, whose own strategic mind-set has been formed by the highly sophisticated, technically elegant, and politically dispassionate Western theoretical literature, will find himself in an entirely different strategic universe. By comparison, the Soviet approach will appear simplistic, crude, and highly partisan. Indeed, it will seem terribly old-fashioned and strangely inappropriate for the nuclear age. It is the Soviet focus on *fighting* nuclear war and acquiring weapons and training forces to wage it that will appear most strangely out of phase to the Western reader, accustomed to thinking about nuclear conflict exclusively as a contingency to be deterred.

This focus on war-fighting is by no means inconsistent with deterrence of the enemy in the system of Soviet strategic thought. Unlike the sharp, often dogmatic distinction made between the two in Western analysis, deterrence of the opponent is subsumed under acquisition of superior war-fighting capabilities in the Soviet view. Similarly, no crisp distinction is drawn in Soviet military doctrine between countervalue and counterforce targets and strategies, *i.e.,* the enemy's industrial-administrative centers and his strategic offensive weapons alike are invariably included in a single integrated target system, the destruction of which must be promptly executed "by crushing nuclear blows . . . if [the enemy] forces the socialist countries to this" (pp. 289-91 of the Scott translation of Sokolovskiy).

This straightforward war-fighting approach to nuclear strategy does not necessarily imply a confident belief that "victory" in nuclear war is feasible (although the goal is repeatedly proclaimed), but it reflects a strong conviction that, whatever costs nuclear war might entail, strategic planning must be oriented toward prevailing in it, should it occur—not at carrying out one side of a mutual suicide pact with a perfidious enemy. Even if general nuclear war under all foreseeable circumstances is perceived as catastrophic and deterrence of such a war is the overriding purpose of Soviet strategic exertions, a sensible policy in the Soviet view must attempt to provide the offensive and defensive ingredients for conducting such a war, maximizing chances of national survival and securing the optimal outcome.

How this "unsophisticated" Soviet approach to nuclear-war-fighting affects Soviet strategic policy may perhaps be delineated most sharply by comparing the main features of Soviet and US strategic behavior. Since the mid-1960's, it has been consistent US national policy—if not always the practice in every detail of implementation—to favor programs that enhance American confidence in maintaining an "assured destruction" capability. The US has deliberately eschewed programs that offer serious prospects of attaining superiority via development of counterforce and damage-limiting capabilities. The possibility of achieving marginal advantages in such capabilities has evoked no enthusiasm, and the United States has concluded that against a determined and powerful opponent like the Soviet Union, a major effort to achieve clear-cut superiority would be unavailing, at best needlessly expensive and at worst dangerously provocative and destabilizing. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, appears deliberately to have chosen a course that leaves open the possibility of various forms of superiority, even if only marginal; it seems prepared to continue to work away at all of the operational problems of war-fighting, even in the absence of any assurance that they can be solved satisfactorily; and it has displayed no unilateral willingness to halt at a specified "end point." While such an orientation seems oddly at variance with American understanding of the logic of nuclear strategy, it is quite compatible not only with the war-fighting focus of Soviet strategic thought but also with the broader Soviet understanding of military competition as but one form of the long-term global political conflict that will endure so long as social systems inherently hostile to the USSR exist in powerful states.

Whether this war-fighting focus of Soviet strategic doctrine is intrinsically malevolent in purpose is a moot question. Certainly, the moral and ethical superiority of a doctrine that attaches strategic virtue to weapons for killing the

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enemy's unprotected people, while condemning weapons capable of disabling his protected means of mass destruction, is not self-evident.

But with respect to the prospects for finding some stable equilibrating mechanisms by which to manage the US Soviet strategic relationship, the divergent American and Soviet strategic mind-sets present a formidable barrier. As implied by Marshal Grechko's assertion that reliable deterrence can be provided only by strengthening Soviet military capabilities, arms control does not rank high in Soviet strategic thought as a means for safeguarding the security interests of the USSR. The reader will find not a single reference in the Grechko translation to the ABM treaty or to the interim US-Soviet agreement on limiting strategic offensive weapons, much less any suggestion that the USSR must unilaterally exercise restraint in its military programs in the interests of facilitating future arms control agreements. (In this respect, as in most others, the Grechko book is not atypical of Soviet military literature as a whole.) One looks in vain for evidence in Soviet pronouncements of sensitivity to the insecurity of others that the Soviet Union's own security programs may promote. On the contrary, the USSR's security tends to be viewed as synonymous with the insecurity of the potential enemy; indeed, the latter is expected to behave more "reasonably" only when the correlation of forces shifts in his disfavor.

In American strategic thought, the MAD standoff appears as the least miserable alternative in a dangerous world—a reasonable, if not altogether palatable, contract of mutually shared liability; in Soviet strategic thinking, it is an unconscionable mortgaging of the future to one's enemies. Unfortunately, the gap separating these two outlooks is less likely the consequence of a temporary "lag" in Soviet strategic sophistication than of profound differences between the political cultures of the two societies.

Détente and Soviet Dissidents

By Harvey Fireside

CORNELIA GERSTENMAIER, Ed. *Wladimir Bukowskij: Der Unbequeme Zeuge* (Vladimir Bukovskiy: The Embarrassing Witness). Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1972.
VIKTOR FAYNBERG. *Zapis besedy V.I. Faynberga s chlenami medkomissii v Leningradskoy spetspsikhbol'nitse* (Record of the Interview of V. I. Faynberg with Members of the Medical Commission in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital). Munich, Arkhiv Samizdata, 1974.
YAROSLAV BIHUN, Ed. *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*. Baltimore, MD, Smoloskyp Publishers, 1974.
EDWARD KUZNETSOV. *Prison Diaries*. New York, NY, Stein and Day Publishers, 1975.
LEONARD SCHROETER. *The Last Exodus*. New York, NY, Universe Books, 1974.
IRINA KIRK. *Profiles in Russian Resistance*. New York, NY, Quadrangle Books, 1975.

WESTERNERS who have followed the course of détente over the past six years have been shocked to learn that the lessening of tensions and the expansion of economic and cultural contacts between East and West have been accompanied within the Soviet Union by increasingly repressive behavior on the part of the regime toward its domestic critics. But the counterpoint of the Kremlin's friendly noises across international frontiers and harshness toward restless intellectuals, Jews, and other religious and ethnic minorities at home seems no accident and ought not to be very surprising. It reflects the hard-line Stalinist habit of denying the existence of indigenous causes for political discontent and blaming all disharmony on foreign agents and ideas. Thus, when strategic factors dictate a lowering of barriers against alien influences, the guard-

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ians of Communist orthodoxy step up efforts within the country to prevent the potential spread of infection from abroad among their subjects. Consequently, the advent of West Germany's *Ostpolitik* in 1969-70 marked the beginning of harsher days for the so-called dissidents, whose fortunes had crested during the period between the Andrey Sinyavsky-Yuli Daniel trial of 1966 and the demonstrations which took place in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. And shortly after the US-USSR Trade Agreement was drafted in 1972, CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Suslov felt obliged to warn that in an era of "peaceful coexistence" there would be no letup in the struggle between capitalism and communism "in the spheres of ideology, politics, and economics." [1]

Since Suslov's pronunciamento, measures taken by the Kremlin have threatened to make Soviet dissidents an extinct breed. Foremost among official tactics have been: (1) the forcible expulsion from the Soviet Union into exile of the most eloquent critics of the regime, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrey Amalrik, Leonid Plyushch, and Aleksandr Nekrich; (2) disruption of the publication of *The Chronicle of Current Events* from 1972 to 1975 and the increased suppression of all forms of *samizdat;* (3) the arrest of nationalist and religious leaders, particularly among Ukrainians, the Baltic peoples, Crimean Tatars, Baptists, and Buddhists; (4) the reduction of Jewish emigration in 1976 to one fourth of 1972-73 levels—a reduction which could be attributed only in part to diminished interest in moving to Israel; (5) the curtailment of public trials for dissidents and their replacement with forcible commitment to psychiatric prisons, as in the cases of such veteran critics as the electrician Vladimir Borisov and Doctor Mykola Plakhotnyuk; and (6) the application of intensified pressure on key dissenters—*e.g.,* Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin—to make them turn state's evidence and denounce former dissident comrades.

As a result of such measures, only the hardiest survivors of the protest movement of the 1960's retain the courage to speak out. An ever-dwindling number tries to maintain the existence of such organizations as the Committee on Human Rights, the embattled Moscow chapter of Amnesty International, and the group formed in 1975 to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord on security and cooperation in Europe. At times Andrey Sakharov appears to be the last angry man on the Soviet scene, kept on official display as a reminder of a vanished species. But he too has recently been subjected to increased harassment and pressure. Of late there have been more Soviet citizens expatiating on the defects of their society as exiles before Ivy League audiences in the United States than there have been describing the same defects to their own countrymen as dissenters within the Soviet Union. Several recent books remind us, however, that this has not been for want of trying.

THE COLLECTION of documents on Vladimir Bukovskiy by Cornelia Gerstenmaier yields the portrait of a brilliant young man whose passion for human rights resulted in his spending 11 of his 34 years in prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric hospitals until his dramatic release last December, in exchange for the Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalan Lepe. This book conveys the essence of Bukovskiy's story, from his first teenage brush with the authorities for publishing an underground student newspaper, through a 15-month commitment to psycho-prison for possessing "treasonous writings," to his trials for various dissidence-related offenses in 1967 and 1972. His experience constituted the political education of a typical dissident of the 1960's, a gifted offspring of the conformist urban intelligentsia. And yet his example seems typical only in retrospect, as others have tried to live up to his standard of courage to bear witness against official barbarism.

Bukovskiy's last arrest in March 1971, preparatory to his 1972 trial, signaled the onset of the Kremlin's sledgehammer treatment of political irritants which has continued up to the present time. His trial, a *samizdat* transcript of which constitutes the centerpiece of Gerstenmaier's study, was a farce. It soon became clear that the assorted charges brought against Bukovskiy—smuggling, spreading disaffection among the citizenry, and abetting anti-Soviet groups — related to KGB traps which Bukovskiy had avoided, and that his real crime—one which he argued infringed no law—was the transmission to Western psychiatrists of files dealing with dissidents forcibly confined in psycho-prisons.

Undaunted by denial of the services of his attorney for want of a proper clearance, Bukovskiy was prepared to conduct his own defense at the trial. But the judge denied all of his motions and

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 15, 1972.

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barred all witnesses who could have testified about the abysmal conditions which exist in the psycho-prisons where political critics are held until prevailed upon to renounce their "sick" convictions. The prosecutor, on the other hand, was allowed to mask his lack of evidence on the formal charges with a diatribe against the defendant borrowed from the pages of *Pravda*. Fully aware of what the outcome of the trial would be, Bukovskiy declared in his final plea:

I will fight for law and justice. I only regret that in the short time I have been at liberty—one year, two months, three days—I have done so little for that cause.

The maximum sentence for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code was meted out to Bukovskiy—two years in prison, five years in labor camp, and five years in exile. Prior to his release, his mother had reported that he was dying as a result of the starvation diet which he received and of the authorities' failure to treat his heart and eye ailments. Nevertheless, despite failing health, Bukovskiy has demonstrated an undiminished desire to help other political prisoners in the Soviet Union.

ONE OF THE witnesses barred from testifying at Bukovskiy's trial was the Leningrad philologist Viktor Faynberg. Arrested in 1968 for demonstrating in Red Square together with six others against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he was adjudged mentally ill—suffering from "reform delirium"—and committed to the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital. After being allowed to emigrate to Israel three years ago, he wrote an account for his interrogation in 1971 by a medical board.

Although weakened by four days of a hunger strike to protest brutal treatment, Faynberg managed to score all the debating points in his confrontation with the examining board. The examining board chairman, Professor Ruben Nadzharov, for example, denied Faynberg's charge that sadistic convicts were employed as attendants. And when a secret police colonel interjected, "Indeed, prisoners do work as attendants here," [2] Nadzharov changed the subject. Nevertheless, the four psychiatrists and two officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) conducting the examination had the last word, and they ordered Faynberg force-fed for the remaining 70 days of his hunger strike and returned to a regimen of mind-numbing drugs.

A puzzling impression which emerges from the exchanges which Faynberg recalls is the doctors' apparent lack of malice, their clinging to the conviction that they were running the best hospital under the circumstances, and that Faynberg, as a patient, could not offer professional criticism. This mixture of naiveté and mystification, though, evidently did not extend to the doctors' underlings. Faynberg cites a plainspoken medic who told him:

Your release is dependent on your behavior. And we know from your behavior just what your political views are. Your behavior is completely normal in every other respect. Your illness is heterodox thinking. As soon as you renounce your views and get back on the right track, we'll release you.

In fact, Faynberg's release, like Bukoxskiy's, resulted—a number of months later—in his departure from the Soviet Union.

A KINDRED spirit to Bukovskiy and Faynberg in steadfastness to the reform cause despite threats and agonies is the Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz, who has spent all but nine months of the past decade in prison for "thought crimes." Now 40 years old, and stricken by blood and liver ailments following an incredible 145-day hunger strike, he lingered near death in Vladimir Prison until his transfer last summer to a labor camp. The essays and poems of Moroz collected in the volume entitled *Boomerang*, edited by Yaroslav Bihun, chronicle Moroz's spiritual odyssey from the "nobody, an unknown history lecturer," he termed himself at the time of his first arrest in 1965 to a world-renowned symbol of nationalist resurgence against the conformity of mass society during his 1970 trial. The journey represented for him a "search for an answer to the question, 'Who am I?' "

Having shed his Marxist spectacles, Moroz turned his gaze to the simple nobility of Ukrainian villagers celebrating holidays with traditional folkways reflecting pre-Christian myths. What he saw was a lyrical evocation of the past being buried by the plastic artifacts of mass culture, which could have been American as well as Russian. Moroz challenged apathetic intellectuals and alienated masses alike to follow his beacon toward "spiritual salvation."

Quite a different air of ironic detachment animates the *Prison*

[2] Quotations from the Faynberg volume are from a translation prepared by Lowry Wyman at the Harvard University Russian Research Center.

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Diaries of Edward Kuznetsov, an organizer of the "Leningrad hijack plot" of June 1970, for which he was given a death sentence, commuted to 15 years in prison camp. Kuznetsov, a poet and philosopher, brings a low-keyed eloquence to his observations of camp life, writing without embellishment or political rhetoric. The prisoners have their share of sadists and toadies, he relates, the guards their share of simple humanitarians. When an officer asks why he should be expected to help Jews leave for Israel, when his own son might be fighting on the Arab side, Kuznetsov replies, "Oh, has your son come back from Czechoslovakia already?" Such mordant wit incenses the authorities, but it saves Kuznetsov from the desperate suicide attempts and self-mutilations of his campmates. Nevertheless, when a KGB captain threatens "to bend you till you're like putty in our hands," Kuznetsov betrays private doubts about how much longer he can drag himself to work, wracked by the pain of an untreated stomach ulcer. But he resolves to be one of the last to resist the pressure for "reeducation," and to be obdurate in his "noncreative attitude to heavy physical labor."

The circumstances that drove Kuznetsov's group to its hijack escape attempt despite the near certainty of failure are explored in Leonard Schroeter's *The Last Exodus*. Schroeter is an American lawyer now resident in Israel. He submits a brief for Soviet Jews trying to retrieve their religious and cultural identity following the 1967 Middle East war. Although he claims to have interviewed many Jewish émigrés, the bulk of his material is from *samizdat* publications. His attempt to identify Jewish activists in every corner of the USSR and his reliance on their manifestos lead him to overstate the magnitude of the movement, which is concentrated in the major cities, the western areas annexed during World War II, and Georgia, and to understate the degree to which the majority of Jews have assimilated. While the sheer weight of the evidence presented by Schroeter attesting to harassment by police and visa officials is staggering, it does not quite seem to warrant his conclusion that "perhaps as many as two thirds" of the Jews who still live in the Soviet Union are ready to depart.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL forces that drive some Soviet citizens into "internal emigration," then to escape abroad are more fully analyzed by Irina Kirk in *Profiles in Russian Resistance*. The émigrés whom she sought out in Europe, Israel, and the United States were predominantly Jewish, areligious, youthful intellectuals. Their generational trauma dated from revelations of Josef Stalin's crimes by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 and 1961, which suddenly explained the mysterious disappearance of family members who had vanished during the purges of the 1930's. The émigrés' individual childhood scars included such chilling experiences as seeing a straggler in a prisoner convoy try to snatch a dead cat from a yard for his dinner.

The 17 interviews of which the book is comprised vary in the intensity of the disaffection they express with the Soviet system and in the gloom or optimism they project for its liberalization. For many of the émigrés questioned, conversion to dissident causes was the result of personal accident rather than ideological conviction. Thus, Alla Tsvetopol'skaya, who was asked to become the pen pal of some prisoners, recounts:

Until I began to write those letters, I was very far from any Democratic Movement. I knew about those courageous people and admired them from a distance. One has to be very noble and brave and totally selfless to express protest openly in the Soviet Union, knowing that society will never support it, that it would only mean loss of work, searches, arrests, and—the most frightening of all—the insane asylum. When I met these people it turned out that they were very simple, unpretentious people, at times weak and helpless.

Yuri Glazov states simply: "the dissenters in the Soviet Union are the only thinking members of society."

Analysts of the future may well boggle at the problem of calculating the scale of the losses which the Soviet Union has sustained by driving some 100,000 of its nonconformists out in the past five years and by silencing other thousands in its prison camps and asylums. For analysts of the present, however, the main problem stems from dealing with "a country," as Sakharov has characterized his homeland, "where anything that happens may be shielded from outside eyes—a masked country that hides its real face." [3] Keeping better abreast of the nature of what is happening behind the Soviet "mask," without trying to measure with accuracy the scale of what is happening, may be all that we can expect for the time being.

[3] See Anthony Astrachan, "Détente and Dissent," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Sept. 22, 1973, p. 18.

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